Irony in a second language: exploring the comprehension of Japanese speakers of English by Togame, Naoko
		
	
"Irony in a Second Language: 
exploring the comprehension of Japanese speakers of 
English" 
 
 
 
Naoko TOGAME 
 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement 
for the degree of PhD 
 
Middlesex University 
March 2016  
 
i	
	
ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the extent to which non-native speakers of English understand 
potentially ironic utterances in a similar way to native speakers. Barbe (1995: 4) sees 
irony as one of ‘the final obstacles before achieving near native-speaker fluency.’ This 
assumption is supported by the findings of earlier studies (Bouton 1999, Lee 2002; 
Manowong 2011; Yamanaka 2003) which assumed a Gricean framework seeing irony 
as communicating the ‘opposite of what is said’ (Grice 1975, 1978). This thesis adopts 
instead the relevance-theoretic account of irony as echoic (Sperber and Wilson 1995; 
Wilson and Sperber 2012), arguing that previous work suffers from both problematic 
theoretical assumptions and flawed experimental methods. 
The thesis reports the findings of two experiments designed to examine similarities 
and differences between the responses of non-native speakers of English (here Japanese 
speakers) and native speakers and how similar or different the effects of prosody are for 
these groups. The first experiment, conducted by an online survey, provided surprising 
results, suggesting that Japanese speakers can respond to potentially ironical utterances 
similarly to native speakers. The second experiment, focusing on the effects of prosody, 
compared the groups with regard to response trends. Three prosodic contours were used 
in this study, labelled ‘basic’ (a kind of default, unmarked tone), ‘deadpan’ (with a 
narrower pitch range), and ‘exaggerated’ (with a wider pitch range). The results 
indicated that Japanese participants could perceive English prosodic structure in similar 
ways to native speakers and were affected by prosodic contours in similar ways. It also 
suggested that Japanese participants were affected less strongly by ‘exaggerated’ 
intonation and slightly more strongly by ‘deadpan’ tones. These findings suggest that a 
relevance-theoretic framework provides the means to carry out fuller investigations than 
carried out previously and to develop a more systematic explanation of the 
understanding of irony in a second language. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The present study 
The goal of the present study is to contribute to understanding of how second language 
speakers (in this case, Japanese speakers of English) understand potentially ironic 
utterances. It applies the echoic account of irony1 developed within relevance theory 
(Sperber 1984; Sperber and Wilson 1981,1995; 1998; Wilson 2006, 2009, 2013, 2014a; 
Wilson and Sperber 2012) which assumes that what has been termed ‘verbal irony’ 
involves the implicit attribution of thoughts from which communicators implicitly 
dissociate themselves. On this view, irony is not a clear-cut, easily definable 
phenomenon. Rather, interpretations can be understood as more or less clearly falling 
within this characterisation. Utterances are not either ironic or not. Instead, they are 
more or less likely to be interpreted as implicitly attributive with an implicit dissociative 
attitude. The thesis explores aspects that make it more or less likely that first language 
(here, British English) speakers and second language (here, Japanese) speakers interpret 
utterances in this way. Most previous studies have not adopted a relevance-theoretic 
approach and have focused on response ‘accuracy’ (assuming that there is a ‘correct’ 
response regarding whether an utterance is understood as ironic, and also assuming that 
the responses of first language speakers are always ‘correct’ in this sense). This study 
focuses instead on a comparison of response trends and processing speed. It is the first 
study to compare non-native speakers’ response trends in preference for ironical 
interpretations and processing speed with those of native speakers. 
This study takes a relevance-theoretic approach and aims to shed new light on 
research on L2 irony comprehension. It discusses the nature of irony, contrasting the 
relevance theoretic account of irony to Grice’s (1975,1978), which most of the previous 
																																								 																				
1 I use ‘echoic account of irony’ and ‘relevance-theoretic account’ interchangeably throughout this thesis unless 
otherwise indicated. 
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studies (Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; Lee 2002; 
Manowong 2011) applied to their investigations. In these studies, the nature of L2 irony 
comprehension was discussed by describing culture-dependent differences in 
contextualisation and their reflections in pragmatic strategies for interpretation. By 
contrast, this study shows that a relevance-theoretic account of irony makes it possible 
to provide systematic explanation of the nature of L2 irony comprehension involving 
interaction between social cognition and culture. 
Theoretical discussions also show that the relevance-theoretic approach gives a 
fuller account of ironical interpretation. One crucial difference with the Gricean 
approach is that this approach does not treat interpretation or the identification of the 
speaker’s intention in potentially ironic utterances in a clear-cut way, in other words as 
either ironic or not. Hence, the present study explores the extent to which two different 
groups (of Japanese speakers and British English speakers) respond in similar way by 
looking into what aspects of an utterance give rise to an ironic interpretation rather than 
interpreting a given utterance ironically or not. As indicated in the theoretical discussion 
in chapter 2, clearly there might be a number of other factors involving linguistic, 
cultural and cognitive aspects that lead to differences between non-native speakers and 
native speakers in how they understand irony. The present study investigated non-native 
speakers’ recognition of prosodic cues as a first step towards better understanding of L2 
irony comprehension mechanisms. Applying suggestions from the relevance-theoretic 
account of irony, two experiments were conducted to investigate a) understanding of the 
ironic speaker’s attitude; and b) recognition of prosodic cues. The empirical evidence 
did not support the findings of previous studies (Bromberek-Dyzman and Ewert 2010; 
Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; Lee 2002; Manowong 
2011; Shively, Menke, and Manzón-Omundson 2008; Yamanaka 2003) that second 
language speakers have difficulties in interpreting potentially ironic utterances. The 
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responses of both groups showed that ironic interpretations were predicted according to 
how the speaker’s tone of voice interacts with aspects of the context, and that similar 
interaction effects were found between Japanese speakers and native speakers. The 
experimental work reported here suggests the conclusion that Japanese speakers can 
infer the ironic speaker’s attitude in a similar way to native speakers. Nevertheless, 
Japanese speakers and native speakers demonstrated a slightly different tendency to the 
particular prosodic contours often described as ‘exaggerated (imitation of) tone of 
voice’ (Capelli, Nakagawa, and Madden 1990; Clark and Gerrig 1984; Wilson and 
Sperber 2012; Wilson 2013, 2014a; Winner 1988). This experimental work suggests 
that irony comprehension mechanisms may operate in a similar way in L1 and L2. This 
suggests that the pragmatic principles proposed by relevance theory are universal to 
some extent. 
1.2 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 discusses pragmatic theories of irony in 
general (i.e. in a first language). It compares the echoic account of verbal irony2 
developed within relevance theory with Grice’s account, highlighting key differences 
between these two accounts. It focuses on how the echoic account explains irony with 
reference to its nature and to the interpretation processes involved in understanding it. 
The echoic account rejects a central claim of the traditional approaches (that ironical 
utterances communicate the ‘opposite’ of the literal meaning) and suggests instead that 
irony involves an implicitly expressed speaker’s dissociative attitude towards an 
implicitly attributed thought or utterance. The echoic account suggests that ironical 
utterances are intended to draw the audience’s attention to a discrepancy between the 
reality (a state of affairs) and expectations of the world (Wilson and Sperber 2012:125- 
																																								 																				
2 I used the term ‘verbal irony’ and ‘irony’ interchangeably unless otherwise indicated. 
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6). It argues that no substitution mechanism is required for ironic interpretation: an 
audience applies the ‘relevance-guided comprehension heuristic’ proposed by relevance 
theory (Sperber and Wilson 2002; Wilson 2014b; Wilson and Sperber 2002; see also 
Clark 2013) to processes of hypothesis construction and evaluation about the speaker’s 
meaning. Interpretation as the result of ‘following a path of least effort’ will vary from 
occasion to occasion and from individual to individual; an utterance may be understood 
as ironic on one occasion by one individual and it may be not or less so on another 
occasion or for another individual. This chapter also considers how prosody contributes 
to guiding audiences to interpret a potentially ironic speaker’s meaning. The ironic 
speaker may provide ‘additional’ cues when she doubts the hearer’s ability to recognise 
her intention using background knowledge alone (Wilson and Sperber 2012) and the 
speaker’s tone of voice often serves as a contextual cue (Ackerman 1983; Capelli et al. 
1990; Cutler 1974, 1976; Kreuz and Roberts 1995; Pexman 2008). It considers findings 
from experimental studies on the role of prosody/the speaker’s tone of voice, which 
suggested that prosodic cues lead to ironic interpretation both independently and in 
interaction with other cues in some contexts (Ackerman 1983; Bryant and Fox Tree 
2002; Capelli et al. 1990; Creusere 1999: de Groot, Kaplan, Rosenblatt, Dews and 
Winner 1995; Dews, Winner, Kaplan, Rosenblatt, Hunt, Lim, McGovern, Qualter, and 
Smarsh 1996; Keenan and Quigley 1999; Happé 1995; Laval and Bert-Erboul 2005; 
Nakassis and Snedeker 2002; Rockwell 2000; Woodland and Voyer 2011). Prosody 
assumed to lead to potentially ironic interpretation has been widely referred to using the 
term ‘ironical tone of voice.’ Although there have been attempts to explore vocal 
features of ‘ironical tone of voice’ (Anolli, Ciceri, and Infantino 2000, 2002; Bryant 
2010, 2011, 2012; Cheang and Pell 2007; Bryant and Fox-Tree 2002, 2005; Laval and 
Bert-Erboul 2005; Milosky and Ford 1997; Rockwell 2000, 2007; Séguin 2007; 
Scharrer and Christmann 2011; Shapley 1987; Voyer and Techentin 2010), each study 
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reported mixed results regarding each acoustic dimension (pitch, tempo, and intensity). 
Some studies raised an objection to the notion that there is consistency in vocal features 
of an ‘ironic tone of voice’3 (Bryant 2010, 2011, 2012; Bryant and Fox-Tree 2002, 
2005; Voyer and Techentin 2010). This study takes these findings and suggestions into 
account and suggests that prosodic features that potentially guide a hearer to ironic 
interpretations may vary depending on the context of the utterance and attitudes that the 
speaker intends to express. 
Chapter 3 discusses previous studies on irony understanding in a second language. 
It discusses suggestions made by previous studies (Bromberek-Dyzman and Ewert 
2010; Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; Lee 2002; 
Manowong 2011; Shively et al. 2008; Yamanaka 2003) looking closely at two points: 1) 
how second language speakers understand irony; and 2) what factors may contribute to 
a difference between first language speakers and second language speakers in ironic 
interpretation. Previous studies that were conducted within the theoretical framework of 
Grice’s account of irony (Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; 
Lee 2002; Manowong 2011; Yamanaka 2003) suggested that cultural variations 
manifest themselves in context construction and inferential strategies (Bouton 1988, 
1990, 1992b, 1994a). In light of findings from earlier studies (Bouton 1988, Devine 
1982; Keenan 1976), Bouton raised questions about Grice’s pragmatic principles as the 
‘structure’ of all languages and his maxims as universal rules of conversations. Some 
previous studies (Bouton 1992a, 1994a, 1999; Yamanaka 2003) found that the growth 
of general language proficiency and of time spent in the target language culture 
appeared to have no or little effect on development of the ability to understand irony, 
Bouton (1994b, 1999) suggested a ‘semantic reversal formula’ for the interpretation of 
irony and claimed to show that explicit instruction was effective in speeding up 
																																								 																				
3 In the literature, ‘ironical tone of voice’ and ‘ironic tone of voice’ are used interchangeably. 
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development of this ability. Other studies, adopting a relevance-theoretic account of 
irony, suggested that the cognitive comprehension mechanisms involved in L1 and L2 
may not be different (Bromberek-Dyzman and Ewert 2010) and that, unlike for native 
speakers, access to more contextual sources did not necessarily help L2 learners of 
Spanish understand the ironic speaker’s intentions (Shively et al. 2008). While taking 
culture-dependent differences and second language speakers’ awareness of prosodic 
cues into account, this study argues that ironic interpretation is not governed by a 
semantic reversal formula. It points out issues arising from both weaknesses of Grice’s 
approach to irony and the nature of sociopragmatic approaches to interlanguage 
pragmatic competence. Within a relevance-theoretic approach to irony, this study 
suggests that second language speakers’ irony understanding should not be explored by 
assessing the ability to recognise the opposite of what the speaker said, but by looking 
into the extent to which they understand the speaker’s attitude. 
Chapter 4 suggests some new possible directions for empirical work on second 
language interpretation in general and on the interpretation of potentially ironic 
utterances in particular. Previous studies discussed culture-dependent differences as a 
key factor affecting ironic interpretations from a sociopragmatic perspective. There is 
no reason to deny the importance of a sociopragmatic approach. However, the 
descriptions in these studies seem to be arbitrary and not to be applied systematically to 
other instances where cultural variation manifests itself. This chapter aims to 
complement such approaches with a cognitive approach in order to move towards a 
more systematic explanation of how culture influences the interpretation of potentially 
ironic utterances. Adopting ideas from a relevance-theoretic perspective, this chapter 
reconsiders aspects of culture and explains how cultural differences affect the 
construction and access of contextual assumptions in ways that lead to L2 
interpretations which are different from those of native speakers. This chapter surveys 
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and reviews studies that have considered cognitive aspects with reference to universality 
and cultural relativity in the recognition of emotion from prosodic contours and with 
regard to working memory capacity in relation to L2 processing and outcomes. While 
these two factors, the recognition of prosodic cues (Lee 2002; Manowong 2011; 
Yamanaka 2003) and differences with regard to the (more limited) capacity of working 
memory (Shively et al. 2008), have been mentioned as factors potentially affecting 
second language speakers’ irony interpretations, they have not been fully explored. 
Some studies (Elfenbein and Ambady 2002a, 2002b, 2002c; Pell, Monetta, Paulmann 
and Kotz 2009; Paulmann and Uskul 2014) showed that particular basic emotions 
expressed from the speaker’s voice are recognised across human cultures. This was 
taken to indicate that ‘inference rules’ for vocal emotion recognition are innately shared 
across human cultures (Pell, Monetta, Paulmann and Kotz, 2009:519). If such ‘inference 
rules’ are indeed universal, it seems plausible to think that second language speakers 
may recognise the ironic speaker’s attitude expressed by means of particular prosodic 
contours. If not, this might be a potential factor that affects second language speaker’s 
understanding of irony. It also considers findings that suggest possible relationships 
between L2 processing and the capacity of working memory. If less automatic 
processing of linguistic inputs makes greater cognitive demands on second language 
speakers, then this may also be a factor leading to different interpretations.  
Chapter 5 reports the empirical work of the present study which aims to take some 
first steps in one of the directions discussed in the preceding chapter, investigating the 
role of prosodic cues in guiding the interpretations of Japanese speakers of English as a 
second language. The results seem to confirm the hypothesis that Japanese speakers 
understand the ironic speaker’s attitude in a similar way to native speakers. Two 
experiments were conducted with the aim of exploring the fundamental question of the 
extent to which non-native speakers understand ironical utterances in the same way as 
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native speakers. The first experiment (an ‘Internet survey’) investigated the research 
question ‘to what extent do Japanese speakers understand the speaker’s intention of 
potentially ironical utterances in the same way as native speakers when a stimulus is 
presented in texts?’ by distributing questionnaires on the Internet. This experiment 
provided surprising evidence, suggesting that in fact Japanese non-native speakers of 
English can respond to potentially ironical utterances in a similar way to native speakers 
of English. The second experiment (a laboratory experiment) investigated the second 
research question: ‘to what extent does the interaction of tone of voice with context 
guide Japanese speaker to potentially ironic interpretation in the same way as native 
speakers?’ by comparing response trends and processing speed with regard to which 
condition guides addressees towards an ironic interpretation. While a slightly different 
tendency to react to ‘exaggerated tone’ was observed between the two sample groups, 
Japanese speakers of English appeared to be able to perceive English prosodic structure 
in similar ways to native speakers in overall terms. 
Chapter 6 presents a general discussion summarising the findings of the two 
experiments and the theoretical discussion in the preceding chapters. A significant 
finding of the present study is that Japanese speakers of English can recognise the 
speaker’s dissociative attitude indicated by prosodic contours in a similar way to native 
speakers, which indicates the possibility that English verbal irony is understood cross- 
linguistically and cross-culturally. Findings of the present study highlight that a 
relevance-theoretic framework has provided scope for a fuller investigation and more 
systematic explanation of irony understanding in a second language than previous 
studies. The question of whether observed differences in the effects of an ‘exaggerated 
tone’ are a reflection of cultural variability has not been explored fully in the present 
study. It would be interesting to explore the implications of this work for understanding 
linguistic and cultural influences on the recognition of prosodic information. The 
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present study is a first step in exploring L2 irony comprehension, which seems to be a 
very complex, ‘tangled web’ phenomenon in which linguistic, cultural, social and 
cognitive aspects are involved. The challenge remains for future research to explore 
possible factors and to investigate situations where such factors affect the interpretation 
processes of ironical utterances. 
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CHAPTER 2 IRONY IN L1 CONTEXTS 
2.1. Overview 
This chapter discusses how irony comprehension (in a first language) has been explored 
within the echoic account of irony (Sperber 1984; Sperber and Wilson 1998; Wilson 
2006, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014a; Wilson and Sperber 1992, 2012), which this study 
adopts as a theoretical framework. The echoic account of irony claims that verbal irony 
is a vehicle for expressing implicitly the speaker’s dissociative attitude towards a 
thought that the speaker tacitly attributes to others. A key claim of the echoic account is 
that irony is not a natural kind, i.e. that it is not an easily definable phenomenon.  
This chapter contrasts this account with a much less developed account, the Gricean 
approach (1975, 1978), which is adopted by many of the previous studies on L2 irony 
comprehension. In a Gricean account, irony is taken as communicating the opposite of 
what the speaker has said. The processes of an utterance as ironic is seen as being 
triggered by a blatant violation of the maxim of quality and this gives rise to another 
related proposition that is ‘the contradictory of the one he purports to be putting forward 
(Grice 1975:53)’. The echoic account rejects this idea and suggests instead, that ironical 
utterances echo a thought or an utterance attributed to specific people, or to people in 
general. The echoic account does not see irony as a special case of language use, 
suggesting that irony does not need to be taught or learned. According to the echoic 
account, no substitution mechanism is required for the comprehension of irony. Ironic 
interpretation involves cognitive mechanisms generally used in language 
comprehension, guided by the ‘relevance-guided comprehension heuristic.’  
This chapter also discusses what has been considered a characteristic tone of voice 
which serves as a natural but optional cue to the speaker’s communicative intention. 
This has been often referred to as ‘ironical tone of voice.’ In the fields of psychology 
and developmental studies numerous experiments (Ackerman 1983; Bryant & Fox Tree 
11		
2002; Capelli, Nakagawa, and Madden 1990; Creusere 1999, 2002; de Groot, Kaplan, 
Rosenblatt, Dews & Winner 1995; Dews, Winner, Kaplan, Rosenblatt, Hunt, Lim, 
McGovern, Qualter, and Smarsh 1996; Keenan & Quigley 1999; Happé 1995; Laval & 
Bert-Erboul 2005; Nakassis & Snedeker 2002; Rockwell 2000; Rosenblatt, Swinney, 
Gardner, and Winner 1987; Woodland & Voyer 2011) have carried out and provided 
evidence for contributions of the speaker’s characteristic tone of voice to irony 
comprehension. On the other hand, the detailed prosodic features of ‘ironical tone of 
voice’ are hard to pin down. There has been little agreement on prosodic features or 
acoustic features that systematically give rise more strongly to potentially ironic 
interpretation. Some studies (Bryant and Fox Tree 2002, 2005) have pointed out that the 
term ‘ironical tone of voice’ has been used loosely and argued that ‘there is no 
particular ironic tone of voice (Bryant and Fox-Tree 2005:257). They suggest that if 
there is no consistency in its systematic voice features, it should not be termed as 
‘ironical tone of voice’. This chapter surveys and discusses the findings from the 
experimental studies on a characteristic tone of voice which are associated with ironical 
utterances. This gives a direction to the empirical work of this study, which investigates 
how second language speakers recognise prosodic cues in ironical utterances. The 
present study considers that the type of tone in which ironical utterances can be 
produced may be varied. 
This chapter is organised as follows: the next section presents some of the insights 
yielded by Wilson and Sperber’s echoic account (2012) for irony (in a first language). 
In the literature on verbal irony, there is a vast number of theories of irony (for a brief 
summary, see Gibbs and Colston 2007:3-21).  Each theory accounts for the nature, 
features, functions and comprehension of verbal irony and not all of the theories 
consider verbal irony as echoing a thought attributed to others. For example, some of 
them still treat irony as a ‘trope’, or others consider it a figure of speech, a type of 
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‘negation’, a kind of  ‘inappropriateness,’ a ‘violation of the Quality maxim’, a violation 
of ‘graded salience’, an ‘insincere speech act’, a type of ‘pretense’, a ‘reminder,’ an 
‘echoic allusion,’ and a ‘miscommunication’.4 A full discussion of each theory is 
beyond the scope of this thesis and it is not part of the aims of this study. Instead, this 
section focuses on two theories, namely the echoic account of irony and Grice’s 
approach to irony (1975, 1978), which relate to the aims of the present study. Most of 
the previous studies (Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1992a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; 
Devine 1982; Lee 2003) have applied Grice’s inferential approach to communication, 
Cooperative Principle and maxims, and his idea of ‘conversational implicature’ to their 
investigations of non-native speakers’/second language speakers’ pragmatic ability to 
understand the speaker’s implied meaning. The present study argues that problems with 
previous studies arise largely from their theoretical assumptions. This section first 
discusses Grice’s approach to irony. Then, it presents the insights of the echoic account 
by starting with the relevance-theoretic idea of ‘interpretive use of language.’ Next, it 
looks closely at the nature of irony and echoic features of irony. It discusses how claims 
differ from each other, highlighting ways in which the echoic account gives fuller 
explanations than Gricean accounts. This section ends by discussing the interpretation 
of potentially ironical utterances based on the ‘relevance-guided comprehension 
heuristic’. 
Section 2.3 considers the ‘ironical tone of voice.’ This section starts by discussing 
how prosody contributes to the speaker’s meaning. Then, it focuses on the notion of a 
characteristic tone of voice. It looks closely at its role in guiding hearers towards 
																																								 																				
4 See Clark and Gerrig (1984) on Pretense Theory, Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989) on Echoic Reminder 
Theory, Martin (1992), Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg, and Brown (1995) for Allusional Pretense Theory, 
Giora and Fein, (1998) and Giora, Fein and Schwartz (1998) for irony as graded salience and indirect 
negation, Colston (2000) for intentional violation of Gricean conversational maxims, Anolli, Infantino, and 
Ciceri (2002) for irony as miscommunication Attardo (2001) for irony as inappropriateness, Utsumi (2000a) 
for Implicit Display Theory, Partington (2007) for irony as reversal of evaluation, Pálinkás (2014) for irony 
as a matter of thought, Garmendia (2011, 2015) for Asif Theory; see also Martin (1992), Barbe (1995), Yus 
(1998, 2000), Seto (1998), Clift (1999), Curcó (2000), Gibbs and Colston (2007), Garmendia (2010, 2013, 
2014), Dynel (2013, 2014), Popa-Wyatt (2014). 
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potentially ironical interpretation and presents how the echoic account explains the 
‘ironical tone of voice’ as one of the distinctive features of irony which differentiate 
irony from other type of figurative language (e.g. metaphor). It also summarises 
empirical evidence for prosodic contributions to potentially ironical interpretations. 
Next, it discusses experimental studies which highlight that vocal features of the 
‘ironical tone of voice’ are diverse (Anolli, Ciceri, and Infantino 20005, 2002; Bryant 
2010, 2011, 2012; Cheang and Pell 2007; Bryant and Fox-Tree 2002, 2005; Laval and 
Bert-Erboul 20056; Milosky and Ford 1997; Rockwell 2000, 2007; Séguin 2007; 
Scharrer and Christmann 20117; Shapley 1987; Voyer and Techentin 2010). Because of 
variety in prosodic features of the speaker’s characteristic tone reported in those studies, 
use of the term ‘ironical tone of voice’ has been challenged in the literature (Bryant & 
Fox Tree 2002, 2005). The focus here is on debate about whether there is a particular set 
of acoustic features that can systematically apply to different ironical utterances used on 
different occasions. The section concludes by explaining assumptions made in the 
present study with regard to the notion of a characteristic tone of voice and features of 
prosodic contours in potentially ironical utterances. 
2.2 The echoic account of irony 
2.2.1. The Gricean approach to irony 
This section presents how Grice (1975, 1978)) treated verbal irony within his approach, 
based on his Cooperative Principle and maxims for communication. 
Grice never proposed a model or a theory of irony per se. In fact, he made only a 
few comments on irony in his William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University 
in 1967, which were widely shared as photocopies before finally being published, 
beginning with the paper ‘Logic and conversation’ in 1978. His main claim here was 
																																								 																				
5 This study was conducted by using native speakers of Italian and a material in Italian. 
6 Participants in the study of Laval and Bert-Erboul (2005) were native speakers of French. 
7 The study of Scharrer and Christmann tested performances of native speakers of German on German ironic 
criticism. 
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that the interpretation of an utterance as ironic was triggered by a blatant violation of the 
maxim of quality which gives rise to the assumption of a related proposition that is ‘the 
contradictory of the one he purports to be putting forward (Grice 1975:53). Grice’s 
notion of the speaker’s blatant flout is based on his Cooperative Principle and the 
maxims for communication. He (Grice 1975, 1978) proposed an inferential model of 
communication, claiming that communication, both verbal and non-verbal, involves the 
expression and recognition of intentions: the speaker provides ‘evidence’ of her 
intention to convey a certain meaning and the hearer will infer this intended meaning 
based on the evidence provided. Grice (1978) suggested that the speaker’s intended 
meaning was not recovered by decoding but inferred by ‘a process of hypothesis 
formation and evaluation’ (Wilson 1994). A rational inference involves making 
logically possible hypotheses about the speaker’s intention through linguistic decoding 
and contextual assumptions, and choosing the best hypothesis by evaluation based on a 
Co-operative principle of communication and maxims of truthfulness, informativeness, 
relevance, and clarity which speakers are expected to obey. Thus, any hypotheses that 
do not satisfy these expectations can be automatically ignored. In other words, the 
hearer should choose the hypothesis that best satisfies these expectations. Grice 
suggested that communication or ‘what is communicated’ consists of two aspects: ‘what 
is said’ by an utterance (what proposition was explicitly expressed) and ‘what is 
implicated.’ Recovery of ‘what is said’ involves knowledge of linguistic meaning, 
disambiguation and reference assignment, which Grice did not assume was governed by 
the maxims. On the other hand, according to Grice, ‘what is implicated’ comprises 
‘conventional implicature’ and ‘conversational implicature.’ In his model, while 
‘conventional implicatures’ are encoded by linguistic expressions and their recovery 
does not involve the context and inference, ‘conversational implicatures’ are all context-
dependent and recovery of ‘conversational implicatures’ involves maxims of 
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conversation. Grice also claimed that the speaker can deliberately violate a maxim to 
communicate something more than what was said. According to him, ironic 
interpretation involves such a blatant flout of the Maxim of the quality at the level of 
‘what is said.’  
Grice (1975, 1978) reanalysed the figurative meanings of tropes as ‘conversational 
implicatures,’ with their interpretations seen as highly context-dependent. Based on the 
idea that there is a sharp distinction between ‘literal’ utterances and ‘non-literal’ 
utterances, he claimed that the speaker of utterances of varieties of figurative language 
has said (or ‘made as if to say’) something which is blatantly false. He continued to 
suggest that such a blatant violation of the Maxim triggers interpretation processes 
leading to the recovery of an implicature. The hearer, assuming that the speaker is 
obeying the Cooperative Principle, looks for an alternative interpretation, in other words 
a ‘related proposition’. Grice suggested that the related proposition was different 
depending on the type of trope, i.e. different for each of irony, metaphor, hyperbole, and 
meiosis, but that the nature of the inferential processes involved in understanding 
figurative utterances was the same for each type. In the case of irony, the speaker 
blatantly violates the first maxim of quality (do not say what you believe to be false) 
and implicates a related proposition, communicating the opposite of what the speaker 
said. The speaker of a metaphorical utterance implicates a related proposition which is a 
related simile or comparison (Wilson 2014a: Clark 2013:254, 283). Here is the example 
of irony introduced by Grice (1975:53): 
(X has betrayed a secret of his close friend A to a business rival. A said to his 
audience who knows what X has done to A,) 
A: X is a fine friend. 
Grice (1975:53) suggested that it is perfectly obvious to both A (the speaker) and A’s 
audience (the hearer/s) that ‘what A has made as if to say is something he does not 
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believe.’ His audience knows that A has blatantly violated the maxim of quality and that 
his blatant violation is deliberate, and constructs an implicature, which is that X is not a 
fine friend. His audience then assumes that A must intend to get across some 
proposition other than ‘what he has said or has made as if to say’ (1975:53). The other 
proposition, which Grice described here as ‘the most obviously related proposition 
(1975:53),’ is the contradictory or the opposite of what A said. Therefore, the hearer 
expects to consider a literal interpretation first. It is only when the literal interpretation 
turns out to be blatantly false that the hearer starts looking for possible figurative 
interpretations. Thus, for Grice, the proposition communicated by irony is ‘the 
contradictory of the one he purports to be putting forward,’ and ironic interpretations are 
like interpretations of other tropes, depending on the hearer’s ability to recognise the 
speaker’s deliberate and blatant violation while he assumes that the speaker is being 
cooperative. Recovery of an implicature may be triggered by this recognition and the 
hearer tries to look for meaning substitution in order to recover the speaker’s intended 
meaning.  
Grice (1978:124) also discussed the ironic speaker’s attitude by introducing another 
example, which he saw as problematic for his account: 
An and B are walking down the street, and they both see a car with a shattered 
window. B says, Look, that car has all its windows intact. A is baffled. B says, 
You didn’t catch on; I was in an ironical way drawing your attention to the 
broken window. (Grice 1978:124) 
Grice (1978) acknowledged that something was missing from his earlier analysis of 
irony (1975). He claimed that, while meeting all the conditions for irony that he 
proposed, the speaker ‘say or makes as if to say’ something blatantly false intending to 
implicate the opposite, there is no irony in this example. Grice (1978) suggested that it 
needed to involve the speaker’s expression of a characteristic attitude. Uttering this 
sentence without expression of such attitude was absurd, and Grice suggested that irony 
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‘intimately’ involves the expression of a feeling, attitude, or evaluation. What is needed 
to get this example to be taken as irony is, Grice suggested (1978:124), reflection of a 
‘hostile or derogatory judgement or a feeling such as indignation or contempt.’ He did 
not discuss the ironic speaker’s attitude further. Grice did not fully discuss the question 
of whether a specific tone, the ‘ironic tone’ must accompany an ironical remark. He 
assumed that ‘an ironic tone is always a contemptuous tone, or an amused tone, or some 
other tone connected with one or more particular feelings or attitude (1978:124).’ He 
only suggested a possibility that if such contemptuous or amused tone was associated 
with a remark that is blatantly false, then that remark would indicate the opposite. 
Grice’s theory of the Cooperative Principle and Maxims was a step towards a 
genuinely explanatory account in which pragmatically derived implicatures account for 
figurative meanings. In classical rhetoric where verbal irony was defined as a trope, it 
was considered that irony involved deviations from the norm, and was governed by 
apparently arbitrary rhetorical rules or conventions. Rhetoricians treated verbal irony as 
a decorative way of literally saying one thing and figuratively meaning the opposite. 
Traditional approaches to verbal irony in the field of linguistics regarded irony in a 
similar way to classical rhetoric. Interpretation of irony was assigned by the grammar 
and involved ‘semantic reversal’ that is, literally saying one thing and figuratively 
meaning the opposite. Instead, Grice claimed that interpretations of tropes could not be 
dealt with by grammatical or semantic rules. As discussed above, for Grice the 
interpretation of an ironical utterance was pragmatically inferred. However, his 
suggestion about ‘what is implicated,’ in other words ‘conversational implicature,’ in 
the case of irony was not different from the one suggested by classical rhetoric and 
traditional approaches, in that it preserved the idea that the pragmatically inferred 
meanings of ironical utterances were the opposite of what the speaker said. This 
indicates, as Wilson (2006) pointed out, that what Grice proposed as an inferential 
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model for figurative language amounted to not much more than a mere substitution of a 
pragmatic mechanism for a semantic one.  
2.2.2 Irony as echoic use of language 
The echoic account of irony (Sperber 1984; Sperber and Wilson 1998; Wilson 2006, 
2009, 2012, 2013, 2014a; Wilson and Sperber 1992, 2012) is developed within the 
framework of relevance theory advanced by Sperber and Wilson (1995). ‘Echoic use’ or 
‘echoic use of language’ is a technical term in relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 
1995 Chapter 4, section7). Before presenting the detailed predictions of the echoic 
account of irony, I will briefly summarise how relevance theory explains a theoretical 
distinction between ‘descriptive’ and ‘interpretive’ representations.	
Within the framework of relevance theory (Clark 2013, section 9, section10; 
Sperber and Wilson 1995 section 7, section 9, Wilson and Sperber 2002), utterances are 
used in two ways: 1) to communicate information about a state of affairs (including 
descriptions of it), and/or 2) to express the speaker’s own belief, opinion, and attitudes. 
Relevance theory claims that the propositional form of an utterance is an interpretation 
of a mental representation of the speaker, which can be used as either ‘descriptive’ or 
‘interpretive’ (Clark 2013; Sperber and Wilson 1995, Wilson and Sperber 2002). Here 
are some examples:	
(1) Paul: Mark is getting another drink at the bar. 
(2) Alex: What is Mark doing? 
Paul: He said he was getting another drink. 
(3) Alex: What is Mark doing? 
Paul: He is getting another drink. 
(4) Alex: What is Mark doing? 
Paul: (Paul says nothing, just rolling his eyes and shaking his head.)  
Alex: Oh, okay, I got it. He is getting another drink. 
Example (1) is a typical example of ‘descriptive use’ of language, which is an utterance 
used to describe or present information of an actual state of affairs. In this case, Paul, 
the speaker, describes what Mark is doing at the time of the conversation. In a 
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descriptive use of language, the state of affairs which the utterance represents may be 
taken to be true or false. Thus, Paul in (1) commits himself to the truth of the 
proposition expressed in his own utterance. ‘Interpretive use’ of language on the other 
hand, is used to either interpret some other utterance or thought (an actual 
representation), or to interpret a desirable representation.8 It is not a direct description of 
a state of affairs but an interpretation of an actual representation that it resembles in 
content. There are several cases where an utterance is used to interpret an actual 
representation.9  All of (2) – (4) above are examples of interpretive use but they achieve 
relevance in different ways. An indirect report of speech is, according to relevance 
theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995:238), a good example of interpretive use. Consider (2) 
above. Paul is informing the audience about what Mark said. Paul’s utterance may be an 
exact reproduction of what Mark said to him, or may resemble it enough for Alex (the 
hearer) to get what Mark was doing. What this utterance of Paul achieves here is 
providing Alex evidence for some of the conclusions that could be derived from the 
original utterance of Mark (Clark 2013:260). In ‘interpretive use,’ the speaker 
represents a thought or utterance (or other representations with a conceptual content) 
that it resembles in content by sharing contextual implications with the thought or 
utterance it represents (Clark 2013:259). This is an interpretation of a desirable (e.g. 
relevant) representation. Other varieties are called ‘attributive use.’ ‘Attributive use’ is 
an interpretation of an actual representation that the speaker attributed to someone 
else.10 Compare the example (3) with (2), where the only difference is that Paul did not 
say ‘he said’ in (3). If (3) is taken as a report of speech in the same way as (2), this can 
																																								 																				
8 Here an interpretation of a desirable representation is not considered since it does not involve figurative language 
(see Clark 2013:261). 
9 Note that interpretive use of language is not limited to verbal communication: it is also found in written 
texts such as reports, summaries, translations and newspaper headline. 
10 In some literature, the term ‘interpretive use’ and the term ‘attributive use’ are used interchangeably. 
Relevance theory defines ‘attributive use’ as one of several sub-varieties of a more general category of 
‘interpretive use’. This study uses ‘attributive use’ distinguishing it from the other sub-varieties: see Sperber 
and Wilson 1995, Wilson 1999, 2006. 
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be Paul’s interpretation of an actual utterance of Mark (attributed utterance). At the 
same time, it is also possible that (3) is expressing what Paul thought of Mark’s 
behaviour, in other words, Paul’s own interpretation. In this case, it may be possible that 
Mark did not say anything to Paul but instead he waved a five-pound note at the bar 
counter. Paul interpreted Mark’s behaviour as showing that he was getting another 
drink. Mark might in fact, simply have wanted to ask a bartender to change his note for 
coins. The speaker attributes her utterance to someone else or herself11 at a different 
time to express her attitudes, beliefs or opinions about it. Next, consider (4). The 
speaker, Alex, does not describe the state of affairs or report information about Mark’s 
doing, but she represents the content of the thought that she thinks Paul has in his mind. 
Notice that Alex’s utterance ‘he is getting another drink’ (the attributed thought) may or 
may not be identical to the original. It does not matter so much as long as an utterance 
resembles the original in content to some degree. It is important that Alex’s utterance is 
‘echoing’ some implications of Paul’s thought that Alex has derived from Paul’s body 
language. This is what relevance theory calls an ‘echoic use’ which is defined as a sub-
category of ‘attributive use’. ‘Echoic use’ serves to show that the speaker intends to 
express her own attitude or reaction to an attributed thought (Clark 2013 chapter 10; 
Sperber and Wilson 1995 chapter 4, section 9; Wilson and Sperber 2002:270-274; 
Wilson 2013:46). Then, what makes the difference between ‘echoic use’ and the other 
varieties of ‘attributive use’? The expression of the speaker’s attitude towards the 
attributed thought or utterance is the key to differentiate echoic use from other 
attributive use. Wilson and Sperber (2002) explain that ‘an [An] utterance is echoic 
when it achieves most of its relevance not by expressing the speaker’s own views, nor 
by reporting someone else’s utterances or thoughts, but by expressing the speaker’s 
attitude to views she tacitly attributes to someone else (p.271).’ Thus, while Paul in (3) 
																																								 																				
11 In this thesis, the speaker is described as ‘she’ and the listener as ‘he’ to simplify the use of gendered pronouns, 
unless otherwise. 
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is expressing his own opinion or view (what he saw about Mark at the bar), Alex, the 
speaker in (4) is clearly expressing her attitude towards it. Notice too, that Paul’s 
utterance in (3) can be taken as an expression of his attitude towards Mark (e.g. Paul’s 
attitude toward the fact that Mark does not know his limits when it comes to 
consumption of alcohol, etc.). According to relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 
1995), there is no limit to the type of speaker’s attitude that can be expressed in echoic 
use, which is very rich and varies from positive/approval attitudes to 
negative/disapproval attitudes or any combination of some attitudes on the scale.  
Within relevance theory verbal irony is treated as one type of ‘echoic use’. What 
makes irony different from other types of ‘echoic use’?  It is the speaker’s intention to 
express her attitude towards the attributed thought or utterance ‘tacitly’, in other words, 
‘implicitly’. Thus, irony involves tacit expression of the speaker’s attitude from a 
dissociative range towards the attributed thought/utterance. Consider another example 
of irony (5) below: 
(5)  (Paul runs after Mark who is very drunk and sees Mark staggering back 
against the rail of the bar and slurring his words.) 
Paul: What are you doing? 
Mark: I need another drink. 
Paul (dryly): That’s just what you need. 
Compare this example with (4) above. Both (4) and (5) are examples of attributive use 
and the speakers in both examples are echoing the attributed thought/utterance in a 
similar content, but only (5) can be treated as irony. The attitude that Alex in (4) intends 
to express is her sympathy towards Paul. Suppose that Mark has a reputation as a 
drunkard. Paul always takes care of his best friend Mark who quite often ends up being 
in a state of total inebriation. Alex knows all the troubles Mark has caused Paul in the 
past. Alex anticipates what is going to happen at the end of the night (such as having to 
apologise to staff at the bar for Mark’s misbehaviour, helping a totally drunk Mark into 
a taxi or seeing Mark safely home, etc.) and sympathises with Paul. By contrast in this 
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example (5), Paul dissociates himself from the idea that Mark needs more drink when it 
is obviously high time for Mark to stop drinking. The attitude Paul intends to express 
here would be a disapproving one towards Mark’s thought and behaviour. The point is 
that Paul is echoing an actual utterance of Mark’s (‘I need another drink’) and is 
implicitly expressing his disapproving attitude towards the attributed thought (‘He needs 
another drink’). This is an example of verbal irony. Consider the following (6a) - (6c) 
which all are the example of ‘echoic use’12: 
Nancy: I’ve finally finished my thesis! 
(6a)  Bill (happily): You’ve finished your thesis! Let’s celebrate! 
(6b)  Bill (cautiously): You’ve finished your thesis! Really completely finished? 
(6c)  Bill (dismissively): You’ve finished your thesis! How often have I heard you 
say that? 
In (6a) – (6c), Bill echoes Nancy’s utterance (‘You’ve finished your thesis!’), which is 
linguistically identical, but as the second utterance of each example shows, the resulting 
implications communicated by Bill are different. In (6a), Bill believes the proposition 
literally expressed by Nancy’s utterance, which is that she completed the thesis she had 
been working on for a long time. Bill expresses his own positive attitude towards the 
attributed thought (/utterance). By contrast, in both (6b) and (6c), Bill doubts the truth 
of it from the fact that he knows Nancy had repeatedly failed to meet the promised 
deadline in the past. Bill is not fully convinced that Nancy has finished her thesis for 
sure. There are some differences between these two examples that are important in order 
for them to be taken as irony: the attitude Bill intends to express towards the attributed 
utterance, and the way he expresses his attitude. In (6b) the attitude that Bill is 
expressing may be sceptical. By contrast, in (6c) Bill expresses his disgust or 
resignation as a reaction. Bill in (6b) may believe some of the proposition literally 
expressed by Nancy’s utterance (e.g. ‘Nancy may have finished her thesis this time’). 
																																								 																				
12 This example was adapted slightly from Wilson and Sperber (2012:131) in which they contrast different attitude 
expressed by the same utterance. 
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On the other hand, in (6c) it was obvious to Bill that what she said was far from the 
truth. Bill in (6c) dissociates himself from his utterance but not in (6b). Another 
difference is that while in (6b) Bill is openly expressing his doubt, in (6c) Bill’s 
expression of his attitude is implicit. Thus, only (6c) but not (6b) exploits features of 
irony. Irony involves not only attributive but also implicit expression of dissociative 
attitude and this distinguishes irony from other types of ‘attributive use’ or/and ‘echoic 
use’ (Wilson 2006:1732).  
2.2.3 Predictions of the echoic account of irony 
This subsection presents features of irony that the echoic account (Sperber 1984; 
Sperber and Wilson 1981,1995; 1998; Wilson 2006, 2009, 2013, 2014a; Wilson and 
Sperber 2012) predicts. It spells out key aspects of irony (indicated in italics below). It 
also highlights an essential prediction that irony is not a clear-cut language 
phenomenon, in other words, utterances cannot be classified straightforwardly as irony 
or not irony. Rather, utterances can be more or less ironic depending on the extent to 
which they contain key aspects of the features of irony.  
The echoic account explains that irony necessarily involves ‘a tacit/implicit 
expression of the speaker’s dissociative attitude’ towards an implicitly ‘attributed 
thought (or utterance)’ and it also involves an ‘echo’ of the attributed thought in a 
‘similar content’(‘resemblance’) to the original or to some ‘source’ other than her at the 
current time. Wilson (2006, 2013) and Wilson and Sperber (2012) explain that the 
attitude is one from the dissociative range that includes attitudes which can be described 
as mocking, resignation, derogatory, scornful, contemptuous, bitter, mean, hurtful, and 
so on. They suggest that the ‘thought (or utterance) attributed’ varies from actual 
utterances to a proposition expressed at an earlier time or a thought in general such as 
shared knowledge, an unexpressed belief, hope, wish, fear, or norm-based expectations. 
The ‘source’ of the attribution also varies; some have real sources such as a specific 
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person (including the speaker herself at the different time), a type of person or group of 
people, or a human in general, whereas others have only a vague or imagined origin. 
Sperber and Wilson (1998:284) stress that the term ‘echo’ used in relevance theory is 
not restricted to echoing of actual words or utterances (for further discussion see 
Sperber and Wilson 1998). ‘Echo’ of the attributed thought may range from immediate 
echoes to delayed ones (‘degree of echoing’). The speaker may echo the attributed 
thought with identical content, a summary, paraphrase, exaggeration, elaboration or 
implication of the original (‘resemblance’). Some may be more explicit with overt 
linguistic forms (interjections, discourse particles, quotation marks, parentheticals, etc.), 
and some may not. Consider the following examples. 
(7)  Mary (after her audition for a new film went terribly wrong): That went well. 
(8)  Susie (on a day when things go wrong one after another):  
I’m having a wonderful day. 
(9)  (when the approval rating of the French President drops to 13%):   
President Hollande is the most charismatic president in the French history of 
post-revolution. 
As in (5) above, none of the speakers in (7) - (9) commits themselves to the proposition 
literally expressed in their utterance. They intend not to inform their audience of the 
opposite of the proposition literally expressed but to express their attitude implicitly 
towards a thought or utterance which is tacitly attributed to others. So in (7), Mary does 
not commit herself to the truth of this assertion and expresses her mocking attitude 
towards the hope or expectation that she had earlier. If she said to someone before an 
audition that she was quite confident of getting a role, then she is representing her 
earlier utterance and expressing her attitude towards her own stupidity or naivety in 
expecting that she would get the role. In either case, the source of an attributed thought 
or utterance is the speaker Mary herself at a different time. Imagine another scenario 
where her agent had reassured Mary before an audition that she would get an offer to 
play a role in a new film. In this case, the source is specific to her agent and Mary 
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expresses her attitudes towards her agent or her own naivety to believe her agent, or 
both. This is in contrast to (8), which involves a representation of the speaker’s 
unexpressed expectation. Generally, humans subconsciously have expectations about 
how things should be or should not be. They do not necessarily express out loud such 
expectations based on socially shared norms. Susie had a hope in her mind that her day 
would go smoothly without any troubles, and when she discovers the state of affairs 
falls short of her expectation, she echoes such an unexpressed expectation in a 
paraphrase in order to show her feeling of resignation or her mocking attitude towards 
it. The speaker in (9) finds ridiculous the opinion that President Hollande is the most 
charismatic president when the reality is that the approval rating of President Hollande 
has hit rock bottom, clearly showing that he is not great as a president of the country or 
as a politician. She dissociates herself from that opinion and expresses her own attitude 
of mockery towards it or a specific person or a group of people who believe such an 
opinion. 
The key point of irony, according to the echoic account of irony, is that the 
attribution and expression of a dissociative attitude are necessarily implicit or tacit. 
Wilson (2006:1733) explains this feature of irony by using the following example13: 
Mary and a friend have been watching Peter lose very badly at tennis. At the end 
of the match, Peter comes up to them and says (seriously) ‘I almost won.’ Mary 
turns to her friend and says, wryly, one of the following: 
(10a) He says he almost won.  
(10b) He almost won, he thinks.  
(10c) He almost won. Allegedly.  
(10d) He almost won. Not. 
(10e) He almost won. Huh! 
(10f) Poor fool. He thinks he almost won.  
(10g) He almost won. 
																																								 																				
13 This scenario and the example utterances cited here are not ones used in this this study. They are taken from 
Wilson (2006:1733). 
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(10a) - (10g) are examples of utterances that interpretively used. The speaker in all 
examples attributes her utterance to Peter’s serious thought that he almost won but they 
are different in terms of how explicitly or implicitly the attribution made and Mary’s 
attitude is expressed. Except for (10g), (10a) - (10f) are all linguistically marked. The 
differences are that explicit forms of reported speech in (10a) - (10c) (indicated with a 
single underline) mark the utterance as attributive. ‘Linguistic indicators’ in (10d) - 
(10f) (indicated with a double underline) may explicitly indicate the attitude. As Wilson 
suggests, because of these ‘linguistic indicators’ in (10d) - (10f) Mary’s expression of a 
dissociative attitude to the attributed thought is conveyed less tacitly. Therefore, only 
(10g) which exploits the features of irony (i.e. involving tacit attribution and implicit 
expression of dissociative attitude) is considered as a typical case of verbal irony. 
The echoic account of irony (Wilson and Sperber 2012:138) treats the property of 
being ‘echoic’ as a distinctive feature of irony and proposes that ‘n[N]o irony without 
an ironical attitude, no ironical attitude without an echoed attributed thought as its 
object.’ Another way to say this is that ‘echoic use of language’ serves to show the 
speaker’s tacit attribution and implicit expression of dissociative attitude. There have 
been studies investigating irony comprehension of adults which provide evidence to 
support this claim (Jorgensen, Miller, and Sperber 1984; Gibbs 1986, 1989; Kreuz and 
Glucksberg 1989; Keenan and Quigley 1999; Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg, and 
Brown 1995; McDonald 2000). The results of these experiments suggested that echoing 
an attributed thought attracts attention from hearers, and that the presence of such an 
echoic source makes it easier for hearers to recognise that the speaker is being ironic. 
Jorgensen, Miller, and Sperber (1984) tested the echoic account and provided insightful 
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evidence to support its claims. They suggested that the standard theory and mention 
theory14 claim a different condition for the speaker to be taken as ironic as follows: 
For the standard theory, a sufficient condition is that the speaker’s communicative 
intention could not be to assert the proposition literally expressed by the utterance, 
since the speaker manifestly expects the hearer to realize that the speaker believes 
the opposite of that proposition. 
For mention theory, this is not a sufficient condition, but it needs to be used in 
conjunction with a condition in which the propositional content of the utterance 
literally understood matches at least in part that of some identifiable utterances, 
thought, intention, expectation, or norm which it can be taken to echo. 
Jorgensen, Miller, and Sperber (1984:116) 
They conducted a reading comprehension test. One of the testing materials satisfied the 
first condition but did not satisfy the second one. The other material of the echoic 
version satisfied both conditions by including antecedents to echo. They compared 
judgements for irony or sarcasm depending on the testing material. Here is one of the 
six anecdotes used in the experiment: 
“The Party”: The party was at the Clarks’, but Joe didn’t know where Mr. Clark 
lived. “It’s on Lee Street,” Irma told him. “You can’t miss it.” But Joe did miss it. 
He never would have found it if Ken hadn’t seen him wondering down the street 
and led him to the Clarks’ apartment. They lived over a store, and their apartment 
door was right on the sidewalk. Irma was already there when they arrived. 
“You’re late,” she called to Joe. 
“The Clarks have a beautiful lawn,” he replied. 
Jorgensen, Miller, and Sperber (1984:117) 
Jorgensen et al. (1984) argued that Joe’s final utterance should be interpreted as ironic 
since this anecdote satisfied the condition of the standard theory. On the other hand, 
from the point of view of the mention theory, Joe’s utterance only would be taken as 
odd or puzzling without an antecedent utterance to echo. Thus, they included the 
antecedent in Irma’s first utterance in the echoic version (the antecedent added is shown 
in italics). 
“The Party”: The party was at the Clarks’, but Joe didn’t know where Mr. Clark 
lived. “It’s on Lee Street,” Irma told him. “It’s the house with the big maple tree 
																																								 																				
14 The echoic account was once called a ‘mention theory.’ Wilson and Sperber (2012:124 footnote 5) explain that 
‘…in those early days of relevance theory, we used ‘mention’ (in an extended sense of the term) to describe what we 
would later call ‘interpretive use’ (of which attributive uses are a subtype …). In the first edition of Relevance (1986), 
we gave up this use of ‘mention’ and have talked since then of the ‘echoic’ theory of irony.’	
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on the front lawn. You can’t miss it.” But Joe did miss it… (the rest of the 
anecdote was the exactly the same as the one above) 
Jorgensen, Miller, and Sperber (1984:117) 
The results lend support for the mention theory. There was a significant interaction of 
the antecedent in the echoic version. Jorgensen et al. (1984:118) suggested the 
conclusion that ‘people do not perceive an implausible nonnormative utterance as ironic 
unless it echoes some antecedent use, which is the outcome predicted by the mention 
theory of irony. Not only is echoing essential for irony to succeed but also the more 
salient the echoic element is, the more likely and easily the irony is to be recognised 
(Wilson 2014a:7). Some other psychological studies have tested the role of echo in 
understanding irony by using negative statements (Hancock, Dunham, and Purdy 2009; 
Harris and Pexman 2003; Kreuz and Glucksberg 1989; Pexman and Glenwright 2007; 
Pexman and Olineck 2002b). Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989) have experimentally 
confirmed the importance of an echoic feature in such a case They investigated how the 
presence of an explicit antecedent negative or positive statement affects ironical 
interpretation. Here are examples they used in their tests (explicit antecedents are in 
italics): 
[negative statement] 
Nancy and her friend Jane were planning a trip to the beach. 
‘It’s probably going to rain tomorrow’, said Jane, who worked for a local TV 
station as a meteorologist. The next day was a warm and sunny one. As she 
looked out of the window, Nancy said, ‘This certainly is awful weather.’ 
 
[positive statement] 
Nancy and her friend Jane were planning a trip to the beach. 
‘The weather should be nice tomorrow’, said Jane, who worked for a local TV 
station as a meteorologist. The next day was a cold and stormy one. As she 
looked out of the window, Nancy said, ‘This certainly is beautiful weather.’ 
Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989:377) 
Based on the results from three experiments, Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989:382-383) 
suggested the conclusions that the influence of an explicit antecedent was greater in 
order for negative statements to be taken as what Kreuz and Glucksberg called 
‘sarcastic’ whereas it was not reliably influential for positive statements. They also 
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suggested that their data provides evidence that the presence of an explicit antecedent 
makes interpretation of potentially ironical utterance readily accessible, which agrees 
with findings of the study by Jorgensen et al. (1984). 
One of the essential predictions of the relevance-theoretic account of irony (the 
echoic account) is that irony is not a natural kind (Wilson 2006:1733). The relevance-
theoretic account suggests that where irony stands within the range of interpretively 
used utterances (interpretive use, attributive use, and echoic use) is much less clear-cut. 
Wilson (2006:1732-33) refers to ‘the gradual borderline’ that distinguishes between 
irony as ‘echoic use’ and other types of ‘echoic use,’ ‘the gradual borderline’ between 
the attitude expressed by irony and the one expressed by other types of echoic use, and 
‘the gradual borderline’ between overt attribution and tacit one: 
i. the borderline between reporting and echoing: an utterance primarily intended to 
report other’s speech or thought may be used to convey some information about 
the speaker’s attitude. 
ii. the borderline between irony and other types of echoic use: the prototypical 
attitudes that the ironical speaker expresses shade off into other types of 
dissociative or sceptical attitude and/or they can be a complex mixture of 
attitudes. 
iii. the borderline between attributions (both overt and tacit) and expressions of 
attitude: the gap between fully explicit conceptual encodings of attribution and 
attitude and purely tacit attributions and expressions is filled by a wide variety of 
paralinguistic and peripheral linguistic forms (intonation, facial expressions, 
gestures, interjections, discourse particles, quotation marks, parentheticals, etc.) 
While the prototypical attitude expressed by ironical utterances is one from a range of 
dissociative attitudes, other types of utterances within the interpretive use of language 
may also express similar dissociative attitudes. For instance, it is also possible that 
Alex’s attitude in this example could be a disgusted or disapproving one towards Mark 
depending on the context, without being ironic. Wilson suggests that ironical utterances 
seem to belong together with other forms of echoic, attributive, and interpretive use. 
Thus, utterances can be more or less ironic depending on how much utterances exploit 
the speaker’s implicit attribution and implicit expression of dissociative attitude. What 
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the echoic account (2006:1733) stresses here is that all the utterances should be treated 
in the same way, regardless of whether they involve echoic use, attributive use, or 
interpretive use, or whether they are taken to be ironic or not. This is very important for 
investigation of the comprehension of irony. Interpretations can be understood as more 
or less likely to be interpreted as implicitly attributive and with an implicit dissociative 
attitude, rather than as either ironic or not. Even the communicator who intends to 
tacitly express her dissociative attitude towards an attributed thought may or may not be 
sure whether her communicative behaviour is likely to be taken as irony. Given this, 
understanding of ironical utterances cannot be measured by a scale involving a 
straightforward irony-non-irony or irony-literal categorisation. 
2.2.4 Differences between the two approaches 
This section considers the crucial difference between two approaches concerning the 
distinction between ‘saying’ and ‘implicating’ in Grice’s approach and the distinction 
between ‘explicature’ and ‘implicature’ in the relevance theoretic approach (Carston 
1988, 2002; Clark 2013; Sperber and Wilson 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2002, Wilson 
2014b). It then discusses how the echoic account’s way of dealing with irony differs 
from Grice’s account. 
Wilson (1994) points out that relevance theory and the Gricean approach to 
communication and understanding have some things in common. She put it as: 
‘Relevance theory rests squarely on Gricean foundations: Sperber and Wilson 
accept Grice’s view that the goal of pragmatics theory is to explain how the hearer 
recognizes the overtly intended interpretation of an utterance; they acknowledge 
the importance of non-demonstrative inference in comprehension, and agree with 
Grice that general principles of communication play a major role in the inference 
process, though not, perhaps, in quite the way Grice thought (1994:57).’ 
Agreeing with Grice’s pragmatics in principle Sperber and Wilson (1995) started 
developing their theory by suggesting answers to questions about Grice’s pragmatic 
insights that Grice himself did not make clear. Consequently, Sperber and Wilson have 
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developed a quite different pragmatic theory in general and a different account of irony 
in particular.  
Sperber and Wilson (1995) replaced the ‘saying- implicating’ distinction with the 
notions of ‘explicature’ and ‘implicature.’ They also do not assume a category of 
conventional implicature. Grice suggested that ‘what is said’ is the proposition resulting 
from decoding, disambiguation and reference assignment (the literal meaning) and saw 
the truth value of the utterance as depending on whether the proposition explicitly 
expressed is true or false. Relevance theory, however, argues that 1) ‘disambiguation 
(including lexical ambiguity and syntactic ambiguity)’ and ‘reference resolution’ are 
also pragmatic processes, and 2) other pragmatic processes, called ‘enrichment 
processes’ in relevance-theoretic terms, are also required (further processes to recover 
the full propositions of utterances). Therefore, relevance theory has abandoned the 
notion of ‘what is said’ in Grice’s sense, and treats the speaker’s intended meaning as a 
combination of ‘explicature’ and ‘implicature’.15   Relevance theory removed the idea 
of ‘what is said’ and replaces it with the idea of ‘explicature’. It defines ‘explicature’ as 
follows: 
On the analogy of ‘implicature’, we will call an explicitly communicated 
assumption an explicature. Any assumption communicated, but not explicitly so, 
is implicitly communicated: it is an implicature. By this definition, ostensive 
stimuli which do not encode logical forms will, of course, only have implicatures. 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995:182) 
‘Explicatures’ are what is explicitly communicated and they are also partly implicit. 
‘Explicatures’ are propositional forms pragmatically developed out of a logical form of 
the utterance (Sperber and Wilson 1995:285). ‘Explicatures’ are derived though 
decoding its literal meaning, and pragmatic processes (i.e. reference assignment, 
disambiguation of word sense and specification of vague term and other pragmatic 
																																								 																				
15 See Sperber and Wilson (1995 Chapter 4 §2), Clark (2013 Chapter 5), and Carston (2002) for full discussion. 
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enrichment). ‘Implicatures’ are communicated assumptions that are not explicitly 
communicated. Relevance theory considers ‘implicatures’ as consisting of both 
‘implicated premises’ and ‘implicated conclusions,’ which differ with regard to which 
stage of inferential process they are derived in. ‘Implicated premises’ are derived 
resulting from the first inferential enrichment of explicatures of the utterance and the 
context to yield contextual assumptions and they are used to derive further implicatures. 
Note, however, that there is no assumption that implicated premises are necessarily 
derived before implicated conclusions. Thus, ‘implicated conclusions’ are derived 
through the interactions of ‘implicated premises’ with contextual assumptions including 
‘explicatures’ of the utterance. Thus, not only ‘implicatures’ as Grice suggested, but 
also ‘explicatures’ are derived though inferential processes, which are governed by 
expectations of relevance. 
In terms of irony, the echoic account sees Grice’s account of irony as simply a 
modern-dress variant of the classical account (Wilson 2006:1724). Wilson and Sperber 
(2002:270) state that Grice’s approach is inadequate both theoretically and 
descriptively. Theoretically, the echoic account rejects the basic claim of the classical 
and standard Gricean approaches in which the intended communicative meaning of an 
ironical utterance is the opposite of the proposition literally expressed. The point of 
irony is that irony is a vehicle to express the speaker’s dissociative attitude toward an 
attributed thought. Grice (1978) claimed that ironic interpretations necessarily involve 
rejecting ‘what the speaker has said or made as if to say’ in Grice’s term and looking for 
the opposite to their literal meanings. If the point of an ironical utterance was, as Grice 
predicted, the opposite of what was said, we should expect some extra effects following 
from the speaker saying the opposite and from the hearer rejecting a literal meaning and 
looking for the opposite. Grice did not or could not explain why a rational speaker says 
the opposite of what she intends to mean and puts her hearer to such effort to derive her 
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intention. The echoic account (Wilson and Sperber 2002) argues that ‘…it is hard to see 
how a rational speaker could hope to convey her meaning more economically by 
choosing a word whose encoded meaning is the opposite of the one she intends to 
convey… (p.217)’. It is irrational and a waste of effort since it is more costly to process 
without any extra benefit. On the other hand, if the point of irony is, as the echoic 
account predicts, the speaker’s expression of her dissociative attitude towards her 
utterance, this intention of the ironical speaker is communicated more effectively by 
attribution of the thought to others than by saying the opposite to what she means. It is 
attribution of the thought that draws the audience’s attention to a discrepancy between 
the reality (a state of affairs) and expectations of the world. It is by expressing the 
speaker’s attitude to views she tacitly attributes to someone else rather than by saying 
the opposite, that an utterance achieves most of its relevance (Wilson and Sperber 
2002): extra effort produces extra effects. Attribution makes the communicative effect 
of the ironical utterances more considerable than if the proposition had been expressed 
directly (communicating the same literally) and this is why people choose to be ironic. 
They also suggest that some types of verbal irony, such as ironical understatement, 
ironical quotations or ironical allusions, do not communicate the opposite of what is 
literally said, and that it is irrational to mean the opposite of the proposition literally 
expressed when it is perfectly possible and more economical to say it directly. They 
(Wilson and Sperber 2002:272) argue that there are situations where an utterance might 
be taken to be ironic even though it is neither blatantly false nor used to convey the 
opposite of what was said. Notice, too that examples (11) and (12) are also not cases 
where what is said is blatantly false as Grice suggested. 
(11) On a night in October when the temperature in London drops to minus 10 c°: 
Ben: It’s a bit chilly tonight. 
(12) Both Paul and Jim know that Mary is a terrible cook. Jim heard that Mary is 
preparing a pork pie, which she has never cooked before, for Paul’s birthday: 
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Jim: Mary is cooking her very first pork pie specially for your birthday. 
Paul: Yay! 
Within Grice’s approach, this type of irony cannot be explained, as it is not blatantly 
false but rather literally true. The utterance in (11) is a typical case of ironical 
understatement. It is literally true. It is not violating the maxim of Quality (truthfulness) 
which says ‘try to make your contribution one that is true.’ It is a matter of the level of 
coldness Ben has described here. This utterance highlights a contrast between the level 
of coldness usually described by the adjective ‘chilly’ and the reality of coldness of -10 
c°. On the spectrum of coldness, a description of the temperature of -10 c° at night in 
October in London would usually involve a stronger expression than ‘a bit chilly.’ 
Similarly, the interjection ‘Yay!’ in (12) cannot taken as true or false since it does not 
directly express a truth-evaluable proposition in it. Hence, it cannot be treated as a case 
of a deliberate violation of the maxim either. 
Irony is generally but not necessarily used to criticise or complain when the reality 
falls short of expectations, which are based on socially shared norms about how things 
should be or should not be. When the speaker echoes a norm-based expectation that 
could have been met, irony is readily understood. On the other hand, when the speaker 
expresses dissociative attitudes ironically by uttering a negative proposition, it is 
necessary to have some thoughts that expressed some doubts or suspicions earlier in its 
context. This feature of irony, a typical normative bias in the use of irony has never 
been adequately explained in Grice’s account or other neo-Gricean accounts of irony. 
Grice’s own counter-example (1978:124) mentioned in the previous section can be used 
to point to an inadequacy of his account. While meeting all the conditions for irony that 
Grice proposed, this example would not normally be understood as ironical. The 
example is repeated here: 
A and B are walking down the street, and they both see a car with a shattered 
window. B says, Look, that car has all its windows intact. A is baffled. B says, 
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You didn’t catch on; I was in an ironical way drawing your attention to the 
broken window. (Grice 1978:124) 
As Grice (1978:124) acknowledged, without the speaker’s hostile or derogatory attitude, 
there is no irony here. Wilson (2013) points out that ironic interpretations are possible if 
a thought or utterance has been expressed previously to which the speaker can attribute 
her expression of doubts or suspicions. She suggests that it needs ‘some evidence that is 
being echoically used to dissociate the speaker from an attributed thought (2013:47).’ 
She suggests that it would be hard to see this as a case of irony unless an echoic element 
is included in this scenario. She added the assumption to Grice’s scenario: When A and 
B walked down the street, B said, ‘I have been worrying aloud about whether it is safe 
to leave my car there overnight.’ A has been trying to reassure B. Then, later A and B 
come across a car with a broken window (Wilson 2013:47). With this added 
assumption, Grice’s original utterance of B ‘Look, that car has all its window intact’ 
could be taken as ironic. The echoic account of irony (Wilson 2013, Wilson and Sperber 
2012) explains this as follows: 
‘…it takes special circumstances to be able to say ironically ‘She is so impolite!’ 
when someone is being polite, ‘Horrible weather!’ when the sun is shining, or 
‘This is an even number’ when talking about an odd number. For irony to succeed 
in these cases, the thought that the person in question might behave impolitely, 
that the weather would be horrible, or that the number was odd must have been 
entertained or, even better, expressed. Only then is there some identifiable thought 
that can be ironically echoed.’ 
(Wilson and Sperber 2012:139) 
The echoic account suggests that a positive proposition can be freely expressed to 
criticise or complain whereas a negative proposition seems to be appropriately taken as 
irony only when the speaker and the hearer mutually share knowledge about a negative 
thought such as doubts, suspicions, or fears. As discussed in the preceding sub-section, 
irony involves implicit expression of the speaker’s dissociative attitude towards a 
thought tacitly attributed. The echoic account suggests that the speaker’s ironic intention 
depends on the utterance being echoic.  
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The echoic account of irony sees irony as sharply distinguished from metaphor: 
metaphor is a means to express a thought about a state of affairs whereas irony is a 
means to express a thought about another thought. If Grice (1975:53) was right to 
suggest that irony involves the speaker’s expression of a ‘hostile or derogatory 
judgement or feeling such as indignation or contempt,’ then the parallelism between 
irony and metaphor or hyperbole is not complete (Wilson and Sperber 2002:271). In 
other words, if irony and metaphor can be treated in parallel, then not only irony but 
also metaphor should involve the expression of a speaker’s characteristic attitude. There 
is no such attitude involved. Neither the classical approach nor Grice had any 
explanation about this. 
Lastly, the relevance-theoretic account of irony argues that context-independent 
processing of literal meaning is not obligatory in order to arrive at the ironic speaker’s 
meaning. Grice proposed a ‘standard pragmatic model’ of processing irony or a ‘two-
stage model of irony’ in which first access to literal meaning was necessary to derive 
the implied meaning. Under this view (Grice 1975; Searle 1979, 1993), accessing the 
literal meaning of a given utterance seems to be necessary to derive implicature and it is 
only when the literal interpretation turns out to be blatantly false that the hearer starts 
looking for possible figurative interpretations. Dews and Winner (1999) reported that it 
took longer to judge ironical than literal utterances, which suggested that the literal 
interpretation was accessed first. On the other hand, Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) 
propose a one-stage processing model. They claim that, irrespective of how weakly or 
strongly explicatures are communicated, a hearer uses the most easily accessible 
assumptions to derive the most easily accessible implications, and stops when he has 
enough. Sometimes interpretations resulting from this procedure would be literal and at 
other times a metaphorical or ironical meaning arises. The relevance-theoretic approach 
suggests that access to literal interpretations is not necessary to derive implicatures in 
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ironical utterances and that there is no such fixed order. Its linguistic form is no more 
than a clue to the speaker’s meaning, or ‘a piece of evidence’ for inferential processing. 
This relevance-theoretic view of a one-stage cognitive mechanism16  is consistent with 
the direct access view supported with some evidence from psychological studies (Gibbs 
1986a, 1986b; Pexman 2008; Pexman, Ferretti, and Katz 2000, Pexman, Rostad, 
McMorris, Climie, Stowkowy, and Glenwright 2011). These challenged the ‘standard 
pragmatic model of processing’ and rejected it with considerable evidence. Instead, they 
provide evidence for the direct access view that predicts direct activation of ironic 
interpretation without arousal of literal meaning. Interpretation of utterances as ironical 
can be derived from a range of contextual information, which comes into play early in 
the comprehension process. 
2.2.5 The interpretation process for potentially ironical utterances 
Given that verbal irony involves the expression of the speaker’s dissociative attitude 
towards the attributed thought/utterance, what is necessary for the hearer to understand 
the ironic speaker’s communicative intention is (a) to understand that the speaker is 
indirectly attributing a thought or an utterance to others without overt linguistic 
indication, and (b) to recognise the speaker’s dissociative attitude towards the attributed 
thought which the speaker is echoing. The echoic account (Wilson and Sperber 
2002:272) suggests that verbal irony involves no alternative or special procedures for 
comprehension or different machinery to the cognitive mechanism that is already 
needed to account for a basic use of language, in other words, the comprehension 
procedure is the same for all sorts of verbal and non-verbal communication. Thus, the 
cognitive process a hearer follows in interpreting ironical utterances involves exactly 
the same comprehension procedure as other utterances. Relevance theory (Clark 2013 
																																								 																				
16	Giora (1995, 1997) has proposed the graded salience hypothesis as an alternative to those two models. See also 
Giora, Fein, and Laadan, Wolfson, Zeituny, Kidron, Kaufman, Shaham 2007; Giora, Fein, and Schwartz 1998 for 
more discussion.	
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chapter3; Sperber and Wilson 2002; Wilson 2014; Wilson and Sperber 2002) proposes 
the ‘relevance-guided comprehension heuristic,’ which is triggered by ostensive 
communicative acts to bridge the gap between sentence meaning and speaker’s 
meaning. It is explained as follows: 
Relevance-guided comprehension heuristic 
a. Follow a path of least effort in constructing an interpretation of the utterance (in 
resolving ambiguities, referential indeterminacies, in going beyond linguistic meaning, in 
supplying contextual assumptions, computing implications, etc.) in order of accessibility. 
b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied. 
(Sperber and Wilson 2005:474) 
In the relevance-theoretic framework (Clark 2013 chapter3; Sperber and Wilson 2002; 
Wilson 2014; Wilson and Sperber 2002), a key to successful communication is that the 
communicator’s ostensive stimulus (e.g. an utterance) should achieve enough cognitive 
effects to be worth the audience’s attention, and without putting the hearer to gratuitous 
effort, in order to satisfy his expectation of relevance. Thus, it is the communicator’s 
responsibility to formulate the utterance so that it provides enough effects to justify the 
processing effort involved so as to lead her audience in the right direction to hold her 
audience’s attention and communicate her intention successfully. On the other hand, the 
addressee presumes that the communicator’s ostensive stimuli/inputs are relevant 
enough to be worth expending his processing effort in processing them. If it is not, he 
will give up on interpreting it. His task is to identify the interpretation that the 
communicator might reasonably have intended to convey by constructing a hypothesis 
about the speaker’s meaning. He aims to derive enough positive cognitive effects to 
justify the effort involved in processing the utterance. The less processing effort 
required for identifying positive cognitive effects, the less risk of misunderstanding, and 
the more relevant the utterance will be. The first acceptable interpretation (i.e. the first 
interpretation which satisfies the expectation of relevance) is the only appropriate 
interpretation and is the one he should choose. If he did not find it at first, he will 
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continue to look for it until he finds one which gives rise to adequate relevance. His 
expectation of relevance will be satisfied if he derives an appropriate interpretation. If 
an utterance demands unreasonable effort and does not meet his expectation of 
relevance, the communicator’s intention must have been to achieve some extra or 
different cognitive effects which offset the extra efforts: ‘extra effort implies extra 
effect.’ According to relevance theory, the task of understanding utterances involves a 
process of building a hypothesis about ‘explicatures,’ ‘implicated premises,’ and 
‘implicated conclusions.’ Thus, the hearer is expected to take a path of least effort to 
build a hypothesis to the point where the expectation of relevance is satisfied. These 
hypotheses are set up in no fixed order and are adjusted constantly. This process is 
called ‘mutual parallel adjustment,’ which is a technical term in relevance theory. 
Let me explain how the relevance-guided comprehension heuristic works in the 
case of irony. Consider a scenario below: 
John is going to work under a new boss, David. John is a little nervous about his 
new boss, so he asks Helen who used to work with David what type of boss David 
is. Helen said John that ‘Oh, I’ve never had any problem with him. Paul is 
considerate and supportive.’ Three months on, John, however, finds David rather 
difficult to work with. David often demands him unnecessary overwork. When 
John was working late alone in his office, Helen comes and asks how he is getting 
on David. John says, 
(13) He is such a considerate and supportive boss! 
Helen disambiguates and assigns reference to derive a proposition (‘ David is a 
considerate and supportive boss’) and creates contextual assumptions using information 
from contextual information (e.g. they are in the office late at night, everyone but John 
has gone back home, John is still working, etc.), background knowledge (e.g. boss who 
demands his subordinates carry out unnecessary work is not good, any employers 
cannot or should not ask overwork, etc.), and mutual cognitive environment (e.g. both 
Helen and John assume that David who was her boss before is now John’s boss, Helen 
remembers that she said to John once that David was considerate and supportive). Helen 
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derives implicated premises from a set of implications from inference. Note that as 
discussed above, the relevance theory does not suggest that the implicated premises are 
derived in order of mention; there is no fixed order. A possible set of implications may 
be something like (13a) - (13d): 
(13a) John said that David is considerate and supportive.  
(13b) John remembers what I said to him. 
(13c) John believes that David is considerate and supportive as I told him.  
(13d) John does not believe that David is considerate and supportive. 
(13a) is a simple report of speech. Helen must reject (13a) since John has no reason to 
report back Helen’s utterance to her. She assumes that John cannot rationally expect his 
utterance to be relevant to her. (13b) does not satisfy Helen’s expectations of relevance 
either since John has no reason to inform her of how well he remembers the 
conversation between them. Both (13c) and (13d) are echoic use. In (13c), John is 
echoing and endorsing (expressing agreement with) her previous utterance. On the other 
hand, (13d) is an echoic use in which John attributes to and dissociates himself from the 
content of Helen’s previous utterance. Helen considers all the available contextual 
information such as that Helen now knows that David demands John carry out 
unnecessary work which is not urgent or necessary, how John has been getting on with 
David, etc., and would reject the echoic interpretation in (13c). Helen may or may not 
notice the way John uttered his utterance, e.g. his facial expression or his tone of voice. 
Thus, (13d) is the first acceptable interpretation. This cognitive effect involves the 
revision of existing assumptions: (13d) contradicts and eliminates an existing 
assumption in Helen’s mind (David is a considerate and supportive boss). After deriving 
(13d), Helen uses this implicated premise to derive further implicated conclusions. The 
resulting implicature might be (13e): 
(13e) John believes that I was wrong to say that David is considerate and supportive. 
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For understanding John’s intention behind his utterance, Helen needs to recognise the 
fact that John’s utterance is being attributively used and that John is expressing his 
derogatory attitude towards her judgement on David. 
The echoic account also (Wilson and Sperber 2012:1) suggests that ‘a speaker who 
doubts her hearer’s ability to recognise this intention using background knowledge 
alone can provide additional cues (e.g. ironical tone of voice, a wry facial expression, a 
resigned shrug, a weary shake of the head).’ As we saw in the example of (6a) – (6c), a 
different attitude to the same verbal content can be indicated by the speaker changing 
her tone of voice. In (13c) and (13d) above, the only difference between these two 
examples is the attitude John intended to convey. Depending on how John sees Helen’s 
ability to understand his intent, he aims to minimise the processing effort which Helen 
needs to make, and may use a particular tone of voice to indicate his communicative 
intention: a different tone of voice to the one he might use in (13c) in which he commits 
himself to the thought expressed. John’s tone of voice comes into play as a clue or cue 
to his dissociative attitude. The echoic account (Wilson 2013, 2014a; Wilson and 
Sperber 2012) suggests that there are cases where the speaker’s characteristic tone of 
voice signals her intent to express a dissociative attitude. The role that the speaker’s 
tone of voice plays during inferential processes will be discussed in the next section. 
2.3 Irony and prosody 
2.3.1 prosody and meaning 
This section considers the term ‘prosody’ in order to understand its functions as a 
prominent cue to signal the speaker’s attitude or emotion. 
According to Roach (2009), the term ‘tone’ refers to an identifiable movement or 
level of pitch that is used in a linguistically contrastive way whereas the term 
‘intonation,’ in its more restricted sense, refers to the variations in the pitch of a 
speaker’s voice, but in its broader and more popular sense it is used to cover much the 
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same field as ‘prosody’ where variations in such things as pitch, voice quality, tempo, 
and loudness are included. In the literature (Wichmann and Blakemore 2006), the four 
vocal features, namely pitch, loudness, tempo, and voice quality are collectively known 
as ‘prosody,’ and these vocal features can characterise anything from a single syllable of 
a word to the whole utterance. Thus, prosodic contours or tone of voice are thought to 
be produced with variations in these four components: the placement of a pitch accent 
may vary, accents can rise or fall (or be more complex), a stretch of speech can be loud 
or soft, tempo can be fast or slow, and utterances can be spoken in a tensed manner or 
with a breathy voice (House 2006; Wichmann and Blakemore 2006; Wilson and 
Wharton 2006)17. 
As has been discussed, acoustic speech signals carry not only information about the 
linguistic content of the utterance, but also non-linguistic information such as the 
speaker’s identity, social status, and the speaker’s psychological state (Nygaard and 
Lunders 2002). Traditionally, these two areas of research, on non-linguistic and 
linguistic properties of spoken language, have been conducted separately: research on 
how non-linguistic or paralinguistic aspects of spoken language such as affective tone of 
voice are related to perception of the emotional state of speaker, and research on how 
the linguistic content of speech such as syllables, words, and sentence of speech are 
processed and represented. In the latter research area, properties of the speech signal, 
such as emotional tone of voice, have been treated as a source of ‘noise’ that listeners 
must ignore. Until recently, it has been considered that the effect of emotional tone of 
voice on resolution of lexical ambiguity was marginal (see Nygaard and Lunders 2002 
for further discussion and references). The opposite discussion, however, has emerged 
in some studies (Frick 1985; Murray and Arnott 1993; Nygaard and Lunders 2002; 
																																								 																				
17 Gumperz distinguishes prosodic features such as stress and intonation from paralinguistic features such as tempo 
and laughter, choice of code and particular expressions, and describes both features as varieties of “contextualization 
cue.” For details, see Gumperz (1992). 
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Scherer, Banse, Wallbott, and Goldbeck 1991; Pittam and Scherer 1993). These studies 
have pointed out that prosody can convey an enormous amount of information about the 
speaker’s emotional state or attitudes. Kitayama and Howard (1994) argued for the 
influence of affective tone of voice on the comprehension of spoken communication, 
and suggested that such non-linguistic properties should not be stripped away during on-
going language processing. They surveyed experimental evidence from 
neuropsychological studies both on the population of patients with brain damage and on 
the normal population. These studies suggested that the right hemisphere is responsible 
for processing vocal content and the left hemisphere for processing verbal content (see 
Kitayama and Howard 1995 for further discussion and references). Kitayama and 
Howard (1994:50-51) concluded that although linguistic content and emotional tone of 
voice appear to be processed through separate channels, information from these two 
different sources are integrated during the course of processing. They also suggested 
that emotional tone of voice appears to influence not only the resolution of lexical 
ambiguity but also the interpretation of sentence-length utterances (Nygaard and 
Lunders 2002:585). 
The job of pragmatics here, then, seems to be to account for the effects of prosody 
on comprehension of the speaker’s communicative intention and to explain how the 
speaker’s emotion or attitude is inferred. As Wharton (2012a) suggested, prosodic 
contributions to meaning should be considered from a viewpoint based on ‘meaning’ 
rather than from a phonological point of view. It has been suggested that the speaker 
chooses particular prosodic elements (e.g. intonation, stress) to convey her emotions and 
attitudes, and thus such prosodic elements may be an important cue to identifying the 
speaker’s intended meaning for a given utterance (House 2006; Wichmann and 
Blakemore 2006; Wichmann 2000; Wilson and Sperber 1995; Wilson and Wharton 
2006). Within the framework of relevance theory (Clark 2007, 2012; Sperber and 
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Wilson 1995, Wichmann 2000; Wharton 2012a; Wilson and Wharton 2006), it has been 
suggested that prosodic elements create impressions, convey information about 
emotions or attitudes, or alter the salience of linguistically possible interpretations. 
Wilson and Wharton (2006:1566) suggested that affective tones of voice create a 
diffusive impression which involves marginal alterations in the strength or salience of a 
wide array of conclusions rather than providing strong support for a single, determinate 
conclusion. Thus, the same input may have different effects depending on occasions or 
contexts. 
2.3.2 The speaker’s tone of voice as a distinctive feature of irony 
The echoic account (Wilson 2013; Wilson & Sperber 2012) suggests that the speaker’s 
tone of voice often but not necessarily helps the audience to recognise the speaker’s 
dissociative attitude towards the thought attributed implicitly. However, this account 
does not treat it as an indispensable cue. Instead, it considers that a characteristic tone of 
voice serves as a natural but optional cue to her communicative intention. It explains 
that the speaker may provide ‘additional’ cues when she doubts the hearer’s ability to 
recognise her intention using background knowledge alone. Kreuz and Roberts (1995) 
quoted Cutler (1974:117) who say that “if cues from the context are strong enough no 
intonational cues are necessary at all”. Roberts (1995:28) claimed that when the speaker 
and a listener share less common ground the speaker may use a characteristic tone of 
voice as an explicit cue for her intention. The echoic account (Wilson 2013:46) 
considers this feature as one of the distinctive features of irony, with regard to which 
stands irony out from other types of figurative language such as metaphor. Wilson 
(2013:48) argues that metaphor, unlike irony is not a case of echoic use of language and 
it does not involve the speaker’s expression of a dissociative attitude. Thus, it is not 
realistic to expect that a specific type pf prosody is associated with metaphorical 
utterances (i.e. we should not expect to find a ‘metaphorical tone of voice’). Kreuz and 
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Roberts (1995) also claimed that the role of intonation during interpretation processes is 
especially important for irony when compared to other types of figurative language. 
They suggested that: 
Although intonation plays an important role in the meanings of utterances, such 
cues seem to be especially important in the use of irony. In fact, irony seems to be 
unique in this regard among the different forms of nonliteral language; no one 
speaks, for example, of an idiomatic tone of voice or a metaphorical tone of voice. 
Kreuz and Roberts (1995:22) 
Thus, use of a characteristic tone of voice is seen as a distinctive feature of irony and 
suggests a way in which irony and metaphor are distinguishable. Such a characteristic 
tone of voice, which is assumed to lead to a potentially ironical interpretation, is often 
termed ‘ironical tone of voice’ in the literature. Typical prosodic features of this 
assumed ironical tone of voice that are most frequently cited in the literature (Ackerman 
1983; Bryant 2010; Bryant and Fox Tree 2002; Chevallier et al 2011; Cutler 1976; 
Rockwell 2000) are slower tempo, lower pitch level, nasalization, and greater intensity 
than found in the corresponding literal utterance, which the echoic account (Wilson 
2013:46) calls ‘deadpan intonation’. The earlier study of Rockwell (2000) has explored 
characteristics of the vocal cues to sarcasm, which she defined as “a sharply mocking or 
contemptuous ironic remark intended to wound another (2000:485)”. She (2000) 
suggested two different conditions where the speaker may use a characteristic tone of 
voice for her utterance to be taken as sarcastic. One condition was a ‘spontaneous’ 
condition which elicited specific vocal characteristics naturally from the speaker 
expressing the feelings or emotions of the speaking character in each vignette. The other 
condition was a ‘posed’ condition where the speaker was instructed to read the target 
utterances ‘sarcastically.’ The results of perceptual judgement tasks (using a 5-point 
Likert Scale) revealed that acoustic features such as ‘tempo’, ‘pitch level (but not pitch 
variation)’, and ‘intensity level (but not intensity variation)’ seemed to influence 
perceptions of sarcasm. ‘Resonance’ and ‘articulation’ were not found to be effective. 
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Rockwell (2000:493) suggested a conclusion that sarcasm is most likely conveyed by a 
slower tempo, lower pitch level and greater intensity level. She also reported that there 
was no significant difference between the posed and the spontaneous conditions in the 
effects of each acoustic feature except for intensity level. The perceptual coders rated 
intensity significantly louder under the posed condition than the spontaneous condition. 
Rockwell also found a significant difference between the posed sarcasm condition and 
the non-sarcasm condition but not between the spontaneous sarcasm condition and the 
non-sarcasm condition18. This seems to indicate two possibilities: that the speaker might 
change her tone of voice subtly, and that the speaker may not necessarily use a 
characteristic tone of voice, which both seem to be consistent with the suggestions of 
the echoic account of irony that irony involves implicit expression of the speaker’s 
attitude and that the ‘ironical tone of voice’ serves as an optional cue.  
It should be noted that the detailed descriptions of ‘ironical tone of voice’ have 
varied among researchers. As a consequence, the term ‘ironical tone of voice’ has been 
described as not only involving a ‘deadpan flat’ tone but also with reference to other 
intonational or tone patterns. Below are some examples of how different studies have 
described features of the regular ironical tone of voice:    
- ‘deadpan’ which might be perceived as light criticism or as being mildly 
amusing, and intonation with heavy stress which may convey much more negative 
evaluation (Kreuz and Roberts 1995:24, 28) 
- ‘sarcastic intonation’ which expresses mocking, exaggerated, contemptuous 
attitudes; flat intonation (deadpan); overly sincere intonation; downright negative 
intonation; subtly negative by its flatness, or overly positive intonation which may 
alert suspicion (Winner 1988:148) 
- ‘sarcastic’ as negative which signals annoyance; ‘deadpan’ as mocking, nasal, 
flat which signals playfulness or superiority, or ‘sincere’ as flat, which has an 
effect of muting the criticism and increasing the humour of irony (Dews et al. 
1996) 
- ‘sarcastic’ tone as exaggerated, ‘mocking’ tone with stress, and ‘uninflected’ 
tone as involving no special emphasis (Keenan and Quigley 1999) 
																																								 																				
18 It has been reported in the study of Bryant and Fox-Tree (2002) that even spontaneously produced irony was also 
accompanied by prosodic features that help listeners to differentiate it from sincere speech. 
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- ‘sarcastic’ intonation as a mocking tone with great exaggeration of the 
modulation of pitch and emphasis on syllables articulating longer than the neutral 
intonation (Capelli et al. 1990:1827) 
The effects of the speaker’s tone of voice on irony comprehension have been of 
great interest not only to pragmatic theorists and developmental psychologists but also 
to neuropsychologists. Numerous empirical studies have been conducted to explore 
what kinds of role the speaker’s tone of voice may play in recognition of a dissociative 
attitude (Ackerman 1983, 1986; Bryant & Fox Tree 2002; Capelli, Nakagawa, and 
Madden 1990; Creusere 1999, 2002; de Groot, Kaplan, Rosenblatt, Dews & Winner 
1995; Demorest et al.1984 ; Dews, Winner, Kaplan, Rosenblatt, Hunt, Lim, McGovern, 
Qualter, and Smarsh 1996; Keenan & Quigley 1999; Happé 1995; Laval & Bert-Erboul 
2005; Nakassis & Snedeker 2002; Rockwell 2000; Rosenblatt, Swinney, Gardner, and 
Winner 1987; Winner & Leekam 1991; Woodland & Voyer 2011).  Some experiments 
on adult participants have provided positive results suggesting that the speaker’s tone of 
voice seems to help the adult audience to recognise the speaker’s attitude or emotion 
(Ackerman 1983; Bryant & Fox Tree 2002; Creusere 1999: Nakassis & Snedeker 2002; 
Rockwell 2000; Woodland & Voyer 2011).  Rockwell (2000) suggested that certain 
aspects of vocal information could facilitate the perception of sarcasm (Rockwell 2000). 
The study by Rosenblatt, Swinney, Gardner, and Winner (1987) found that ‘adults 
understood ironic statements more quickly when they contained a mocking intonation 
than when they did not (cited in Kreuz and Roberts 1995:24).’ At the same time, some 
studies have suggested no effect of the speaker’s tone of voice. For example, Winner 
and Gallagher (1983 cited in Kreuz and Roberts 1995) suggested that behavioural cues 
such as laughing or pointing serve as more informative cues to the ironical speaker’s 
intention than intonational cues. Gibbs and O’Brien (1991:529-530) claimed, based on 
work by Gibbs (1986a, 1986b), that any special intonation cues were not required for 
the understanding of sarcasm, which this study considers as subtypes of verbal irony. It 
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should be noted, though, that these claims are to some extent misleading. In the study of 
Winner & Gallagher (1984), gesture or body language showed more significant effects 
than intonational cues, which is not the same as suggesting that intonational cues had no 
effect. What Gibbs (1986a) investigated was the role of prosody in memorising sarcastic 
expression rather than in interpretations. In fact, he suggested that prosody does not play 
an important role in memorising sarcastic expressions more effectively, but this does 
not indicate that there is no effect of prosody in the interpretation of sarcasm (p.56).  
On the other hand, developmental studies which tested both typically developing 
children and an atypical population (autistic children and brain impaired adults) have 
provided mixed results in respect to the role of a characteristic tone of voice for irony 
comprehension. While some studies (Capelli, Nakagawa, and Madden 1990; Creusere 
2002; de Groot, Kaplan, Rosenblatt, Dews and Winner 1995; Dews, Winner, Kaplan, 
Rosenblatt, Hunt, Lim, McGovern, Qualter, and Smarsh 1996; Happé 1993; Keenan and 
Quigley 1999; Laval and Bert-Erboul 2005) suggested that intonational cues play an 
important role in understanding of the speaker’s intention and attitude, evidence of 
positive effects has proved inconclusive in terms of children’s age when they show 
development. For instance, experimental studies (de Groot et al. 1995; Keenan and 
Quigley 1999; Happé 1993) have provided some evidence that intonational cues seem to 
be facilitative for 6-year-old children to comprehend irony. The results from a study by 
Laval and Bert-Erboul (2005) showed that even 5-year-old French speaking children 
appear to use information that intonation carries to interpret ironical utterances. On the 
other hand, there has been a debate in developmental studies about how far tone of 
voice contributes to children’s irony comprehension. Some studies (Ackerman 1983, 
1986; Demorest, Meyer, Phelps, Gardner, and Winner 1984; Winner and Leekam 1991; 
Winner, Windmueller, Rosenblatt, Bosco, Best, and Gardner 1987) have argued that 
intonation did not play any role in the irony comprehension of 6-year-olds. A study by 
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Winner et al. (1987) even suggested that no effect of tone of voice was found in 8-year-
old and 10-year-old children’s understanding of irony. These confusing results might be 
related to differences in methods used in the experiments (Creusere 1999; Kreuz and 
Roberts 1995:24; Nakassis and Snedeker 2002:429). The experimental design of each 
study differed with regard to dependent variables, stimuli, procedure and some 
combination of these factors. In addition, these studies differ in what kinds of effects of 
tone of voice were explored: some have explored the effects of intonation on 
interpretation; others have investigated its effect on understanding the speaker’s 
intention or the speaker’s attitude, detection, perception, or awareness of sarcasm; 
others on distinguishing irony from other types of language use (e.g. lie, joke). More 
importantly, many of these developmental studies have investigated the interaction 
effects of tone of voice and context. It should be taken into account that these studies 
were focused on the effects of intonation in comparison with those of context. Thus, in 
line with the echoic account’s prediction discussed above, these arguments against the 
facilitative effects of tone of voice seem to suggest a supplementary role of tone in 
guiding hearers towards potentially ironic interpretations: the speaker may express her 
attitude more explicitly by using a different tone of voice when the speaker doubts the 
hearer’s ability to recognise her intention using background knowledge alone.    
2.3.3 The notion of the ‘ironic tone of voice’  
There have been some attempts to explore vocal features of ‘ironical tone of voice’ 
(Anolli, Ciceri, and Infantino 2000, 2002; Bryant 2010, 2011, 2012; Cheang and Pell 
2007; Bryant and Fox-Tree 2002, 2005; Laval and Bert-Erboul 2005; Milosky and Ford 
1997; Rockwell 2000, 2007; Séguin 2007; Scharrer and Christmann 2011; Shapley 
1987; Voyer and Techentin 2010). Some studies have focused on identifying acoustic 
parameters which are crucial for the perception of irony. For example, Milosky and 
Ford (1997) used acoustic analysis software to rate target utterances which professional 
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actors read aloud. They suggested three acoustic features that were most likely to lead a 
given utterance to be taken as sarcastic: lower pitch /fundamental frequency (F0), longer 
duration/length, and reduced F0 variability (indicated by smaller standard deviations of 
F0). In her further investigation of the acoustic features which influence perceptions of 
sarcasm, Rockwell (2007) obtained slightly different results to her earlier study 
(Rockwell 2000). She analysed voice features of sarcastic utterances which were 
naturally produced in comparison with those of non-sarcastic utterances. Acoustic 
analysis measured ‘length (total length of utterance, total amount of sound and silence)’, 
‘tempo’, ‘fundamental frequency (F0)’, ‘maximum and minimum of F0’, ‘F0 range’, 
‘intensity’, ‘maximum and minimum of intensity’, and ‘intensity range’.19 Perceptual 
coders judged the following six acoustic features with a 5-points Likert scale: ‘pitch 
(low-high)’, ‘pitch range (narrow-wide)’, ‘volume (soft-loud)’, ‘tempo (slow-fast)’, 
‘length of utterance (short-long)’, and ‘total amount of sound (small amount of sound 
with many poses-large amount of sound with few poses)’. The results from both 
acoustic analysis and perceptual judgement tests revealed that a significant difference 
between sarcasm and non-sarcasm was found in three acoustic features – 
‘frequency/pitch range’, ‘total length of utterance’, and ‘total amount of sound’. In 
addition, acoustic analysis found a significant difference in frequency mean. Rockwell 
(2007:368) suggested that sarcasm is highly likely to be accompanied by a higher than 
normal pitch with a wider than normal range, with longer utterance comprised of longer 
vowel sounds (the amount of sound) and less pausing. The direction of pitch diversity 
(higher or lower) away from normal pitch was observed to be the opposite to that found 
in her previous study (2000) which reported lower pitch. In addition, this study 
																																								 																				
19 Rockwell (2007) used the SFS acoustic analysis software. This software produces a visual speech waveform of 
recorded utterance as output which reanalysed .to produce a pitch profile and intensity profile. From the basic speech 
wave length was measured in millisecond. Tempo was measured by dividing the number of syllables in a given 
utterance by the length of the utterance. From the pitch profile, F0 was extracted in Hertz, and F0 range was 
measured by subtracting minimum F0 from maximum F0. From the intensity analysis, intensity was measure in 
decibels (dB), and intensity range was measured by subtracting minimum intensity from maximum intensity. 
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(Rockwell 2007) found no difference in ‘tempo’, ‘intensity/volume’ or ‘intensity range.’ 
Rockwell (2007) explained that a lower pitch level for sarcastic utterances may actually 
reflect a greater pitch range of sarcastic speakers rather than a lower general level, and 
that ‘it is possible that what passed for slower tempo… may actually be longer duration 
of vowel sounds (p.368).’ 
Three acoustic dimensions, ‘pitch’, ‘tempo’, and ‘intensity’ have appeared to be 
crucial features of ‘ironical tone of voice’ in other studies (Anolli et.al 2000, 2002; 
Cheang and Pell 2007; Laval and Bert-Erboul 2005; Milosky and Ford 1997; Rockwell 
2000; Scharrer and Christmann 2011; Shapely 1987; Voyer and Techentin 2010). 
However, different studies reported different directions for each acoustic dimension. For 
example, while most studies suggested that a sarcastic speaker uses lower pitch (Cheang 
and Pell 2007; Milosky and Ford 1997; Rockwell 2000; Scharrer and Christmann 2011; 
Voyer and Techentin 2010), some researchers (Anolli et.al 2000, 2002; Laval and Bert-
Erboul 2005) suggested that a sarcastic speaker uses higher pitch. At the same time, 
Shapely (1987) found that pitch ranges were rather ‘flattened.’ It has been suggested 
that the sarcastic speaker may speak louder with increased volume (Anolli et.al 2000, 
2002; Rockwell 2000; Scharrer and Christmann 2011) but Voyer and Techentin (2010) 
have suggested the opposite and Cheang and Pell (2007) found no difference in 
intensity. In addition, acoustic features other than ‘pitch’, ‘tempo’, and ‘intensity’ were 
observed to be crucial for utterances to be taken as sarcastic. Voyer and Techentin 
(2010) suggested that other acoustic characteristic features such as less pitch variation, 
less intensity variation, less resonance, less clarity and stress also produced significant 
differences between sarcasm and non-sarcasm. Cheang and Pell (2008) suggested that 
reduced pitch/fundamental frequency (F0), decreased F0 standard deviation and voice 
quality with greater amount of noise robustly marked in sarcastic utterances whereas 
changes in resonance and slower speech rate appeared to serve as supplementary cues. 
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As is evident, these diverse results suggest that no consensus has been reached in the 
literature on a set of acoustic features which may be most associated with perception of 
the ironic speaker’s intent.  
In response to findings on acoustic features of an ironic tone reported in these 
experimental studies, some studies have raised an objection to the assumption of 
consistency in vocal features of ‘ironical tone of voice’ (Bryant 2010, 2011, 2012; 
Bryant and Fox-Tree 2002, 2005; Voyer and Techentin 2010). In particular, Bryant and 
Fox-Tree (2005:257) argued that ‘there is no particular ironic tone of voice.’ The points 
of their argument are that a) verbal irony may be accompanied by particular vocal 
characteristics; b) however, such vocal characteristics may not be specific to verbal 
irony, merely more closely associated with verbal irony than other categories of 
language use; c) there was no particular prosodic pattern or a set of acoustic features 
that ‘systematically’ applies to all cases of verbal irony. They pointed out 
inconsistencies in definition and prosodic features. They suggested that it is 
oversimplified and misguided to use the term ‘ironical tone of voice’ without any 
definition and indication of associated prosodic features. Bryant and Fox-Tree 
(2005:272) claimed: 
‘Speakers are communicating multiple messages by layering propositional and 
non-propositional information, and providing prosodic cues in contextually 
dependent ways that map differently onto the simultaneously presented 
information…We should expect a variety of prosodic strategies to accommodate 
this incredible diversity of nested emotional and propositional messages. Attempts 
to make one-to-one mappings between acoustic parameters and ironic content 
seem futile from this angle.’ 
Bryant and Fox-Tree (2002:111) strongly suggested that ironic tone of voice is a 
complex interaction of ‘local’ and ‘global’ prosodic cues (also called ‘linguistic’ and 
‘affective’ prosody) to the ironic speaker’s intent. They (2002) defined ‘local prosodic 
cues’ as ‘use of particular acoustic features (F0, amplitude, duration) that operate on 
specific syllables, words or groups of words’, whereas ‘global prosodic cues’ involve 
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‘intonation contours that act on whole utterance or group of utterances characterised by 
five acoustic dimensions such as F0 mean, F0 range, F0 variability, amplitude 
variability and speech rate (p110)’. They suggested that local cues play a role in the 
recognition of an echoed proposition and global prosodic cues are likely to signal the 
speaker’s attitude towards an echoed proposition. Bryant (2010:547) later put 
interaction of ‘local’ and ‘global’ prosodic cues as follows: 
Vocal signals produced to guide listeners’ understanding should function not only 
on surface linguistic features (e.g., local prosody for focus and accent), but also on 
multiple levels of attitudinal information conveyed by the utterance (e.g., global 
prosody for affective information and to signal an ironic intention). 
Bryant and Fox-Tree (2002) focused on the role of local prosodic cues. In this study, 
they prepared utterances which could be taken as sarcastic or non-sarcastic depending 
on the context and then extracted the context to see whether listeners could distinguish 
sarcastic utterances from non-sarcastic utterances. The results showed that even in the 
absence of the context, the target utterances extracted from sarcastic contexts were rated 
significantly more sarcastic than the same utterances extracted from non-sarcastic 
contexts. Bryant and Fox-Tree (2002) suggested that local prosodic cues which 
interacted with individual lexical items might facilitate the rating of sarcasm. Later, 
Bryant and Fox-Tree considered acoustic features of global prosodic information as 
characteristics of the assumed ‘ironical tone of voice.’ They (2005) conducted a follow-
up study which investigated the role of global prosodic cues without being affected by 
local prosodic cues. They created sarcastic utterances, which they described as 
involving ‘dry’ sarcasm, in which sarcastic intent was ambiguous in a written form but 
unambiguous in an auditory form. They eliminated local prosodic features needed to 
identify words in order to leave only basic global prosodic information. The results 
showed that listeners could no longer recognise the speaker’s sarcastic intention from 
filtered utterances. Acoustic analyses revealed that there was very little evidence of 
prosodic features which may distinguish sarcastic from non-sarcastic utterances. Bryant 
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and Fox-Tree (2005) also investigated whether acoustic features of global prosodic cues 
were uniquely associated with sarcasm. They used filtered target utterances, which they 
described as involving ‘dripping’ sarcasm, in which sarcastic intent was unambiguous 
both in a written form and in an auditory form. Listeners were asked to rate ‘sarcasm 
judgement’ and other ‘emotional and linguistic judgements’ (i.e. ‘anger judgement’ as 
other emotion, ‘inquisitiveness’ as non-emotional but prosodically dynamic language 
use, ‘given or new information structure’ as linguistic distinction judgement, ‘the degree 
of authority over a topic’ as a sociolinguistic distinction). The results of judgement 
rating revealed the high degree of similarity and overlap in global prosodic features 
across those different ‘emotional and linguistic judgements.’ Based on such results, a 
conclusion has been suggested (Bryant 2010, 2011, 2012; Bryant and Fox-Tree 2005) 
that there is no such ‘ironic tone of voice’ that is associated exclusively with sarcastic 
utterances. Prosodic cues that the speaker of sarcastic utterances might use are also 
closely related to many other emotional vocal signals (Bryant 2012:679). 
In recent studies, Bryant (2010:545) argued that prosodic ‘contrast’ might be an 
important mechanism for communicating implicit emotional and intentional information 
in verbal irony, and it might be a means of understanding the traditional notion of the 
‘ironic tone of voice’. He considers that vocal signals may contribute to both conceptual 
and procedural meaning (Bryant 2011:295). A prosodic contrast, according to Bryant 
(2011), is ‘a statistically significant and perceivable shift in some acoustic dimension 
across phrasal units that can signal speaker meaning and help guide listeners’ inferential 
processes (2011:295).’ The important thing is to know how the speaker changes vocal 
features during speech to indicate her intent. Thus, he focused on ‘changes’ of vocal 
features which have not been focused on in previous studies. Bryant (2010:556) found 
regularity in prosodic change across verbal ironical utterances: speakers systematically 
spoke slower and amplitude variability was reduced across speakers. Pitch was also 
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changed to a greater degree but the direction of change (higher/lower) was found to be 
inconsistent. He (2011) also suggested a form-function approach to understand 
speakers’ varied vocal signals. This approach considers a form-function relationship 
between form of prosodic signals and the function of verbal irony, and attempts to 
explain how prosodic forms are ‘tailored’ to specific emotional communication rather 
than attempting to map prosodic forms onto verbal irony as one type of language use in 
a systematic way (2011:295). For example, an aggressive and/or critical form of irony 
(sarcasm) is associated with lowered pitch and noisy growl-like voice quality, whereas 
praise-by-blame type of irony is accompanied by rising pitch. While his study provides 
interesting insights, this form-function approach does not seem significantly different 
from the previous studies on characteristic acoustic features of ‘ironical tone of voice’ 
which he and Fox-Tree (Bryant and Fox-Tree 2002, 2005) have criticised. It is not clear 
how different this form-function approach is from the assumption of a ‘one-to-one 
mapping’ between acoustic parameters and ironical utterance. This approach seems to 
suggest particular prosodic forms for sub category of verbal irony, which could be 
described with another ‘label’ (e.g. “praise-by-blame ironic prosodic form”). 
2.3.4 The present study’s viewpoint concerning the ‘ironical tone of voice’    
Discussion so far suggests that acoustic features of the ‘ironical tone of voice’ are not 
the same in all cases of ironical utterances, even if they share some features. An attempt 
to identify prosodic consistency (in features of ironic tone of voice) that systematically 
applied to irony language phenomenon is beyond the scope of this thesis, and it is not an 
aim of the present study to come down on one side or the other of the debate about the 
notion of the ‘ironic tone of voice’. 
While the present study follows the assumption that the term ‘ironical tone of 
voice’ is useful in indicating features of the speaker’s tone often associated with 
potentially ironical utterances, it also assumes that there is no single tone of voice used 
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in irony and that the tone of voice used in irony is not unique to irony. Given the key 
assumption of the relevance-theoretic account of irony that irony is not a natural kind 
(Wilson 2006), it is not surprising that ironical utterances may be produced with more 
than one set of prosodic features (or prosodic patterns). Irony is seen as involving the 
speaker’s implicit expression of a characteristic attitude from a wide range of 
dissociative attitudes, and similarly the speaker’s tone of voice may vary. There might 
be a multiplicity of available speaker’s tones which would be consistent with the 
potential for ironical interpretations. Even under the same condition (the expression of 
the same attitude in the same context), characteristics of the speaker’s tone of voice may 
vary from individual to individual. There is no reason to expect that the ironic speaker 
uses the same characteristic tone of voice in all cases of ironic speech. In addition, given 
that one of the echoic account’s predictions is that irony involves the speaker’s tacit 
expression of her dissociative attitude attributed implicitly, it is not surprising if 
differences between tones which lead to potentially ironical interpretations and tones 
which lead to non-ironical interpretations may be subtle. While exploiting exactly the 
same acoustic dimensions and features, the same prosody may not always serve as a cue 
to potentially ironical interpretations. In other words, there might be cases where the 
speaker uses a regular ironical tone of voice, i.e. the ‘deadpan flat’ tone, without 
intending to be ironic. The borderline which distinguishes each acoustic feature (i.e. 
pitch, tempo, intensity) of the speaker’s tone when conjoined with an ironical utterance 
from their use in other cases may be also gradual. Given these assumptions, the term 
‘ironical tone of voice’ should be treated as referring to varieties of prosody which are 
different from the tone the speaker may have used in expressing a literal counterpart of 
an ironic utterance, and it should not be considered as a tone of voice that systematically 
associates with all cases of verbal irony.   
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While accepting that ironical utterances can be produced not only with the regular 
‘deadpan’ flat tone but also with an ‘overly enthusiastic’ or ‘exaggerated’ one, the 
echoic account (Wilson 2013:46) draws a clear line between these two types of tone. 
The echoic account (Wilson and Sperber 2012:143) describes the latter as “…an 
exaggerated imitation of the tone that someone genuinely performing the associated 
speech act might use.” It argues that the second tone is not an ironic tone but a parodic 
tone of voice which the speaker uses as a parody of the actual speech act of others by 
mimicking the tone of voice of the person who actually makes, did make, or would 
make the assertion.20 The experimental work presented here used these two prosodic 
patterns as tones of voice for potentially ironic utterances in the investigations, i.e. the 
regular ironic tone of voice and the overly-enthusiastic one, describing them as 
‘deadpan’ and ‘exaggerated’ respectively. It assumed that the speaker’s intention of 
dissociation can be expressed not only with ‘deadpan’ tone, the one most commonly 
and typically used in ironical utterances, but also with an ‘exaggerated’ tone.  
2.4 Summary 
This chapter discussed ‘verbal irony’ in L1 contexts. One of the key claims of the 
echoic account of irony is that verbal irony necessarily involves both the speaker’s 
attribution of a thought to others and echoic use of language, a sub-category of 
interpretive-attributive representation. Ironic interpretation involves implicit attribution 
with an implicit dissociative attitude. The echoic account claims that verbal irony arises 
spontaneously with no need to be taught or learned. To understand ironic utterances, no 
substitution mechanism specific to irony is required: it involves cognitive mechanisms 
for interpretations used in basic uses of language and ostensive communicative acts. It 
follows the automatic working of the relevance- guided comprehension heuristic 
																																								 																				
20 See Wilson 2013 and Wilson and Sperber 2012 for fuller discussion about the notions of an ironical tone and a 
parodic tone suggested by pretense theory (Clark and Gerrig 1984).   
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(procedure) which is triggered by expectations of relevance. Having developed from 
Grice’s framework of pragmatics, the relevance- theoretic account of irony differs in 
three major ways: 1) the intended communicative meaning of an ironical utterance is 
not the opposite of the literal meaning but the expression of the speaker’s dissociative 
attitude toward an attributed thought, 2) irony is sharply distinguished from metaphor: 
irony and metaphor do not share similar processes, developmental patterns or risks of 
misunderstanding, 3) access to a literal meaning is not obligatory in order to arrive at 
the speaker’s meaning in an ironical utterance. Discussion of differences between the 
two types of accounts highlighted that the echoic account gives fuller explanations than 
Gricean accounts. 
This chapter also considered the role prosody plays in the interpretation of irony, 
and in particular, the question of whether there is an ‘ironical tone of voice’. The 
speaker’s characteristic tone of voice may play a supplementary role in some cases of 
ironical communication depending on how much the contextual knowledge and the 
background knowledge are mutually manifest between the speakers and the hearers. The 
diverse results from experimental works on vocal features suggested that there may be 
more than one type of tone in which ironical utterances can be produced. A survey of 
these and discussion of the role that prosodic cues play in guiding hearers towards 
potentially ironic interpretations gave a clearer direction to the present experimental 
work. The experimental work discussed here used two types of tone of voice (referred 
to ‘deadpan’ and ‘exaggerated’) each of which can be associated with potentially ironic 
utterances. The details of the experimental work are reported in chapter 5. The next 
chapter discusses how irony understanding in L2 has been explored in previous studies 
adopting Grice’s approach to irony. This study reviews and discusses their findings 
from the point of view of the relevance-theoretic account of irony.  
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CHAPTER 3. PREVIOUS APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING 
IRONY IN L2 CONTEXTS 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter focuses on verbal irony in cross-linguistic and cross-cultural situations (L2 
contexts). The previous chapter discussed how the echoic account (Sperber 1984; 
Sperber and Wilson 1981, 1995, 1998; Wilson 2006, 2009, 2013, 2014a; Wilson and 
Sperber 1992, 2012) explains verbal irony in a first language, contrasting this to Grice’s 
account (1975, 1978). It also considered how prosody contributes to guiding audiences 
to interpret the ironic speaker’s meaning. This chapter looks closely at how previous 
studies have explored understanding of verbal irony in L2 contexts. 
Adopting a Gricean account of inferential communication as a theoretical 
framework, previous experimental studies (Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 
1994b, 1996, 1999; Lee 2002; Manowong 2011; Yamanaka 2003) suggested that 
second language learners of English interpret potentially ironical utterances differently 
from native speakers (here, specifically native speakers of American English). They 
suggested that lack of knowledge of the target language culture was a key factor 
affecting the ability of second language learners to interpret irony.  
Based on the result of his first study (Bouton 1988), which showed a significant 
difference between non-native speakers and native speakers, Bouton questioned the 
universality of Grice’s inferential model of communication. Bouton (1990, 1992b) 
suggested that different interpretations reflected cultural variability in pragmatic 
principles and assumed that such cultural knowledge could be acquired naturally 
through life experiences in the target language culture. He (1992a, 1994a, 1994b, 1999) 
conducted two longitudinal experiments to investigate a relation between the 
development of the ability of L2 speakers to derive conversational implicature and the 
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time they spent in the target culture. These studies showed that developmental progress 
with regard to the ability to understand irony through exposure alone was slow. Bouton 
suggested that a ‘semantic reversal formula’ for the interpretation of irony was one of 
the very ‘skills’ that second language learners needed to be taught and learnt. Bouton’s 
two studies (1994b, 1999) provided evidence that explicit instruction was effective and 
speeded up the developmental progress.  
The present study critically discusses suggestions made by previous studies. Due to 
the weakness of Grice’s approach to irony, previous studies treated irony as necessarily 
communicating the opposite of the proposition literally expressed. Taking some ideas 
from the echoic account of irony, the present study argues that the point of irony is that 
the speaker intends to express her dissociative attitude towards an attributed thought, 
which none of the previous studies has considered. It also argues that the assumption is 
fundamentally wrong that semantic reversal formula leads a given utterance to be 
interpreted ironically. These theoretical issues lead to flawed experimental methods. 
Previous studies (Bouton 1988, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1999; Lee 2002; 
Manowong 2011; Yamanaka 2003) have taken for granted that native speakers always 
understand the speaker’s communicated meaning as intended. Based on the illusion of 
native speakers as norm provider, task performances of second language learners were 
assessed by response accuracy in choosing the same response as native speakers. The 
present study argues that different choices to native speakers do not necessarily indicate 
inabilities or failure to understand the speaker’s implied meaning. All these theoretical 
and methodological issues, in turn raises a question of the extent to which a widely 
accepted idea of L2 irony understanding that irony is the final obstacle before achieving 
near native-speaker fluency (Barbe 1995:4) is convincing.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 focuses on previous studies that 
have applied the Gricean inferential approach to communication to their investigation 
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and reviews the findings from Bouton’s first study (1988), studies that replicated 
Bouton’s experiment (Lee 2002; Manowong 2011), and a study by Yamanaka (2003). 
These studies found that irony is the most difficult item among various phenomena of 
indirect language use. Next, it discusses the effects of length of residence in the target 
language culture and general language proficiency on development of irony 
understanding abilities reported in Bouton’s two longitudinal studies (1992a, 1994a, 
1994b, 1999) and Yamanaka’s study (2003). Then, it considers the effect of explicit 
instruction on speeding up the developmental progress observed in experiments (Bouton 
1994b, 1999, Broersma 1994). Section 3.3 reviews two other studies by Bromberek-
Dyzman, Rataj, and Dylak (2010) and Shively, Menke, and Manzón-Omundson (2008). 
Both studies have applied theoretical approaches other than the Gricean approach and 
have looked more closely at inferential processes involved in the interpretation of 
potentially ironical utterances in L2. These studies suggested other possible factors that 
affect the interpretation processes of ironical utterances: limited capacity of working 
memory and recognition of paralinguistic cues. Section 3.4 considers two factors that 
previous studies have suggested affecting irony interpretation in L2: culture difference 
and perception of paralinguistic cues. 
Previous studies (Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; 
Bromberek-Dyzman and Ewert 2010; Lee 2002; Manowong 2011) suggested the 
culture-dependent differences in conceptualisation and their reflections in pragmatic 
strategies for interpretation. On the other hand, while some studies (Lee 2002, 
Manowong 2011; Shively 2008; Yamanaka 2003) mentioned that awareness of prosodic 
cues might be another factor that affects the interpretation processes of ironical 
utterances in L2, none of the studies has explored this possibility further. It summarises 
what has been known about how non-native speakers recognise prosodic cues. Then, 
section 3.5 critically discusses the issues arising from these previous studies. The 
62		
present study argues that their issues are involved mainly in a) reflections of weakness 
of Grice’s approach to irony and b) sociopragmatic approaches to interlanguage 
pragmatic competence. These issues in turn, cast some doubt on their suggestions about 
understanding irony in L2. The chapter ends with an indication of some other possible 
ways of investigating the nature of L2 irony comprehension, which will be considered 
more fully in Chapter 4. 
3.2 The Gricean approach to L2 irony understanding 
3.2.1 Bouton’s first experiment 
Bouton (1988) applied the framework of Grice’s approach to communication (Grice 
1967a, b/1978) in investigating the ability of non-native speakers of English (NNSs) to 
derive21 ‘conversational implicatures’ from a range of kinds of indirect language: irony, 
understated criticism, indirect criticism, scalar (quantifier/numerical scale), implicatures 
related to Maxim of Relation (Grice 1967a, b/1978), sequence of events (Horn 1984), 
and rhetorical questions, which Bouton describes as “the Pope Q”.22 The results of his 
first experiment revealed that non-native speakers interpreted various types of indirect 
use of language as a whole in the same way as native speakers of American English at 
75% [79.5%]23 of the time. Significant differences were found not only between non- 
native speakers and native speakers of American English but also found among different 
cultural groups. These findings led Bouton to question the universality of Grice’s 
																																								 																				
21 Bouton used the expression ‘interpret conversational implicature’ throughout his studies (1988, 1990, 1992a, 
1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999). Bouton (1999:47) sees ‘conversational implicature’ as indirect 
communication (1999:47). The present study does not agree with this idea and argue that ‘implicature’ does not 
refer only to indirect language uses. Thus, the words ‘derive’ or ‘derivation’ are used in this thesis where 
Bouton used the words ‘interpret’ or ‘interpretation.’ This matter is discussed later in this chapter. 
22 Rhetorical questions such as the question ‘Is the Pope a catholic?’ to answer a question whose answer is 
supposed to be rather obvious. 
23	The figure 75% was based on the scores over all 33 items originally used in his first experiment whereas the 
figure 79.5% was taken from Bouton (1994b). The difference was due to the difference in the number of the 
testing items between the original instrument and the revised one. Over the time of his longitudinal studies, 
Bouton decided to take out 5 items (including 2 items of irony) due to their unreliability as testing items. 
Bouton reanalysed the data based on these 28 items from the revised instrument and as a result, the figure of the 
testing on the arrival in the first longitudinal study was raised up to 79.5%. The figure has been reported as 
79.5 % in his several papers since 1994.	
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inferential model of communication and motivated Bouton to conduct his longitudinal 
experiments.  
Bouton (1999:47) explained Grice’s inferential model of communication 
(1967a.b/1978) as below: 
‘When the literal meaning of what someone says does not seem to provide 
enough information or to be true or relevant or clear, people assume that the 
speaker is being cooperative and that it is their understanding of what the 
speaker has said that is flawed, not the utterance itself- and they look for 
another message that might have been intended that would be appropriate to 
the conversational context at that moment. Messages arrive at indirectly in this 
way are said to be derived through the use of implicature.’ 
Bouton (1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999) treated ‘conversational 
implicature’ as ‘a type of indirect communication’ in which the speaker indirectly 
conveyed her intended meaning24 (1999:47). He (1990) explained that ‘an implicature is 
a message that is conveyed indirectly by taking advantage of what Grice has called the 
Cooperative Principle and its various maxims (p.35).’ The literal meaning of what was 
said in an utterance is ‘direct’ whereas ‘implicature’ is indirect or less direct than the 
literal meaning. He referred the term ‘implicature/conversational implicature’ not only 
to the speaker’s intended meaning indirectly conveyed but also to ‘inferential process of 
drawing context-based inferences’ (1999:47).  
In his first experiment, Bouton (1988) created written materials25 in which 
participants were asked to read a dialogue and to choose the ‘expected’ interpretation. 
Prior to this experiment Bouton conducted a pilot study. He using the same scenarios as 
those used in the experiment and asked native speakers to describe in their own words 
what the speaker of each scenario may have meant by what she said. The ‘expected’ 
answers were based on the responses that formed the broadest consensus among those 
native speakers.  He tested 436 international undergraduate students who had just 
																																								 																				
24 Bouton used ‘implicature’ and ‘conversational implicature’ interchangeably throughout all his papers. 
25 Bouton (1988) used 33 trials in total consisting of 7 different types of conversational implicature. 
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arrived at a university in the US from six different cultural backgrounds: Chinese, 
German, Japanese, Korean, Latin Americans and Taiwanese (Bouton 1988, 1992a, 
1999). He compared their task performances with those of 28 native speakers of 
American English (Native speakers of American English). Here are the examples:26 
[singing badly] 
At the recent party, there was a lot of singing and piano playing. At one point, 
Sue played the piano while Mary sang. When Tom asked a friend what Mary 
had sung, the friend said: 
Friend: I’m not sure, but Sue was playing ‘My Wild Irish Rose’. 
Question: Which of the following is the closest to what the friend meant by 
this remark? 
a. He was only interested in Sue and did not listen to Mary. 
b. Mary sang very badly. 
c. Mary and Sue were not doing the same song. 
d. The song that Mary sang was ‘My Wild Irish Rose.’ 
[good friend] 
Bill and Peter have been good friends since they were children. 
They roomed together in college and travelled Europe together after 
graduation. Now friends have told Bill that they saw Peter dancing with Bill’s 
wife while Bill was away. 
Bill: Peter knows how to be a really good friend. 
Question: Which of the following best says what Bill means? 
a. Peter is not acting the way a good friend should. 
b. Peter and Bill’s wife are becoming really good friends while Bill is away. 
c. Peter is a good friend, so Bill can trust him. 
d. Nothing should be allowed to interfere with Bill and Peter’s friendship. 
 
The results from the testing on their arrival showed that irony appeared to be one of the 
cases where a significant difference was found between non-native speakers and native 
speakers of American English. Table 3.1 below shows the difference between two 
groups in the four trials of irony. The results revealed irony, indirect criticism, scalar 
type of implicatures and ‘the POPE Q’ rhetorical questions turned out to be the difficult 
																																								 																				
26 Bouton did not present the full description of the other two trials but only an essence of the content and the 
target sentence; 
“Dr. Sharp made a little mistake, I hear. /Not everyone wants scissors inside them.” 
“We’re out of . . . /Could you bring me a glass of water?” 
65		
items. On the other hand, non-native speakers interpreted implicatures related to Maxim 
of Relation in the expected way at almost 90% of the time on average (accuracy rate of 
native speakers of American English was 97.3%). 
Table 3.1: Difference in accuracy rate between NSs and NNSs in the trials with irony examples27 
(Bouton 1988:190) 
Essence of content NSs  
(n=28) 
NNSs 
(n=451) 
difference 
What did Mary sing? / I don’t know, but Sue was playing 
‘My Wild Irish Rose.’ 
93% 52% 41% 
Peter knows how to be a really good friend.  86% 39% 47% 
Originally Bouton used four trials with ironical utterances in his first experiment. 
However, as two of them were found unreliable as an example of irony, Bouton 
excluded them (c.f. footnote 24). The trial with the example [good friend] displays the 
widest difference between non-native speakers and native speakers of American 
English. Only 39% of non-native speakers had chosen what Bouton took to be the 
expected answer (a) (Peter is not acting the way a good friend should). Differences 
were also found between cultural groups: the percentage of choosing the expected 
answer varied ranging from 70% for Spanish/Portuguese speakers to 33% for mainland 
Chinese speakers from mainland. Bouton pointed out, however, that while the majority 
of non-native speakers did not choose the expected answer, their choice did not vary 
across different cultural groups. The majority of non-native speakers had chosen the 
‘wrong’ answer (c) (Peter is good friend and so Bill can trust him) instead, which he 
took to indicate that they had missed the irony completely. Bouton pointed out that the 
only variable here that makes the results of each cultural group of non-native speakers 
different was their cultural background as the language proficiency of all the non-native 
																																								 																				
27 This table is the extract taken from the table 6, ‘Evidence of NS consensus and cross-cultural difference in 
interpreting implicatures in English’ in Bouton (1988:190). 
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speakers was essentially the same (the average of language proficiency level was a 
score of 550 in TOEFL28). Bouton (1988) suggested that lack of the specific American 
cultural knowledge for inference or/and unfamiliarity with particular types of indirect 
use of language might cause the differences that were found between non-native 
speakers and native speakers of American English. These two factors might contribute 
to the obstacles that L2 speakers need to overcome for successful cross-cultural 
communication.  
It seems worth pointing out that almost all the options in multiple-choice question 
in each example could be taken as communicated to some extent. Adopting Grice’s 
account of irony that the point of irony is to communicate the opposite of the 
proposition literally expressed, Bouton assumed that only the option (c) (Mary sang 
very badly) in the [singing badly] example and the option (a) (Peter is not acting the 
way a good friend should) in the [good friend] example are “correctly” described 
interpretations of the speaker’s meaning. However, as the echoic account of irony 
(Sperber 1984; Sperber and Wilson 1981, 1995, 1998; Wilson 2006, 2009, 2012, 2013; 
Wilson and Sperber 1992, 2012) suggests, irony is not clear-cut easily definable 
language phenomenon. Considering indeterminacies about the interpretation of the 
ironical utterance in these examples, it seems questionable the extent to which these 
accuracy rates in choosing these “expected” option revealed in previous studies (Bouton 
1988, Lee 2003, Manowong 2011) represented non-native speakers’ understanding of 
irony. This will be discussed further in section 3.5.1.  
Bouton (1988) initially set out his research with the aim of exploring whether 
Grice’s pragmatic principles and his maxims were universal. Bouton (1992b) reflected 
upon the results of his first experiment (Bouton 1988) and raised some doubt about 
																																								 																				
28 This score is equivalent to a score of 6.5 in IELTS.  
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Grice’s pragmatic principles as the ‘structure’ of all languages, and his maxims as 
universal rules of conversations. He (1992b: 40) pointing out that Grice’s principles 
were developed in English argued that Grice did ‘not deal directly with the possibility of 
extending his principles and maxims to other languages and cultures’. Bouton suggested 
that ‘speakers from different cultural and linguistic backgrounds might use 
“implicature” differently and such implicatures may be perceived where none are 
intended or they may be intended but missed (1992b: 42).’ He took up the findings 
observed in earlier studies (Devine 1982; Keenan 1976) as evidence for his argument. 
Keenan (1976) reported that people in Madagascar systematically violate Grice’s 
maxim of Quantity (‘Make your contribution as informative as is required’): they refuse 
to supply information required since keeping such information to themselves is regarded 
as precious in the society, and it gives conferring status on those who have it. Keenan 
argued that Grice’s principles and maxims for communication might be overstated and 
that maxims may vary situationally and cross-culturally. Devine (1982) also addressed a 
question of whether any situational or cultural constraints might interfere with Grice’s 
pragmatic principle and maxims. As she (Devine 1982:195) put it:	
‘if as Grice suggests, these rules of conversations and the manipulation of 
these rules to create implicature are universal phenomena, then there should 
be clear cases of implicature in all languages…if Grice’s maxims are 
genuinely universal, then they should operate across language.’ 
  
Grice (1975) suggested that since it is reasonable to follow the Cooperative Principles 
and maxims, the failure to fulfil the maxims must be purposeful communicative 
behaviour, which conveys conversational implicature or implications. Grice (1975:49) 
suggested that the failure to follow the maxims involved a variety of forms such as quiet 
and unostentatious violation of a maxim, opting out from the operation of both the 
maxims and the Cooperative Principles, clashing the maxims, and blatant flout of a 
maxim. Based on these forms, according to Grice (1975:51-52), conversational 
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implicature falls into three major categories: 1) ‘unstated connection between remarks’ 
(no maxim is violated, or it is not clear which maxim is violated); 2) ‘clash of two 
maxims’ (a speaker may find that two maxims clash and that it is necessary to choose 
one over the other), 3) ‘flouting of maxims’ (a speaker may choose to flout a maxim by 
obviously failing to fulfil the demands of the rule and not attempting to hide this from 
the listener). Devine (1982) adopting these categories of implicatures, investigated 
whether Grice’s maxims operate across languages. She assessed the ability of non- 
native speakers to understand implicatures in L2 by comparing their perceptions of 
implicature in English with those of native speakers. Non-native speakers were asked to 
read brief situational descriptions and paraphrased them. Each description contained an 
example of conversational implicature. The paraphrased responses were then evaluated. 
Devine reported that the mixed results were found: non-native speakers and native 
speakers did not always respond to the failure to fulfil the maxims in the same way. For 
example, non-native speakers inferred implicatures in the same way as native speakers 
when no maxim was violated, when it was not clear which maxim is violated, or when a 
speaker may find that two maxims clash and so that she must choose one over the other. 
In terms of violation/flouting of the Maxims, depending on which the Maxim was 
flouted, non-native speakers interpreted given utterances in a similar way as native 
speakers. Especially when the maxims of quality and manner were flouted, the same 
interpretations were triggered. Devine considered the implied meaning of irony as the 
case of flouting of the maxim of quality. In her study, she used two examples of irony, 
which presented below:  
- Bill and Peter have been friends since they were children. They roomed 
together in college and travelled together after graduation. Bill has just 
learned that Peter has been dating his (Bill’s) fiancée. Bill says to a group 
of friends, “Peter is a fine friend.” - Professor Jones has just given a long, boring, and pointless lecture. As the 
students are leaving the lecture hall, one says, “We could all learn a lot from 
Professor Jones.” 
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The results revealed that no significant difference was found between non-native 
speakers and native speakers. 
On the other hand, significant differences were found in the case of flouting of the 
maxims of quantity and relation. In the case of flouting of the maxim of relation, native 
speakers succeeded 96% at the time while non-native speakers did so 70% at the time. 
In the case of flouting of the maxim of quantity, neither native speakers nor non-native 
speakers appeared to understand the implied meaning as readily: native speakers 
understood it 56% of the time whereas non-native speakers understood 20%. Devine 
reported that her study did not confirm the universality of Grice’s rules of conversation: 
non-native speakers were not necessarily aware of use or failure to fulfil the maxims. 
She (1982:194) suggested that these results supported the findings from Keenan’s study: 
how a speaker and a hearer are expected to behave with respect to the Cooperative 
Principle and the maxims, which she described as ‘the expectations of interlocutors’ 
vary from culture and culture and from situation and situation. She (1982:203) 
concluded that Grice’s assertion about the conversational rules he formulated is a 
simplification of conversational interaction, which appeared to be a complex 
phenomenon. 
Bouton (1992b: 38) argued that that ‘implicature’ was not understood as part of the 
structure of all language in the same way. In the light of findings of these studies 
(Bouton 1988, Devine 1982, Keenan 1976), he suggested that non-native speakers as a 
hearer (listener) need to have ‘skills’ of deriving ‘implicature’ for successful cross- 
cultural and cross-linguistic communication.  
3.2.2 Other studies on the ability of non-native speakers to interpret ironical 
utterances  
Bouton’s studies (1988, 1992a, 1994a, 1994b 1999) had a great influence on subsequent 
studies on the comprehension of conversational implicatures in L2. Lee (2002) and 
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Manowong (2011) replicated Bouton’s studies to investigate conversational implicature 
understanding by Korean and Thai speakers of English respectively. Yamanaka (2003) 
using audio-visual materials investigated this ability of Japanese L2 speakers of English. 
This subsection discusses the findings of these studies. 
Lee (2002) and Manowong (2011) conducted similar experiments to Bouton’s first 
study, testing performances of Korean and Thai speakers of English respectively. They 
replicated the experimental design of Bouton’s studies (1988, 1944a, 1944b, 1999) for 
their investigations. The materials in both studies included two examples of ironical 
utterances that were more or less the same as Bouton’s examples presented just above. 
They also used an introspective verbal reporting method known as a post-test ‘think-
aloud’ interview session29 to explore reasons for their choice of their answers and what 
kinds of strategies they had used. Lee (2002) found similar results to Bouton’s. Her 
results showed that a statistically significant difference (p < .01) between Korean 
participants and Native speakers of American English in the accuracy of choosing the 
‘correct’ answer was found in the trial with irony example [good friend]30 but not trials 
with other types of language use31. Comments from the interview session clearly 
pointed to the existence of different cultural norms about marriage or friendship from 
those of American participants. Lee (2002) suggested that in Korean male culture, the 
quality of a man’s character is judged by his loyalty to his friends and consideration for 
others. Korean people saw this as fulfilling a responsibility as a good friend: it is 
responsible for men to take care of a good friend’s wife. Another possible way of 
judging this situation from a Korean cultural point of view, Lee continued, was that the 
																																								 																				
29 Lee (2002) conducted ‘think-aloud’ interview with Korean participants in Korean. Manowong (2011) did 
this in Thai. 
30 Lee (2002) adopted the context and choices of multiple-questions in the example from Bouton’s studies but 
changed the names of characters, wording or sentences in the scenario. She also added another option as a blank 
so that participants could fill in an alternative interpretation in case where participants did not agree with any of 
four choices given. 
31 There were only two trials where a significant difference was found. One was in this trial with    irony and the 
other was in the trial with the example of understated negative criticism.	
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speaker intends to save his friend’s face out of responsibility as a man. This was why 
Korean participants did not take the speaker as being ironic or sarcastic. Lee (2002) 
pointed out that Korean participants seemed to interpret a given utterance based on their 
own cultural values. Lee also described differences found in the results of the trial with 
the other example of irony [singing badly] (presented below).32 She (2002:13) reported 
that 73% of native speakers of American English had chosen the option d (‘Mary sang 
very badly’), which she took to mean that they took this utterance as expressing the 
speaker’s negative evaluation.	While Korean L2 speakers chose the same option as 
Native speakers of American English,33 comments from the interview revealed that they 
took the speaker’s intent as ‘creating humorous ambiance to liven up the conversation.’ 
[Lee’s version of “singing badly”] 
At a recent party, there was a lot of singing and piano playing. At one point 
Sue played the piano while Mary sang. When someone who had not been at 
the party asked Bob what song Mary had sung, Bob said, 
Bob: I’m not sure, but Sue was playing a song named “We are the World’. 
Question: Which of the following is the closest to what Bob meant by this 
remark? 
a. He was only interested in Sue and did not listen to Mary. 
b. Mary and Sue were not doing the same song. 
c. The song that Mary sang was ‘We are the World”. 
d. Mary sang very badly. 
e. Other:  
 
Korean L2 speakers took this example as a case of humour not perceiving any negative 
implications. Lee stated that those comments supported the view that non-native 
speakers interpret given utterances based on their native cultural values and norms. 
The results from the study of Manowong showed that the accuracy rate of Thai L2 
speakers was very low in both trials with irony examples [good friend] and [singing 
																																								 																				
32 Like the other example [good friend], although the names of characters, wording or sentences in the scenario 
were not exactly the same as the example [singing badly] used by Bouton, the context and choices of multiple-
questions were the same. 
33 Not all the data of the percentage of NNS was reported in Table 1: Tabulations of responses for NS and NNS 
arranged according to the grouping of similar type of implicatures in Lee’s paper (2002:8). 
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badly] (20% in one example and 30% in the other).34 Although irony did not appear to 
be the most difficult type of implicature in her study, these low accuracy rates clearly 
indicated that Thai L2 speakers had trouble with interpreting ironical utterances. (Note 
that Manowong did not collect data from native speakers of English for comparison.) 
Yamanaka (2003) also carried out an investigation comparing the performances of 
Japanese L2 speakers with those of native speakers of American English. She applied 
Gumperz’s ideas of ‘contextualization’ (1992) in which both verbal and non-verbal 
‘signs’ were playing an important role in inferential processes. As he put it: 
‘I use the term, “contextualization” to refer to speakers’ and listeners’ use 
of verbal and nonverbal signs to relate what is said at any one time and in 
any one place to knowledge acquired through past experience, in order to 
retrieve the presuppositions, they must rely on to maintain conversational 
involvement and assess what is intended. (Gumperz 1992:230)’ 
 
The experimental design of Yamanaka’s study was different from the one used in 
Bouton’s studies. Yamanaka developed an audio-visual comprehension test with an 
attempt to explore whether Japanese L2 speakers of English make use of verbal and 
non-verbal ‘clues’ as inferential strategies in similar ways to native speakers of 
American English. Excerpts from different types of TV programmes aired in the US 
were used for testing (i.e. comedy shows, interview programmes, group discussion 
situations, daytime dramas). The types of indirect use of language she investigated were 
irony, implied negative evaluation, parody, implicature related to the Maxim of Relation, 
rhetorical questions. Four examples of irony (‘sarcasm’, ‘situational irony’, 
‘cynicism/irony’) were included. Yamanaka (2003:138), referring to Gibbs (1994:372), 
regarded ‘sarcasm’ as a ‘sub- category’ of irony where the speaker mocks the target’s 
speech act (p.138). She also regarded ‘situational irony’ as the situation that turned out 
to be against one’s expectation or belief (p.133). The task asked participants to: 1) 
																																								 																				
34 Manowong (2011) did not indicate which one was [good friend]. 
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choose the ‘correct’35 interpretation from four multiple-choice options, and 2) write 
down what kinds of contextual clue(s) they used to make a choice of interpretation. The 
results revealed that understanding of irony appeared to be much more challenging for 
Japanese participants than for native speakers of American English. As shown in Table 
3. 2 below, the results revealed that Japanese participants’ accuracy rate in choosing the 
‘correct’ interpretations was very low compared to the native speakers of American 
English. She reflected that the NS standard in the example of situational irony did not 
reach 100 % due to a problem with contents of the distractor in multiple-choice 
question. 
Table 3.2: Difference in accuracy rate between NSs and NNSs in the trials with irony examples 
	
Yamanaka has also found that there was a difference between native speakers of 
American English and Japanese participants in the contextual clue(s) they reported. She 
reported that Japanese participants seemed to have missed contextual clue(s) that would 
have guided them to interpret a given utterance correctly. Most native speakers of 
American English said that they had drawn the ‘correct’ answer from non-verbal clues 
such as the character’s tone of voice, facial expression, body language, gestures, or 
information from the situation of the scene. By contrast, comments collected in post-test 
interviews revealed that number of Japanese participants who mentioned use of these 
contextual clues were very few. 
																																								 																				
35 Yamanaka described the ‘correct’ interpretation as ‘conforming to the NS standard (p.116)’. She did not give 
any further explanation about it (i.e. how she set the NS standard or what the NS standard was), but it was 
assumed that the NS standard was corresponding to her assumption of what the majority of native speakers 
would choose. 
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3.2.3 Bouton’s longitudinal studies 
Bouton (1988) suggested that lack of the specific American cultural knowledge and/or 
unfamiliarity with particular types of indirect use of language specific to English might 
contribute to the obstacles for L2 speakers to achieve successful cross-cultural 
communication. Bouton assumed that such culture knowledge could be acquired 
naturally through life experiences in the target language culture. To that end, he 
conducted two longitudinal experiments to investigate a relation between the 
development of the ability of L2 speakers to derive conversational implicature and the 
time they spent in the target culture. 
Bouton (1992a, 1994a, 1994b, 1999) tested the same participants on several 
occasions (17 months, 33 months and 54 months after first tested on arrival in the US) 
to observe the development of the ability to derive the same implicature as native 
speakers, which Bouton described as “implicature skills” in interpreting indirect use of 
language in the course of time.36 The results suggested that the interpretation abilities of 
non-native speakers for ironic examples did not follow the same developmental path as 
for other types. Irony remained a difficult type even after living in the target language 
culture for 54 months. The accuracy rate of non-native speakers to interpret other types 
of indirect language had increased significantly in the course of time and the difference 
between non-native speakers and native speakers of American English had diminished. 
The results showed that non-native speakers interpreted indirect uses of languages in 
similar ways as native speakers of American English by 17 months after the arrival (at 
																																								 																				
36 The first longitudinal experiment was conducted during 1986-1991, testing non-native speakers on their 
arrival and 54 months later (see Bouton 1988, 1992a 1999 for the details). The second longitudinal 
experiment was conducted during 1990-1993, testing 375 of non-native speakers on their arrival, 17 months 
later and 33 months later (see Bouton 1994a, 1994b, 1999 for the details) comparing their responses to those 
of 77 native speakers of American English. In the second longitudinal study, Bouton developed the material 
he used in the first longitudinal experiment. He removed some items, which had appeared to be of 
questionable validity from the original 33 items, and repaired some of the contents of the rest. He also added 
two new items based on implicature related to the Pope Q and the one based on the example of scalar 
implicature used by Levinson (1983, cited in Bouton 1994a: 164). In total, 22 items of conversational 
implicature were used for testing. Bouton included three more items as distractors, which did not involve 
implicature but he did not count these three trials for data analysis (1994a). 
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90.6% of the time).  Although “implicature skills” continued to develop (at 94.1% of the 
time after 33 months), Bouton (1994b, 1999) suggested that the growth curve seemed to 
be levelling off. However, the results of the same longitudinal experiment revealed that 
irony appeared to be a ‘barrier to effective cross-cultural communication’ (Bouton 
1994a: 166). When university students who had been living in the US for between 4 and 
7 years37 were tested, similar results were obtained. Table 3.3 shows the growth in 
accuracy rate in the trials with ironical utterances.38 
Table 3.3: Progress in percentage of choosing the expected answer in examples of irony 
Example of irony on arrival 17-month-
group 
33-month-
group 
4-7-year group NSs 
(N=375) (n =34) (n =35) (n= 34) (n=77) 
[good friend] 47 53 60 56 75 
[singing badly] 51 53 57 76 84 
      
      
This result was parallel with the result in the first longitudinal study (1992a), where 
Bouton compared the data on their arrival with those collected 54 months later. In the 
example of irony [good friend], the accuracy rate of L2 speakers was only 50% even 
after 54 months. Relatively many L2 speakers had still chosen the option of literal 
interpretation (‘Peter is a good friend, so Bill can trust him’). 
Based on these findings Bouton (1992a, 1994a, 1994b, 1999) suggested that the 
length of living in the US did not facilitate development of the ability of L2 speakers to 
interpret ironical utterances. Yamanaka (2003) also investigated the development of 
Japanese speakers’ pragmatic comprehension abilities in relation to length of residence 
in the target language cultural context. Her study found similar results. Her Japanese 
participants were categorised into three different groups depending on their length of 
residence in the U.S.: ‘short-term’ (0-17 months), ‘medium-term’ (18-53 months), and 
																																								 																				
37 Bouton collected the data from a group of Chinese university students who had been living in the US 
between 4 and 7 years for comparison. 
38 This is extracted from ‘Table 4’ Implicatures listed in table 2 as difficult for L2 speakers’ in Bouton’s 
study (1999:57). 
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‘long-term (54 months and more). The results found little effect of the length of 
residence on irony comprehension abilities. 
Conducting these two longitudinal studies, Bouton also considered the effect of 
general language proficiency on the development of the “implicature skills.” The results 
of his studies (Bouton 1992a, 1994a, 1994b, 1999) seem to support the view of Barbe 
(1995:45) that ‘…foreign language humour, irony, and the like are the final obstacles 
before achieving near native-speaker fluency.’ While a definite correlation between 
language proficiency and “implicature skills” was found in interpreting other types of 
indirect language, language proficiency seems not to be a reliable predictor of high 
performance in interpreting ironical utterances. Bouton (1992a, 1994a, 1994b) found 
that the ability of non-native speakers to interpret ironical utterances did not increase 
along with the growth of general language proficiency 54 months after first tested on 
their arrival. Similar results were found in Yamanaka’s study (2003). She reported that, 
while the correlation between proficiency level and accuracy in the task performance of 
Japanese L2 speakers was not negligible in other types of indirect language, the effect 
of language proficiency on the interpretation of irony was marginal. Other studies (Lee 
2002; Manowong 2011) also found that interpretations of ironical utterances appeared 
to be difficult regardless of proficiency level. 
3.2.4 The effects of explicit teaching ‘skills’ necessary to interpret irony 
As discussed above, the results of his two longitudinal studies (1992a, 1994a, 1994b 
1999) revealed that neither the growth of language proficiency nor the length of 
residence showed positive effects on the development of irony interpretation abilities. 
Bouton (1999) suggested that explicit classroom instruction would speed up the 
developmental progress in non-native speakers’ skill in deriving implicatures and 
Bouton’s investigations (1994b, 1999) supported this idea. Lee (2011:12) also suggested 
that L2 speakers could improve their ability to observe how language is used in a 
77		
community by directing their attention to the contextual and linguistic cues that govern 
implicatures. There is the need for L2 learners to ‘raise their level of critical awareness’ 
not only of how knowledge of the target language culture interface with the language 
but also of how the speaker’s meaning was guided by what Lee called ‘suprasegmental 
features’ such as relevant gestures, facial expressions, intonations and tone. However, 
she did not explore this further. There have been numerous studies that have explored 
the extent to which the ability to understand particular phenomena of speech acts or 
implicatures could be taught39. Although their suggestions are equally valuable, for the 
purpose of the present study this thesis discusses only studies that have considered the 
effects of teaching relevant to the comprehension of irony.   
Bouton (1999) pointed out that developmental progress of L2 learners’ pragmatic 
comprehension abilities through living in the target language societies alone was slow 
and not complete. Bouton (1990:43) claimed that ‘“implicature” is often used to convey 
all or part of a speaker’s message… skill in the use and interpretation of implicature is a 
necessary element of the communicative competence of anyone who plans to be an 
effective participant in conversational interaction.’ He (1994a) assumed that not only 
specific cultural knowledge but also a specific ‘type of reasoning’ would enhance L2 
learners’ developmental progress. As Bouton (1994b:98) put it; 
‘…the opaqueness of particular implicatures in a specific situation depends to 
some extent on the cultural background of each of the participants involved, 
and we have been unable to keep the cultural makeup of the various samples 
exactly the same. However, this study suggests that another factor that makes 
one type of implicature difficult to learn is the type of reasoning necessary to 
work out the intended message.’ 
Bouton (1994b, 1999) categorised indirect uses of language used in his studies into two 
types, ‘formulaic implicature’ and ‘idiosyncratic implicature,’ depending on ‘the type of 
																																								 																				
39 See Ifantidou (2014) for an extensive summary and an excellent discussion of previous studies on the topic of 
teaching pragmatic competence. See also Kasper (1997) for discussion of possibilities and limits to the teaching of 
pragmatic competence. 
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reasoning.’ Bouton (1994b: 98-99) considered that a structural or a semantic formula 
underlies the whole range of ‘formulaic implicatures’. Recognition of the formula as 
such triggers ‘formulaic implicatures’. Irony was considered as ‘formulaic.’ Bouton 
assumed that the underlying feature of ironical utterances is a semantic formula. Irony 
as well as indirect criticism, sequence of events (Horn 1984) and the ‘POPE Q’ were 
considered to be categorised into ‘formulaic implicatures’. Bouton assumed that some 
sort of systematic semantic formula “forms” ironical utterances. Bouton did not explain 
exactly what was involved in this semantic formula but treated semantic reversal 
formula (i.e. looking for the opposite of what was said) as a “skill’ which L2 learners 
needed to acquire in order to understand ironical utterances. On the other hand, Bouton 
(1994b, 1999) treated as ‘idiosyncratic’ conversational implicatures where 
interpretations depend idiosyncratically on ‘the relationship between a particular 
utterance and its context that is related to specific cultural knowledge’. This type 
includes implicatures related to the Maxim of Relation (Grice 1967a, b/1978), the 
minimum requirement rules (Levinson 1983) and scalar type of implicatures (Levinson 
1983). Bouton (1994b) suggested that interpretations of the ‘idiosyncratic’ type were 
based on specific cultural knowledge. He argued that interpretations of the 
‘idiosyncratic’ type were based on ‘the speaker and the hearer having a common 
perception of the principles of conversation and a mutual understanding of the context 
of the utterance in all its complexity (p.98).’  
Bouton conducted a pilot study (1994b) and an experiment (1999) to investigate the 
effects of explicit instruction on development in the ability of L2 learners to derive both 
‘formulaic’ type and ‘idiosyncratic’ type of implicatures. “Skills” in deriving six types 
of conversational implicatures40 were taught in this experiment. The results of Bouton’s 
																																								 																				
40 The six types were implicatures related to: irony; indirect criticism; sequence of events and Pope Q 
(‘formulaic’ types of implicatures); scalar-related implicatures; implicatures related to the Maxim of Relation 
(‘idiosyncratic’ types of implicatures). See Bouton (1999) for details about ‘formulaic- idiosyncratic’ 
categorisation. 
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investigations (1994b, 1999) revealed that classroom instruction on specific rules and 
patterns was highly effective at interpreting ‘formulaic’ type of implicatures including 
irony. On the other hand, the explicit instruction for ‘idiosyncratic’ type of implicatures 
had no effect. Bouton stated that this result could be explained by the culture-dependent 
nature of the ‘idiosyncratic’ type of implicatures. Bouton (1994b, 1999) and Broersma 
(1994) suggested that the cultural knowledge necessary for interpretations was arbitrary 
and varied context by context.  
The instruction41 of his investigations was designed to help EFL learners to master 
skills necessary to derive particular types of implicature in similar way to native 
speakers. Each introductory session lasted from 20 to 40 minutes for one type of 
language use. These sessions were set as a part of the syllabus in classes of a regular 
university ESL course. The language proficiency of these L2 learners was advanced. 
Bouton tested EFL learners on their arrival. These EFL learners were then assigned to 
either the experimental group with the explicit instructional sessions or the control 
group without it. After having 6 sessions (6 weeks after the arrival), EFL learners of 
both groups took the same test. Their performances were assessed before and after the 
instruction period. Bouton advised teachers on achieving the following objectives of the 
instruction: making the students aware of different types of indirect communication 
as normal tools of indirect communication in American English. Using a hand-out 
with examples, teachers defined and labelled each type of indirect communication, 
and provided several examples of how they might work in specific contexts 
i. helping them to find examples of different types of indirect communication in 
both American English and in their own languages (where such examples 
exist) 
ii. helping them to learn to recognise and interpret indirect communication they 
hear in their daily interaction with others 
iii. encouraging them to use indirect communication in appropriate situations 
																																								 																				
41 See Broersma (1994) for details about the teaching sessions. 
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(Bouton1994b: 102)  
Teachers started an introductory session by introducing the topic of language use with 
some example. At the end of the session, teachers often asked students to introduce to 
the class an example of the same type of language use if it existed in their native 
language. By generating a dialogue of their own in English, students were given a 
chance to practice the ‘skill’ that they had just learnt. After the introductory session, 
more informal instruction was given every 3 or 4 days during a 6-week period. The 
teachers bringing up some examples in the classes occasionally reminded students of 
“conversational implicatures” (use of language) that had already been introduced. So L2 
learners could familiarise themselves with cases of such uses of language. Below are 
examples of irony used in the pilot study (Bouton 1994b) and the experiment (Broersma 
1994):42  
[an example of irony used in the pilot study]  
A: Hi, Anne. 
B: Hi Joan. What’s up? 
A: I was wondering if I could ask a small favour of you. Would you read my 
Linguistics 441 paper? 
B: Gosh, Joan, I wish I could, but I promised Jack I’d go bowling with him 
tonight. 
A: Yeah. Well, Thanks for the help! 
(Bouton 1994b: 101) 
[examples used in the experiment] 
Example 1: Jill has just baked a cake which looks horrible. 
Jill: What do you think of my cake? Julie: It’s a real work of art. 
What does Julie mean? How can you tell? 
Example 2: George just discovered that he has to take another class when he 
thought he was finished with the requirements for his degree.  
George: I won’t be able to graduate this semester. I have to take a course I 
didn’t know about. 
Brenda: You must be really excited about that! 
																																								 																				
42 Broersma was a teaching assistant in ESL classrooms where Bouton’s pilot test and experiment took place. 
He (1994) provided a report based on teaching journals of his own and of his three colleagues, with transcripts 
of lessons. 
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What does Brenda mean? 
Example 3: Sharif and Imran are taking about a friend who is failing all of his 
classes. 
Sharif: I don’t know why Fred wastes his time and money going to school. 
Imran: He’s really a scholar, isn’t he? 
What does Imran really think about Fred? 
[Discussion] 
This kind of implicature occurs when we say one thing and mean the exact 
opposite. Usually this kind of implicature becomes obvious when we know 
the context. For example, if we know that George is really upset that he has to 
stay for another semester, then Brenda’s comment in example 2 does not 
make any sense. Of course George is not excited about his bad news. Because 
Brenda’s comment is so obviously out of place, we know that she must mean 
to express a completely different idea. 
[Activity (5 minutes)] 
Working with a partner, develop a short dialogue which uses irony. The 
dialogues will be presented to the rest of the class. 
(Broersma 1994:20-21) 
Results from both studies (1994b, 1999) showed that the learning curve of “skills” of 
ironic interpretation was gradual compared to those of other types of language use, but 
that the performance of EFL learners in the experimental group had developed 
dramatically after just 6 weeks. The results of the experimental group showed that their 
accuracy rate had increased by 33 % in one example of irony and by 15 % in the other 
(Bouton 1999:63).43 Their accuracy rate was as good as, or better than any of other 
groups (17 month-, 33 month-, 4-7 year-residence groups). On the other hand, the 
results from the control group showed very little increase in the accuracy rate. Bouton 
(1994b) claimed that even less than 1 hour of formal instruction and a certain amount of 
informal follow-up speeded up the progress to the same level as 3-year-resident-groups 
or resident groups of longer than 3 years on average. Bouton (1999) claimed that ‘…the 
clues form a pattern that is there to be taught-and subsequently to be recognized and 
																																								 																				
43 Bouton (1999) did not make it clear which example each case indicated, [good friend] or [singing badly]. 
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used (p.66)’ He claimed that an awareness of underlying structural or semantic formula 
brought about the desired effect on development.  
3.3 Other approaches to L2 irony understanding 
3.3.1 Comparing irony in English as a second language with irony in Polish irony as 
a first language 
Working within a relevance-theoretic account of irony, Bromberek-Dyzman, Rataj, and 
Dylak (2010) explored the question of whether understandings of irony in English as a 
second language lagged behind understanding of first language irony for Polish 
speakers. This study was unique in that it investigated the ability to interpret ironical 
utterances in L2 not by comparing non-native speakers and native speakers but by 
comparing second language and first language understanding. The participants were 
Polish native speakers who were third-year-university students based in Poland. They 
were highly proficient English language users (equivalent to score of 8.0 in IELTS). 
Material included two or three sentences making up mini-stories ending with a target 
sentence. All the target sentences were built in the same syntactic structure: subject + 
predicate (be) + positive adjective. Depending on its context, the target utterance was 
expected to convey either ‘literal praise’ or ‘ironic criticism.’44 The task was to judge 
whether the comment was favourable (positive) or unfavourable (negative). Participants 
could spend as much time as they needed reading the contexts (‘self-paced reading 
test’). Response error rate and response time were measured. Here are some samples of 
test items in English. 
																																								 																				
44 Those positive/negative opinions were validated by norming tests. Bromberek-Dyzman et al conducted two 
norming test; a ‘probability cloze test’ and a ‘positivity/negativity’ rating test.  The result of a probability 
cloze test ensured that the context of each mini-story triggered an adjective   that expressed the intended 
interpretation (negative/positive). The result of a second norming test demonstrated that the intent of a target 
sentence was evaluated as intended. 
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[Sample of items used in a study by Bromberek-Dyzman et al (2010)]45 
 
Bromberek-Dyzman et al (2010:208) reported that the results indicated that ironic 
criticism appeared to be more difficult to understand and required a longer time to 
process than literal sentences. A comparison of L1 (Polish) responses and those in L2 
(English) was interesting: no statistically significant difference in error rates or response 
speed was found.46 These results were congruent with a similar study by Bromberek- 
Dyzman and Ewert (2010). Bromberek-Dyzman and Ewert (2010) also investigated the 
ability to interpret ironical utterances in comparison between Polish (L1) and English 
(L2). The results did not show any significant difference in ironic interpretations 
depending on language i.e. whether the stimuli were in Polish (L1) or English (L2). 
Bromberek-Dyzman et al (2010) suggested that cognitive comprehension 
mechanisms involved in L1 and L2 might not be different. They suggested that ‘i 
																																								 																				
45 This is taken from table 1: Sample stories in Bromberek-Dyzman et al (2010:205). 
46 In their earlier study (Bromberek-Dyzman et al in press) the result of response time had come out 
differently. Their earlier study found a significant difference between L1 and L2 in response time to ironic 
sentences. They argued that this different outcome was caused by the forced-responding method (‘response 
window procedure’) used in the study. They suggested that the time required for parsing linguistic 
information in L2 was longer than in L1 and that this difference could become more evident when required to 
respond within a limited time. On the other hand, under a self-paced condition faster accessing to lexical 
store in the dominant language dissipates (p.210). See Bromberek-Dyzman et al (2010) for full details. 
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[I]rony comprehension grounded mostly in social cognition, demands the fully 
operationalized Theory of Mind for successful metalizing in all languages one is able to 
communicate in (p.211).’ They (2010:201), referring to developmental psychology 
research (Garfield et al. 2001; Papafragou 2002; Lohmann and Tomasello 2003; Saxe et 
al. 2004 cited in Bromberek-Dyzman et al 2010:201) suggested that L2 users in their 
experiment have already developed Theory of Mind in the childhood. Based on this 
assumption predicted by Theory of Mind, Bromberek-Dyzman et al. argued that L2 
users who had already developed this ability in their first language should be able to 
comprehend irony in L2 using this ability (p.210). While suggesting that cognitive 
competence for metarepresenting attitudinal intentions on top of linguistic competence 
might be more demanding in L2 than in L1, Bromberek-Dyzman et al (2010) proposed 
a conclusion that there was no language-specific comprehension mechanism of the 
interpretation processes of ironical utterances. 
3.3.2 Understanding irony in Spanish irony as a second language 
The other was the study of Shively, Menke, and Manzón-Omundson (2008) investigated 
how the ability of L2 learners of Spanish to understand Spanish irony related to the 
development of their language proficiency. Based on a ‘criterion of optimal 
accessibility to irony’ proposed by Yus (1988, 2000), they focused on the effects of 
different contextual sources on interpretation processes. They suggested that, while this 
ability improves in accordance with both development of language proficiency and 
increases in experience with the target language, it was not the case for L2 learners of 
Spanish that the more contextual sources were available the easier it was to understand 
the ironic speaker’s intent as Yus predicted. Yus (1988, 2000) developed the ‘criterion 
of optimal accessibility to irony’ within the framework of a relevance-theoretic account 
of irony (Sperber and Wilson 1981,1995, 1998, Wilson and Sperber 1992). He 
commented as follows on the cognitive effort required to process ironical utterances: 
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The processing effort required for the interpretation of the intended ironic 
meaning of an utterance decreases in proportion to the increase in the number 
(and quality) of incompatibilities (detected by the addressee) between the 
information supplied by the inferential integration of simultaneously activated 
contextual sources (leading or leading plus supportive) and the information 
provided by the proposition expressed by the utterance. 
(Yus 2000:50) 
Based on the central claim of the echoic account that irony involves the expression of a 
speaker’s attitude towards an attributed thought (or utterance), which the speaker 
echoes, Yus explained that the more contextual sources activated, the more efficiently 
and economically the speaker’s dissociative attitude underlying irony is identified. Yus 
(1998:399) suggested that irony processing involves detection of ‘incompatibilities’ 
between the proposition expressed by the literal contents of an utterance and contextual 
sources previously activated. Among seven contextual sources suggested in a criterion 
of optimal accessibility to irony47 (Yus 1998, 2000), Shively et al (2008) focused on 
three contextual sources in particular: the effects of ‘encyclopaedic, factual 
information,’ ‘speaker’s nonverbal behaviour,’ and ‘linguistic cues.’ According to Yus 
(1998, 2000), ‘encyclopaedic, factual information’ consists of mental representations 
and stereotypical information already stored in the hearers’ mind, of such things as 
‘macrosocial norms and factual information’ and ‘common sense assumptions.’ This 
information is activated to form a mental background of assumptions for processing 
new coming information. ‘Speaker’s nonverbal behaviour’ is information accessible via 
perceptual mechanisms such as recognition of facial expression, body language, tone of 
voice, etc. ‘Linguistic cues’ are syntactic structures and vocabulary that ‘alter’ their 
meanings to the nonliteral, ironic quality of the utterance.48 
																																								 																				
47 Yus (1998, 2000) proposed seven contextual sources: ‘encyclopaedic, factual information,’ ‘mutually 
manifest physical context,’ ‘speaker’s nonverbal behavior,’ ‘addressee’s background knowledge of addresser’s 
biographical data,’ ‘mutual knowledge,’ ‘previous utterances of the conversation,’ ‘linguistic cues.’ See Yus 
(1998,2000) for the details.	
48	Yus (2000:37) acknowledged that it is controversial to treat linguistic cues as proper contextual sources since 
many (if not all) of particular words or syntactic structures are not irony-specific. Yus suggested that linguistic 
cues might be supplemental cues: ‘they may occasionally help the hearer in the identification of irony.’	
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Shively et al (2008) used audio-visual material to investigate how non-verbal 
information helped to guide L2 learners of Spanish towards an ironic interpretation. In a 
‘video-enhanced task,’ ironic utterances from actual films were used. Participants’ 
performance in a ‘video-enhanced task’ were compared with those in a ‘written task.’ 
Below is a sample of three task questions. 
[Task questions used in a study of Shively et al (2008)] 
 
Shively et al (2008) reported that, while the results showed the effects of language 
proficiency and exposure to Spanish culture, accuracy rates49 for perceiving irony as a 
whole were relatively low in both the written task and the video-enhanced task varying 
from 9% to 50%. The results revealed that response accuracy in the written task was 
higher than the one in the video-enhanced task. Shively et al (2008) suggested that these 
findings indicated that an audio-visual context could help more advanced learners. 
Shively et al explained these findings by considering the limited capacity of second 
language learners’ working memory (Schmidt 1992; Shiffrin and Schneider 1997). 
Shiffrin and Schneider (1997) claimed that the cognitive demands of processing stimuli 
from various sources are very complex with attention needing to be focused on different 
																																								 																				
49 For data analysis Shively et al (2008) coded each participant’s description of the meaning of the target 
comment to task question＃1: if their description was either explicitly mentioned or described 
the opposite of the literal meaning or included the words “sarcasm” or “irony,” they were coded as 
“understanding the irony.” On the other hand, the code “non-understanding the irony” indicated the cases 
where their description showed that the student interpreted the meaning of the comment literally or the student 
did not understand either the literal or the figurative meaning of the utterance in question. If response was 
impossible to judge by their wording it was coded as “unclear” (p.117). 
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components (lexical, syntactic, prosodic, pragmatic). These studies suggested that 
processing of inputs in L2 is more controlled (cited Shively et al 2008:125). A video-
enhanced task in the experiment by Shively et al (2008) included not only written input 
(i.e. a brief synopsis) but also auditory and visual inputs (i.e. prosodic information, 
facial expression, body language and information about the physical environment). 
Shively et al (2008) suggested that the cognitive demands of processing of information 
in a video-enhanced task might be more taxing than those in the written task. As Shively 
et al (2008) put it:  
If learners were focusing their attention on lexical items and syntax in order to 
work out the meaning of the utterances in the dialogue of the movie scene, it 
is possible that they were not attending to other contextual cues such as 
intonation or mismatch between literal meaning and context. 
(Shively et al. 2008:126) 
 
They explained that an audio-visual context assisted more advanced learners interpret 
ironical utterances because they have more cognitive resources available to pay 
attention to a range of contextual sources than lower proficiency learners. They 
suggested that this was due to differences between learners of different proficiency in 
constraints on automaticity and working memory (p.128). These results seem to be 
consistent with findings from Yamanaka (2003). Yamanaka (2003) compared the 
accuracy rate of her participants with those of the participants who participated in 
Bouton’s first studies (1988, 1999). She found that the accuracy rate of Japanese 
participants in choosing the ‘correct’ interpretation in her study was much lower than 
those in Bouton’s studies. Yamanaka suggested that differences in the results might be 
caused by the different experimental designs: while Yamanaka used the audio-visual 
material with time limits, Bouton used written materials with no time limit. She pointed 
out that the audio-visual material included much more information from different 
sources and suggested that Japanese participants could not process as much information 
as native speakers of American English. Findings from these studies indicate the 
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influence of limited cognitive resources on non-native speakers’ interpretation 
processes. However, neither Shively et al (2008) nor Yamanaka explored this further. 
3.4 Suggested factors affecting interpretations of irony 
While providing empirical evidence for a difference between non-native speakers and 
native speakers in interpreting ironical utterances, previous studies suggested possible 
underlying factors. This section looks in particular at two possible factors suggested by 
previous studies (Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; 
Bromberek-Dyzman and Ewert 2010; Lee 2002; Manowong 2011; Shively et al 2008; 
Yamanaka 2003): culture-dependent differences and differences in the perception of 
paralinguistic cues. 
3.4.1 Culture-dependent differences 
Previous studies (Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; 
Bromberek-Dyzman and Ewert 2010; Lee 2002; Manowong 2011; Yamanaka 2003) 
suggested culture-dependent differences as a main factor affecting non-native speakers’ 
interpretation of ironical utterances. They stressed two points: an important role that 
one’s culture-related notions play in constructing contextual assumptions (Bouton 1988, 
1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; Bromberek- Dyzman and Ewert 2010; 
Lee 2002; Manowong 2011), and the influence of cultural variations on inferential 
strategies (Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b; Lee 2002; Yamanaka 
2003). 
While claiming that cultural variation and/or lack of knowledge about the target 
culture might cause non-native speakers to interpret a given utterance in a different way 
to native speakers, each researcher suggested what aspects of culture were related. For 
example, Lee (2002) and Manowong (2011) suggested concepts such as values, norms, 
belief, personal biases, personal experience, and stereotypes might be culture specific. 
Bromberek-Dyzman and Ewert (2010) suggested that relevant cultural aspects were 
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concepts and representations of the world. On the other hand, Shively et al (2008:106) 
referred to Bell (2005:4) suggesting that although irony may be universal as a language 
phenomenon, its use may be culture-specific involving specific topics, form and styles 
of language, and contextual clues. 
Bouton (1990, 1992b) claimed that ‘speakers from different cultural and linguistic 
backgrounds might use “implicature” differently and such implicatures may be 
perceived where none are intended or they may be intended but missed (1992b: 42).’ 
Bouton (1990, 1992b) suggested that it is crucial that the speaker and the hearer share 
not only the communication principles but also the same perceptions in order to 
construct mutual context and thus, in turn achieve successful communication. Bouton 
(1992b: 38-39) referring to Grice (1975), suggested the following four perceptions that 
both parties of the conversation are expected to share: 
‘…Grice himself (1975) had pointed out that in order for the hearer to 
understand the same message from an implicature that the speaker intended it 
to have, both people must have a common perception of at least four crucial 
factors related to the context in which the utterance occurs. They must agree 
on 1) what the conventional meaning of the utterance involved is, 2) how the 
Cooperative Principle and its maxims are defined and whether they should be 
brought into play in interpreting this particular utterance, 3) how the context 
in which the utterance occurs should be constructed, and 4) how the world 
must be viewed in order to draw the particular inference intended. These 
factors are quite sweeping and demand a great deal of common ground 
between a speaker and a listener if the implicatures they use are to be mutually 
understood.’ 
However, based on the result of experimental studies (Bouton 1988, Devine 1982; 
Keenan 1976) which had cast some doubt on the universality of Grice’s Cooperative 
Principle and the maxims, Bouton (1990, 1992b) argued that perceptions that are 
involved in factor 2), factor 3), and factor 4) vary across cultures. Bouton (1990: 44) 
demonstrated an example of different perceptions between a native speaker and a non- 
native speaker. Suppose that you stopped by your friend’s house to return something 
you had borrowed from her. She said to you ‘Hi…come on in. I’ve got the coffee pot 
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on.’ According to Bouton (1990), she would intend to mean something like ‘Come on in 
and have some coffee. I’ve just made a fresh pot so it ought to taste good.’ He (Bouton 
1992b: 44) demonstrated how non-native speakers might arrive at different 
interpretation to this one: 
‘…The assertion that she has the coffee pot on, taken as a simple statement of 
fact concerning the state of her kitchen at the moment, is rather strange. But, 
of course, another possible interpretation of the utterance immediately comes 
to mind, i.e. its function as an offer of a fresh cup of coffee and the fellowship 
that goes with it. And this, then, is what you take your friend’s message to be. 
It is unlikely, of course, that anyone familiar with American culture would 
misunderstand what your friend said…NNS [non-native speaker] sometimes 
turn down an invitation to “go get a cup of coffee” with the simple comment 
that they “don’t feel like having a cup at the moment.” In these cases, the 
NNS takes the invitation to have coffee literally and misses the additional 
offer (through implicature) of a chance for those involved to enjoy each 
other’s companionship. They do not realize that in turning down the offer of 
coffee, they reject the offer of companionship, too.’ 
He (1992b: 39) suggested that the potential for misunderstanding would expand in 
cross-cultural communication as people from different cultures construct the context 
based on their own culture-related concepts. 
Bouton (1990) explained that difficulties that non-native speakers had faced with 
examples of irony in his studies were related to factor 4) above: ‘how the world must be 
viewed in order to draw the particular inference intended’. He (1988, 1994a, 1994b) 
suggested that the interpretation of the ironical utterance in the [good friend] example 
seemed to be based on ‘an entirely different cultural attitude towards marriage and 
friendship.’ He considered that difficulties were ‘related to specific points of American 
culture in the substance of the test item and not to the type of implicature involved, and 
in that sense, the problems caused by these items were arbitrary and idiosyncratic 
(1994a: 163).’ Lee (2002) and Manowong (2011) replicating Bouton’s first study 
(1988), suggested that non-native speakers seemed to interpret this example of irony 
[good friend] based on their own culture-related concepts. However, it must be pointed 
out again that not all the participants of native speakers took the speaker’s meaning of 
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this [good friend] example as such (‘Peter is not acting the way a good friend should’). 
This seems to indicate that it cannot be taken for granted that people who have the same 
cultural backgrounds construct the same contextual assumptions. Inevitably concepts 
such as values, norms, belief, personal biases, personal experience, and stereotypes vary 
at individual level before cultural level. It does not seem unrealistic to suggest from this 
that there might be factors causing different interpretations or misunderstandings other 
than culture-dependent difference. 
Bouton assumed that such culture knowledge could be acquired naturally through 
life experiences in the target language culture. However, as mentioned above, both 
Bouton’s longitudinal studies and the study of Yamanaka revealed that length of living 
in the US did not positively affect the ability to understand irony. Bouton pointed out 
that the ‘arbitrary and idiosyncratic’ nature of cultural knowledge might prevent 
individuals from developing pragmatic comprehension abilities. As he (1994b: 98) put 
it: 
‘…it is because the hearers do not understand one or more points related to the 
nature of utterance, the context, or both, as the speaker does. It follows that to 
learn to understand a particular relevance-based implicature, the NNS [non-
native speakers] must learn the relevant culture points on which it is based. 
Given the complexity of the context of some implicatures, it is not surprising 
that at least some of them based on relevance that are opaque to NNS when 
they arrive remain impenetrable even after a relatively long stay in this 
country.’  
 
His longitudinal studies (1994b) indicated that the development of the ability to 
understand the speaker’s intent in socially and culturally oriented types of indirect 
utterances was slow. Explicit instruction has been also proved ineffective. Bouton 
(1994b, 1999) reported that it was quite difficult not only to learn but also to teach 
“skills” for socially and culturally oriented types of indirect utterances. There seems to 
be no quick way to learn cultural knowledge systematically. Bouton (1999) suggested 
that ‘time seems to be the only factor that correlates with an overall improvement in 
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understanding relevance implicature (p.64)’. On the other hand, the results of Bouton’s 
longitudinal studies suggested that, even in the cases where a definitive effect of longer 
length of residence manifested itself, the effect had begun to wear off after he first 17 
months.50 In recent literature on interlanguage pragmatic comprehension abilities the 
effect of length of residence has been reconsidered from a viewpoint of ‘quality’ of 
contact or exposure. In more recent literature on interlanguage pragmatics, individual 
differences in terms of the amount and/or opportunities of interaction with native 
speakers has been taken to be more effective than length of residence on acquisition of 
the pragmatic rules in speech acts (Ahn 2007; Eslami-Rasekh 2005; Eslami and Ahn 
2014; Matsumura 2003; Ren 2013a; Wray 1999). However, it has remained uncertain to 
what extent L2 irony interpretation abilities are developed through acquisition of 
pragmatic rules and skills (if any) or acquisition of cultural knowledge, or both. What 
should be taken into consideration as a positive effect on development of pragmatic 
comprehension abilities might be not ‘length of time (quantity)’ spent in the target 
culture but ‘immersion (quality)’ or the amount of contact or exposure to the culture. 
Kasper and Rose (2002:196) argued that the pragmatic comprehension ability of L2 
speakers may be more correlated with quality of social contacts with native speakers 
and amount of exposure to the target language culture rather than a quantitative measure 
of length of residence. Kasper (1998:200) mentioned that ‘sustained contact with the 
target language and culture may be required to attain native pragmatic knowledge and 
skill (cited Eslami and Ahn 2014:13).’ Yamanaka suggested that not just the length of 
residence but the immersion into the target language culture might facilitate 
accumulation of knowledge about the culture more efficiently. She considered that non-
native speakers’ awareness of non-verbal clues might be facilitated by deeper 
																																								 																				
50 There have been some studies that reported significant effects of length of residence in the target language 
culture on the ability to understand various phenomena of speech acts (Blum-Kulka and Olshtain 1986; House 
1996; Takahashi and Beebe 1987; Röver 1996). 
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immersion such as higher amounts of interaction with NSs or television viewing in the 
target language, field of study or occupation, etc. Although Yamanaka (2003) collected 
background information of Japanese participants regarding the amount of interaction 
with the target language culture, Yamanaka has not further investigated the effect of the 
amount of exposure and interaction with the target language culture. Contrary to the 
suggestions of those studies, however, there is counterevidence. Taguchi (2005, 2007) 
examined the extent to which EFL learners in Japan understand the speaker’s intent in 
indirect replies such as implied negative opinions, indirect refusals of requests, and 
disclosures. The empirical results suggested that EFL learners could improve 
interpretation abilities even though they were living in a foreign language context where 
exposure to pragmatic conventions and socio- cultural practice in the target language 
were extremely limited. Taguchi argued that ‘...exposure to the target language context 
and culture is not the only contributing factor in pragmatic development (2007:328).’ 
The effect of cultural variations on inferential strategies has been also suggested 
(Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1999; Lee 2003; Yamanaka 2002). 
Based on the result of his first experiment (1988), Bouton (1992b: 40) criticised Grice’s 
inferential model of communication as one that accounts only for English. He (1999:48) 
considered ‘conversational implicature is a part of any native speaker’s communicative 
competence.’ It should be noted that Bouton (1990, 1992b) extended Grice’s idea of 
implicature so far as to say that “conversational implicatures”51 is an inferential 
‘strategy’ for successful communication. Based on this idea, he (1990:38) went on to 
argue that “use of conversational implicature” was not necessarily an “unremarkable 
and ordinary strategy” in cross-cultural and cross-linguistic communication. However, 
this is wrong, if not, misleading at least. Bouton was not clear about which of Grice’s 
																																								 																				
51 I use double quotation marks when the terms ‘implicature’ or ‘conversational implicature’ are used in 
Bouton’s sense, not strictly in Grice’s sense. 
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maxims was culture-specific. Devine and Keenan clearly indicated which maxims or 
implicatures they took to be culture-oriented: Keenan claimed that Grice’s maxim of 
Quantity was not applicable to Madagascar’s society, and Devine’s study was taken to 
suggest that flouting of the maxim of quantity and relation may not trigger the same 
implicatures in all cultures. Bouton did not explain further what he meant by ‘inferential 
strategies’. 
On the other hand, Lee (2001:13) suggested that both Korean L2 speakers and 
American native speakers seemed to arrive at interpretation through logical reasoning. 
Lee argued, however, that the “reason” that give rise to reasoning differed between the 
two groups. According to Lee, since logical reasoning is based on their own cultural 
norms and values, there is a high risk that cross-cultural communications might result in 
miscommunication. The results of further statistical analysis52 and reanalyses of some 
qualitative data from the post-test interview provided some evidence for this. Lee 
(2002:10) categorised indirect language used in her experiment into two different types: 
‘generalised’ implicatures or ‘particularised’ implicatures. She suggested that 
interpretations of ‘particularised implicatures’ were guided by culture-related 
contextual cues and non-linguistic cues (2002:10). The results showed that a statistically 
significant difference between two sample groups was found only in ‘particularised 
implicatures.’ According to Lee, especially ‘contextual cues’ were based on cultural 
aspects such as cultural values, norms, beliefs or personal experience of the target 
language culture. 
Yamanaka’s study (2003) revealed that Japanese participants did not make use of 
the contextual clue/s in the same way as Native speakers of American English. Based on 
																																								 																				
52 Lee (2002:10) ran a Pearson correlation coefficient test and Cronbach’s alpha test. She reported the result of 
the Pearson correlation coefficient test as showing that “…the items within the Particularized and Generalized 
category had moderately high inter-item correlations and had very   low or negative correlations with items in 
the other category.” She also reported the result of Cronbach’s alpha test as showing that “Cronbach’s alpha for 
these two constructs was .59 for Particularized Conversational Implicatures and .54 for Generalized 
Conversational Implicatures.” 
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Gumperz’s ideas of ‘contextualization’ (1992), Yamanaka (2003:108) suggested that the 
speaker’s intended meaning was universally inferred through ‘connecting what is being 
said to the relevant context’, irrespective of language. On the other hand, she suggested 
that contextual clues in which situation the hearer attends to for inference might be 
culturally specific. Yamanaka (2003) considered that the use of sarcasm or ironic 
remarks is ‘well-recognized strategies of indirect expression in American English (p. 
137),’ and suggested that cultural aspects might affect use of contextual clues as 
inferential “strategies.” 
Relevance theory (Wilson and Sperber 2002:254) explains that relevance-orientated 
human cognitive system operates in ways that our perceptual systems are organised to 
monitor and select potentially relevant stimuli, our memory retrieval systems are 
organised to activate potentially relevant background information for constructing 
assumptions, and our inferential systems are organised to maximise derivable cognitive 
effects in the most efficient way. Within relevance theory (Clark 2013; Sperber and 
Wilson 1995; Wilson 2014; Wilson and Sperber 2002), communication is treated as 
‘ostensive’ from the speaker’s (communicator’s) point of view, and ‘inferential’ from 
the hearer’s (audience’s) point of view (ostensive-inferential communication). The 
speaker intends to communicate something by producing an ostensive act, and the 
hearer makes inferences about the speaker’s communicative intention. Claiming that 
human cognition is relevance-orientated relevance theory suggests that for successful 
communication an utterance should achieve enough cognitive effects without gratuitous 
efforts to be worth the hearer’s attention to satisfy his expectation of relevance. The 
speaker’s task is to formulate the utterance with enough effects to justify processing 
effort involved so as to lead his audience to the right direction, and the hearer’s task is 
to identify the interpretation that the speaker might reasonably have intended to convey. 
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An ostensive stimulus /input (e.g. utterance) is relevant to the hearer and his expectation 
of relevance will be satisfied if he derives an appropriate implicature. 
These previous studies suggested the culture-dependent differences in 
contextualisation for interpretations and their reflection in pragmatic strategies. While 
the present study does not deny an important role that culture plays during inference at 
work, it points out that their discussions were all descriptive. Given that the human 
cognitive system operates based on individual’s expectations of relevance, cultural 
differences might not be the only factor affecting non-native speakers’ inferential 
processes. It does not seem irrational to suggest different ways to look at differences in 
the interpretation processes. The present study taking some ideas from relevance- 
theoretic account offers systematic explanation about how cultural variations affect the 
way in which non-native speakers arrive at different interpretations in chapter 4.  
3.4.2 Difference in recognition of prosodic cues 
Lee (2002) and Manowong (2011) conducted post-test ‘think-aloud’ interview sessions 
to explore ‘the types of strategies’ L2 speakers used for interpretations. They suggested 
that non-native speakers’ awareness of paralinguistic cues i.e. the speaker’s tone of 
voice seems to be promising factor that can affect interpretation of ironical utterances 
apart from the influence of cultural variations. Both Lee (2002) and Manowong (2011) 
suggested that L2 speakers relied “too much” on ‘translation strategies,’ translating an 
utterance word by word transferring word meaning from their native language. Such 
translation strategies might be a ‘blockade’ preventing second language speakers from 
making use of non-verbal and paralinguistic information for inference. Lee (2002) 
pointed out that while comments from native speakers of American English in the 
interview clearly indicated the importance of non-linguistic cues for derivation of 
implicatures, there was no such comment collected from Korean L2 speakers: she 
(2002:11) reported that ‘they [NNSs] did not comment at all on how the intonation or 
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tone would have changed the meaning of expression.' On the other hand, Manowong 
(2011:145) reported that there was one Thai participant who mentioned that she tried to 
imagine how the character of the target utterance would express herself or himself in 
terms of tone of voice, intonation, facial expressions and the like. Lee (2011:12) 
suggested that L2 speakers could improve their ability to observe how language is used 
in a community by directing their attention to the contextual and linguistic cues that 
govern implicatures. There is the need for L2 learners to ‘raise their level of critical 
awareness’ not only of how knowledge of the target language culture interface with the 
language but also of how the speaker’s meaning was guided by what Lee called 
‘suprasegmental features’ such as relevant gestures, facial expressions, intonations and 
tone. 
Based on replies to the second task questions (the contextual clue/s used to choose 
one interpretation from the four multiple-choice options), Yamanaka (2003) reported 
that most native speakers of American English had chosen the answer based on non-
verbal clues such as the character’s tone of voice, facial expression, body language, 
gestures, or information from the situation of the scene. She examined comments from 
Japanese participants who did not choose the ‘correct’ answer, and found that they did 
not mention the contextual clues that would have led them to interpret a given utterance 
correctly. According to Yamanaka, these comments clearly indicated that Japanese 
participants did not perceive tone of voice of the character as much as native speakers in 
the trials with sarcasm in particular. Broersma (1994), reflecting on the explicit teaching 
sessions, pointed out that a challenge for ESL teachers might be how to teach the role of 
intonation in irony in interactions with the context. 
To my knowledge the only study focusing on this is the study of Shively et al 
(2008). They have attempted to investigate the potential role of recognition of the 
speaker’s tone of voice as a contributing factor to different interpretations for non- 
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native speakers and native speakers. They (2008:112-114) used scenes extracted from 
films where the speaker used particular prosodic contours, which they termed ‘normal 
intonation,’ ‘prosodic tone of false sincerity,’ ‘a matter-of-fact tone of voice,’ ‘a high- 
pitched tone that diverges greatly from the pitch of the surrounding utterances,’ and 
‘lightheaded and joking’. Among three task questions (repeated below again for 
convenience), one task question (Question #2) was designed to ask whether participants 
perceive irony from the speaker’s tone of voice. 
[Task questions used in a study by Shively et al (2008)] 
 
Shively et al (2008) intended to analyse participants’ responses to this task question 
together with the first task question (Question #1), which was designed to assess how 
participants interpret ironical utterances as an indication of participants’ perception of 
irony. They expected that their response to the task question about the speaker’s tone 
(Question #2) should be interpreted as the descriptor of ‘sarcastic/irony’ if participants 
understood the speaker’s intent as ironic or sarcastic. However, the results showed that 
responses to the task question about tone were not consistent with their responses to the 
first task: while their responses to Question #1 (open-ended question) clearly indicated 
that they understood the speaker’s ironic or sarcastic intent, the responses to Question 
#2 did not correspond to it (i.e. participants did not select the ‘sarcastic/irony’ 
descriptor). Thus, Shively et al. (2008:116) treated such data as “observed 
inconsistency” and decided to exclude responses to the question concerning the 
speaker’s tone from further analysis. Shively et al. (2008:116) explained that this 
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observed inconsistency seems to reflect that some students did not interpret irony and 
sarcasm as “tone”. The present study argues that a problem with the results lies in how 
Shively et al considered ‘the speaker’s tone.’ Neither of the descriptors ‘irony’ nor 
‘sarcasm’ can be interpreted as tone. Given that irony is not a ‘natural kind’ as 
suggested by relevance-theoretic account of irony, there is no reason to assume that 
participants need to be able to label the paralinguistic aspects that the speaker shows 
such as tone, facial expression or body language as ironic in order to understand ironic 
utterances. These are generic names or labels for phenomena related to figurative use of 
language, which Kreuz (2000:14) called ‘rhetorical label.’ ‘Tone’ phonetically refers to 
movement or level of pitch. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the speaker’s tone is 
considered to convey information about the speaker’s emotional state or attitudes. 
However, neither ‘irony’ nor ‘sarcasm’ refers directly to a speaker’s emotional state or 
attitudes. The ability to understand the ironic speaker’s intent and the ability to label 
tone of voice as ‘irony’ are two different abilities (Kreuz 2000). Shively et al 
acknowledged that the ability to understand irony should not have been measured by 
labelling the speaker’s tone as ‘irony’ or ‘sarcasm’ and that the option ‘sarcastic/irony’ 
should not have been included as a descriptor. In fact, Shively et al (2008:116) reported 
that some participants chose other options that described the speaker’s emotional state 
or attitudes such as ‘critical’ or ‘joking’ instead. This indicates the possibility that some 
L2 learners might have understood the ironic speaker’s intent from the tone. If the data 
in responses to these task questions had not been discarded, interesting findings about 
L2 learners’ recognition of the ironic speaker’s tone might have been available and 
could have been used to explore more relations between perceptions of the speaker’s 
attitude and each of these prosodic contours.  
One study (Taguchi 2002) reported that Japanese L2 learners frequently derived the 
implied meaning in indirect refusal and indirect opinion via recognition of the speaker’s 
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acoustic information (‘paralinguistic cues’). It was evidenced in Taguchi’s study (2002) 
that Japanese L2 learners could be deriving the implied meaning through paralinguistic 
cues even when they did not understand the proposition literally expressed by a given 
utterance or they did not know the meaning of some words. Taguchi (2002) suggested 
that paralinguistic information such as pause, intonation, or speech rate could play an 
important role in understanding the speaker’s expression of attitudes and emotions. 
Previous experimental studies provided challenges for future experimental research 
on L2 irony understanding. A question about non-native speakers’ recognition of 
paralinguistic cues during processing of ironic utterances is certainly one of the 
challenges. 
3.5 Critical discussion of previous approaches 
This section critically discusses issues arising from previous studies. Some issues seem 
to stem mainly from problems with the theoretical approaches that previous studies have 
applied to their investigations. Theoretical issues lead to methodological issues, and 
this, in turn, makes their suggestions questionable. In most these studies, ironic 
interpretations were investigated collectively with other forms of indirect language use 
(Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; Lee 2002; Bromberek-
Dyzman et al 2010; Manowong 2011; Yamanaka 2003). In addition, the data 
concerning the ability of non-native speakers to understand irony were considerably 
small. This section discusses issues involved in reflections of weaknesses of Grice’s 
approach to irony and sociopragmatic approaches to interlanguage pragmatic 
competence. 
3.5.1 Weaknesses of Grice’s approach to irony 
Grice proposed an inferential model of communication which opposed the classical 
code model and suggested that interpretation of irony is triggered by recognition of the 
speaker’s blatant flout of maxims, not via recognition of a semantic formula. However, 
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Grice clung to the idea that the related proposition (the substituted meaning that the 
hearer should look for when understanding irony) was the opposite of the literal 
meaning. This is why his account of irony was described as a ‘modern-dress’ variant of 
the traditional account (Wilson 2006:1723). Within the theoretical framework of Grice’s 
account of communication in general and his approach to irony in particular, previous 
studies (Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; Lee 2002; 
Manowong 2011) assumed that the ability of non-native speakers to understand irony in 
L2 should manifest itself in interpretations of a given ironical utterance as expressing 
the opposite of the proposition expressed by the literal contents of the utterance. This 
central claim of Grice’s account has been theoretically questioned and empirically 
disconfirmed. While many different theories of irony exist in the field of pragmatics, the 
majority of the theories have come to the consensus that the opposite of what was said is 
neither the point of irony nor the meaning that the speaker intends to imply. 
Bouton (1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999) looked for some 
‘patterns’ or ‘rules’ of ironic interpretation that L2 learners should acquire. He assumed 
that ‘semantic reversal’ (i.e. meaning the opposite to the proposition literally expressed) 
is the formula that forms a pattern for ironical utterances, and that interpretations of 
irony are governed and constrained by this semantic formula. This issue stems from a 
serious weakness not only in the Gricean account but also in the classical accounts. As 
discussed in the preceding chapter, the echoic account of irony assumed that the 
speaker’s meaning in ironical utterances is more or less likely taken to be implicitly 
attributive with an implicit dissociative attitude. If the relevance-theoretic approach is 
right, investigations should focus on whether non-native speakers understand 1) the 
speaker’s dissociative attitude to the thought or utterance represented; 2) attribution of 
that thought or utterance to someone other than the speaker at the time of utterance. 
These two points have often not been considered in previous studies, which indicates 
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that the ‘scope’ of what counts as an ironic interpretation in their theoretical framework, 
Grice’s account of irony is wrong. Here is an example of irony that previous studies 
(Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; Lee 2002; Manowong 
2011) used in their experiment (repeated here again for convenience): 
[good friend] 
Bill and Peter have been good friends since they were children. They roomed 
together in college and travelled Europe together after graduation. Now 
friends have told Bill that they saw Peter dancing with Bill’s wife while Bill 
was away. 
 
Bill: Peter knows how to be a really good friend. 
 
Question: Which of the following best says what Bill means? 
a. Peter is not acting the way a good friend should. 
b. Peter and Bill’s wife are becoming really good friends while Bill is away. 
c. Peter is a good friend, so Bill can trust him. 
d. Nothing should be allowed to interfere with Bill and Peter’s friendship.	
Option (a) was treated as the ‘correct’ answer that non-native speakers were expected to 
choose. How the hearer takes the speaker’s meaning entirely depends on how one sees 
this behaviour ‘dancing with best friend’s wife.’ If this behaviour was against one’s 
norm or expectation about ‘good friends’ (i.e. ‘a good friend of anyone dare not to flirt 
with his wife or girlfriend’), the speaker’s intent would be to express dissociative 
attitude. On the other hand, if it was accepted in one’s norm or achieved one’s 
expectation, other choices could be possibly taken as one of a set of assumptions about 
the speaker’s meaning. Suppose you come across the same situation in your real life, 
then all the options could be taken as implicated to some extent. All the options in fact 
represent the possible range of pragmatically inferred meanings communicated from 
this context. 
The same argument can apply to another example of irony used in previous 
experimental studies (repeated below for convenience). 
[singing badly] 
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At the recent party, there was a lot of singing and piano playing. At one point, 
Sue played the piano while Mary sang. When Tom asked a friend what Mary 
had sung, the friend said: 
Friend: I’m not sure, but Sue was playing ‘My Wild Irish Rose’. 
Question: Which of the following is the closest to what the friend meant by 
this remark? 
a. He was only interested in Sue and did not listen to Mary. 
b. Mary sang very badly. 
c. Mary and Sue were not doing the same song. 
d. The song that Mary sang was ‘My Wild Irish Rose.’ 
In the same as the other example [good friend] above, all the choices could be taken as 
communicated to some extent. All the options are appropriate because it depends on the 
speaker’s intention: the speaker intends to offer some judgement of Mary’s singing in 
option (b), option (c), and option (d). If the speaker intends to give a simple answer to 
Tom’s question of what song Mary sang, then option (c) and option (d) are appropriate 
as higher explicature. On the other hand, even (a) could be seen to be weakly 
implicated. The problem with these examples reflects the weakness of Grice’s account 
of irony, which treats irony simply as communicating the opposite of the proposition 
literally expressed. As discussed in the preceding chapter, at which point irony stands 
within the range of pragmatically inferred meanings of a given utterance is much less 
clear-cut and it is rather gradual (Wilson 2006). The resulting interpretation of a given 
utterance can suggest that the speaker is being ironic, but it cannot be assumed that 
irony is expressed by the opposite of what the speaker said. 
The present study argues that Bouton’s idea of semantic reversal formula which 
forms a pattern of irony (so Bouton assumed) is fundamentally wrong. Interpretation of 
irony is not governed by any formulas or semantic rules. There are obvious 
counterexamples where a semantic reversal formula or similar patterns do not work. 
Consider the following examples again. Consider the same examples, which were 
discussed in preceding chapter (chapter 2, section 2.2.4) as repeated below: 
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(11) On a night in October when the temperature in London drops to minus 10 
c°: 
Ben: It’s a bit chilly tonight. 
(12) Both Paul and Jim know that Mary is a terrible cook. Jim heard that Mary 
is preparing a pork pie, which she never cooked for Paul’s birthday: 
Jim: Mary is cooking her very first pork pie specially for your birthday.  
Paul: Yay! 
(11) is a typical example of ironical understatement and (12) is an example of ironical 
interjection. If a semantic reversal formula existed in these examples, what Ben meant 
by the utterance in (11) would be something like ‘It’s NOT chilly tonight’ or ‘It’s A 
LOT chilly tonight,’ and it would presumably be something like ‘NOT Yay’ in (12). 
Clearly, these do not represent what the speakers in (11) and (12) meant. It is hard to see 
what would count as the opposite of what was said in those examples. Successful 
communication cannot be guaranteed if L2 speakers interpret these ironical utterances 
following this kind of semantic reversal formula. 
This leads to another argument against the validity of the effect of explicit 
instruction reported in Bouton’s teaching experiments (Broersma 1994; Bouton 1994b, 
1999). Semantic reversal formula was explicitly taught as ‘skills’ that L2 learners need 
to acquire. As discussed above, only prototypical irony was introduced in the classroom. 
It is beyond doubt that ironical utterances like (11) or (12) above do not embed in such 
semantic reversal formula. Although the effect of explicit instruction appeared to be 
significant, explicit instruction teaching that the opposite of what is said is the key to 
interpret ironical utterance is wrong. 
It seems that Bouton suggested teaching formula as skills in deriving implicatures 
based on a sociolinguistic approach to communication. In the field of interlanguage, 
‘pragmatic competence’ is broadly defined as the ability of non-native speakers to 
communicate appropriately in a sociocultural context (Ifantidou 2014:38). The ability to 
understand pragmatically inferred meanings has been discussed under sociolinguistic- 
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oriented study tradition which focuses on linguistic rules and forms (semantic formulae, 
realization of strategies) of the target language and social norms and conventions of the 
target language culture (Kasper 1996:145-6).53   However, as Ifantidou (2014:21) 
pointed out, shades of the speaker’s attitudes in a wide range of pragmatic phenomena 
including metaphors, irony, understatement, etc. cannot be dealt with by linguistic rules 
and conventions of forms. The present study argues that irony cannot be categorised in 
‘formulaic’ type of implicature, and above all its interpretation is not governed by any 
formulas or semantic rules. 
Another controversial issue is that some previous studies (Bromberek-Dyzman and 
Ewert 2010, Yamanaka 2003) have treated a wide range of loosely related phenomena 
such as ‘banter,’ ‘situational irony,’ ‘cynicism’ as verbal irony without considering 
whether or not each phenomenon fits the distinctive features. Wilson (2004, 2006: 7, 
2014) argues that disparate phenomena including hyperbole/overstatements, 
understatements, jocularity/banter, jokes and rhetorical questions have been treated as 
multiple forms and functions of irony54. She points out that these phenomena have been 
considered as ‘irony’ under a very general sense involving ‘some contrast between 
expectation and reality (Gibbs 2000/2007)’.55 Although those phenomena do not fit the 
distinctive features, they have been treated and tested as a case of irony applying the 
operational definitions56 in recent experimental literature on irony comprehension. 
According to Wilson (2014), those utterances in question are not inherently ironical: 
they do not show the distinctive features. For instance, Bromberek-Dyzman and Ewert 
																																								 																				
53 Blum-Kulka (1982) suggested this as an idea of an interlanguage of speech act performance. However, this 
idea has been used as a description of ‘pragmatic competence’ in following studies (e.g. Koike 1989:279). 
54Also see Carston and Wearing (2015) for discussion about distinctive features of hyperbolic use of language 
from metaphor and irony.  
55 See Wilson (2014) and Gibbs (2000/2007) for full discussion. See also Roberts and Kreuz (1994) for 
discussion of goal taxonomy and the relatedness of eight different forms of figurative language (hyperbole, 
idiom, indirect request, irony, understatement, metaphor, rhetorical questions, and simile). According to Roberts 
and Kreuz, while a unique constellation of communicative goals was found for each figure of speech, the results 
also provided supporting evidence for theoretical claims about the relatedness of certain figures. They suggested 
that understanding of functional and theoretical differences between the various kinds of figurative language 
could be broadened. 
56See Gibbs and Leggitt (2000) for ‘operational definitions’ of some related phenomena.  
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(2010) have included ‘banter’ as verbal irony in their experiment. Below are the 
examples of banter (personal communication with Bromberek-Dyzman): 
[banter♯1] 
Chris and Jake were competitors in an international student competition. The 
competition was pretty tough as the number of competitors from all over the 
world as well as the quality of the projects were high. To Jake’s surprise and 
jubilation, he was announced the winner. 
Jake: I did my best, but can’t believe it happened. Is it for real?  
Chris: It is. You’re not lucky at all! (meaning “Congratulations!!!)  
[banter♯2] 
The exam session, which was as usually pretty exhausting, is just over. 
Pauline and Joanna are discussing their holiday plans. 
Pauline: I am so tired after all those exams. I think I will spend two weeks 
doing nothing. And then I will have to find some summer job. That’s how it 
looks. And you? 
Joanna: My dad just phoned me yesterday to congratulate me on the exam 
results. He said that they are so happy that I did so well. They want to 
celebrate this, and they’re inviting me for an- all- paid vacation to the 
Caribbean! I think, I will go. What do you think? 
Pauline: You have a hard life!  (meaning “Wow! That’s great! I envy you.”)  
While the second example [banter♯2] can be taken as irony in some cases where sharing 
echoic elements (occasionally ironical), the first one [banter♯1] seems to have no echoic 
elements. Considering the speaker’s meaning in the examples [banter♯1] 
(“Congratulations!!!), the speaker’s attitude expressed by her utterance in both 
examples is clearly outside of the dissociative range such as mocking, scornful or 
contemptuous. In the literature, ‘banter’ or ‘ironic jocularity’ is described as teasing 
someone in a humorous way, which is often accompanied by ‘laughter' (Gibbs 
2000/2007). Recall that the distinctive features are the key to the underlying 
mechanisms for irony comprehension. Wilson (2014) argues that if ‘a connection 
between jocularity and laughter’ serves as a clue to potentially ironic intent, this 
indicates that irony and jocularity/banter may operate under different mechanisms since 
jocularity/banter does not necessarily fit the distinctive features of irony. Wilson (2014) 
expressed a warning about this broadened notion of irony, saying that ‘important 
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differences in underlying mechanisms may give rise to significant differences in both 
developmental trajectory and pragmatic or social effects (p.14).’ It seems wrong to use a 
variety of loosely related phenomena as an example of irony in investigations of L2 
irony comprehension. That would bring questionable results to our understanding of 
how L2 irony is understood. 
3.5.2 Sociopragmatic approaches to interlanguage pragmatic competence 
In the field of interlanguage pragmatics culture variation has been treated as a barrier to 
successful communication (Kasper and Rose 2002; Kasper and Schmidt 1996; Leech 
1983; Scollon and Scollon 1995; Thomas 1983, 1995; White 1993, 1997; Wierzbicka 
1991, 1992, 1997). However, the influence of culture has been discussed in a rather 
biased way. For instance, unsuccessful communication resulting from the influence of 
non-native speakers’ own culture, which distinguishes from the target language culture 
has been described as ‘failure.’ According to Thomas (1983), breakdown in the cross- 
cultural communication57 is caused by ‘pragmatic failure,’ which was defined as 
inability of non-native speakers to understand what is meant by what is said. She 
explained that ‘pragmatic failure’ consists of ‘pragmalinguistic failure’ and ‘socio- 
pragmatic failure’. ‘Pragmalinguistic failure’ is mainly attributed to ‘pragmatic 
transfer’ that is inappropriate transfer of speech act strategies from one language to 
another language of utterances which are semantically and syntactically equivalent, but 
tend to convey a different pragmatic force in the other language (Thomas 1983:101). 
‘Pragmatic transfer’ can be exemplified by cases such as that Japanese L2 learners tend 
to say ‘please’ in an inappropriate situation58, say ‘sorry’ instead of ‘excuse me’, or to 
ask permission unnecessarily using auxiliary verbs ‘may’ or ‘can’. For instance, when a 
Japanese person asks to be excused to go to toilet, many of them use this expression; 
																																								 																				
57 Thomas (1983) uses the term ‘cross-cultural’ as any communication between participants who do not 
share a common linguistic or cultural background. 
58 See White (1993) pp.196-200 for full descriptions. 
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‘May I go to toilets?’ attempting to be polite. This is the very case of negative pragmatic 
transfer. On the other hand, ‘socio-pragmatic failure’, which socio-pragmatic approach 
deals with, seems to be very much related to misinterpretation of indirect use of 
language. Thomas (1983:107) suggested that native speakers and non-native speakers 
operate differently formulated pragmatic principles for conversations. Different 
‘pragmatic ground rules’ may evoke cross-cultural conflict of values. Thomas (1983) 
and Leech (1983) maintained that the hearer perceives the force of the utterance as 
something other than the speaker intended. This is because both the hearer relies on his 
own culture knowledge or beliefs, not knowing that the speaker might hold different 
perspective of the world. According to Thomas (1983), ‘socio-pragmatic 
competence/failure’ is the (in-) ability to apply their norms or social/cultural values to 
utterances, knowing how, when, and why to speak. When a speaker produces an 
utterance and a hearer interprets it, their linguistic behaviour is largely determined by 
their own social scale of values. Not only norms or social/cultural values but also the 
scale of those norms and values are different in different cultures and participants in 
cross-cultural communication make judgements according to their own scale. Thomas 
also suggested that assessments of relative importance of pragmatic principles might 
vary depending on culture. Even in the cases where they share same or similar values in 
different cultures, there might be difference in the degree of norm (i.e. how seriously a 
particular value is accepted in their culture: how polite is ‘polite’?), and the ranking 
might be different (i.e. which value outweighs the others). Sociopragmatic approaches 
have treated the influence of culture on pragmatic competence from such points of view. 
The present study questions the widely accepted assumption that ‘difference’ or 
‘deviation’ from native speakers’ language behaviour involving both producing and 
interpreting is ‘failure’ or ‘inability’ of non-native speakers. Spencer-Oatey (2008:6) 
suggested that ‘…cultural factors do not necessarily lead to communicative problems; 
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on the contrary, they can be a major source of comity and enrichment.’ House and 
Kasper (2000: 155) have strongly argued against the view that norms of native speakers 
are taken as all-important in the interlanguage pragmatic literature (cited in Ifantidou 
2014:105 and adopted below): 
Examination of the sociopragmatic functions of L2 learners’ codeswitching 
calls for a radical re-writing of the norms against which NNS’ pragmatic 
knowledge and behaviour should be matched. This norm should not be the 
monolingual NS because an L2 learner, by definition, is no monolingual 
speaker. L2 learners are bilingual or multilingual speakers whose 
interlanguage knowledge and skills are under construction. Consequently, the 
yardstick by which the unstable bilingual should be measured is the stable 
bilingual under comparable social, cultural and historical conditions of 
language use, and with comparable goals for interaction in different discourse 
domains. 
(adopted from Ifantidou 2014:105) 
This argument seems parallel with Cook’s notion of ‘multicompetence’ (cf. study of 
Bromberek-Dyzman and Ewert discussed in 3.4.2). Cook (1992:558) has also argued 
that ‘much SLA research is biased by adopting the monolingual as norm rather than 
multicompetent speaker.’ He (1992:563-564) suggested that L2 users and monolinguals 
might have different cognitive processes and metalinguistic awareness. It might be also 
possible that knowing another language (L2) facilitates codeswitching more readily 
from L1 to L2 (p.569). Different interpretations as outputs should not be treated as 
evidence for different mechanisms involved, and more importantly, that the underlying 
ability is faulty.  
The view that ‘deviation’ from native speakers’ language behaviour is some sort of 
‘failure’ seems to reflect on the experimental designs of previous studies (Bouton 1988, 
1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; Lee 2002; Manowong 2011; Yamanaka 
2003). These previous studies have taken it for granted that interpretations of native 
speakers would be always ‘correct’ and native speakers would uniformly interpret 
ironical utterances in the same way. The ability of L2 speakers to interpret ironical 
utterance was measured by the accuracy of choosing the ‘correct’ or ‘expected’ answer, 
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which was assumed to represent the interpretation of native speakers. Bouton 
(1988:185-186) asked native speakers open-end questions to indicate what the utterance 
in question may have meant. He used as ‘correct’ answer in the multiple-questions the 
interpretation that the ‘dominant’ native speakers had provided. The options that Bouton 
(1988) had originally set as ‘correct’ have been used in following experiments (Bouton 
1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; Lee 2002; Manowong 2011). The 
question is, however, to what extent the ‘correct’ answer represents native speaker’s 
interpretation. Taking the example of irony [good friend], for instance, the option (a) 
‘Peter is not acting the way a good friend should’ was set as the ‘correct’ answer but it 
was based on the interpretation from 73% but not 100% of native speakers. This means 
that ‘correct’ answer was not a definite interpretation of the utterance in question. In 
fact, the percentage of native speakers of American English who had chosen option (a) 
was 86% in Bouton’s first experiment (1988) and 80% (mean score 12.0 out of 15) in 
Lee’s study (2002). In the study of Yamanaka (2003), no complete consistency in native 
speaker’s choice of answer was found. There may be cases where people from the same 
linguistic and cultural background also interpret the same utterance differently. This 
‘native norm model’ applied into research in interlanguage pragmatics has been 
questioned (Dewaele 2007, Ren 2013). For example, Dewaele (2007) suggested that 
non-native speakers’ disagreement with the NS norm does not necessarily indicate 
‘pragmatic failure.’ He also questioned which sets of norm we could take as the norm of 
native speakers. He (2007:167) stated that ‘different communities of practice have 
different sets of unwritten rules concerning appropriate behaviour. Against what set of 
rules should we compare the data from our L2 learners and L2 users?’ As Ren 
(2013:720) pointed out, the ability of non-native speakers should not be measured by 
maximal convergence to native speakers. This illusion of ‘the NS norm’ that 
interpretations of non-native speakers would be always ‘correct’ seem to make the 
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suggestions of previous experimental studies questionable. Relevance theory (Sperber 
and Wilson 1995) claimed that assumptions or representations of the world dramatically 
vary by individuals, and differences between individuals result in not only different 
interpretations but also different memory of the basic physical facts. It cannot be 
expected that successful communication is always guaranteed in conversations among 
native speakers.  
Lee’s ‘particularised-generalised’ categorisation is based on the idea of Grice 
(1975) that ‘particularized implicatures’ but not ‘generalized implicatures’ are very 
sensitive to the non-linguistic and contextual cues which the implicature was embedded 
in (2002:10). According to Lee, ‘non-linguistic cues’ were cues such as the speaker’s 
tone of voice, facial expression, body language, gestures, or information from the 
situation of the scene. Based on the comments of Korean participants from the post- 
interview, Lee has suggested that the ability to recognise non-linguistic cues was also 
culture-specific. On the other hand, Taguchi’s investigation (2002) has found that 
different inferential strategies were identified across proficiency level. Lower 
proficiency group showed a tendency to pick up a key word in the utterance and 
associate it with meaning (‘key word inferencing’), or referring to life experience and 
global background knowledge (‘background knowledge/experience’). Taguchi referred 
to Ross (1977) in that L2 learners of lower proficiency especially in listening skills tend 
to rely on ‘key word inferencing.’ A word of caution here: ‘the key word’ does not 
mean the word that potentially guides to the speaker’s implied meaning. It is rather the 
last word that L2 learners processed during the flow of linguistic inputs. This 
disposition to ‘key word inferencing’ was also evidenced in Taguchi’s other study 
(2005) in which the ability of Japanese L2 learners to understand the implied meaning 
in ‘conventionalized implicature’ was assessed. Taguchi set three types of distractor out 
of a four-choice question as either ‘opposite to the implied meaning,’ ‘words from last- 
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heard utterance,’ or ‘related to other part of dialogue.’ For instance, in between two 
people conversation, A asked B about the movie that B had watched. B answered 
uttering “I was glad when it was over.” Taguchi (2005:550) created four choices as 
follows: 
- B didn’t enjoy the movie.  [correct choice] - B thought the movie was good. [distractor: opposite to the implied meaning] - B liked the end of the movie. [distractor: words from last-heard utterance] - B thinks Ben should have watched the movie. [distractor: related to other part of 
dialogue] 
Post-hoc error data analysis revealed that Japanese L2 learners who had chosen a wrong 
interpretation were most attracted to the distractor of ‘words from last-heard utterance.’ 
This finding indicated that Japanese L2 learners became confused by ‘other irrelevant 
and misleading cues, particularly by the words that remain strongest in their short-term 
memory (p.555).’  It was revealed that as language proficiency had developed, Japanese 
L2 learners seemed to rely more on different strategies such as ‘paralinguistic cues’, 
‘adjacency rules’, ‘logical reasoning.’ If Taguchi’s suggestions (2002, 2005) are right, it 
seems more plausible to suggest that language proficiency rather than sociocultural 
knowledge specific to the target language culture potentially may affect non-native 
speakers’ inferential processes on irony interpretations. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter surveyed and reviewed how previous studies have treated irony and how 
they have investigated the ability of L2 speakers to interpret irony. Among various 
phenomena of indirect use of language, irony has been reported as the most difficult 
type for L2 speakers to understand. Most of the previous studies have taken Grice’s 
account of irony, and irony has been regarded as involving the communication of the 
opposite of what the speaker has literally expressed. Within relevance-theoretic account 
of irony the present study has argued that issues with Grice’s inferential model of 
communication in general and his approach to irony in particular have been reflected in 
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problems with those previous studies. The ability of non-native speakers to interpret 
ironical utterances has been investigated by measuring whether speakers select the 
opposite of what was said as a communicated meaning. None of the previous studies 
considered the point of irony as the speaker’s intent to express her dissociative attitude 
towards an attributed thought. The question of how non-native speakers understand the 
speaker’s attitude has been ignored. The present study also argued that ironic 
interpretation is not governed by rules or conventions. Explicit instruction focusing on a 
semantic reversal formula did not help L2 speakers to understand the communicative 
intention of the ironic speaker. Based on the illusion of native speakers as ‘norm 
providers,’ previous experimental investigations of the ability of L2 speakers to 
interpret ironical utterances have been conducted to see whether L2 speakers choose the 
‘correct’ answer. The present study pointed out that the nature of L2 irony 
comprehension has been dealt with from sociolinguistic and sociopragmatic viewpoints 
with discussions about the culture-dependent differences in contextualisation for 
interpretations and their reflection in particular linguistic forms and pragmatic 
strategies. All these discussions were descriptive, and previous studies did not explain 
how cultural variations affect the way in which non-native speakers arrive at different 
interpretations.  
Research on L2 understanding pragmatically inferred meanings in general and 
irony in particular remains within the theoretical framework of Grice’s approach to 
communication. The present study suggests that a more fully developed theory is 
needed. It assumes that a relevance-theoretic account of irony (the echoic account) 
provides better foundations for investigations. The next chapter reconsiders possible 
factors that may affect inferential processes of irony interpretation from a cognitive 
perspective.	
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CHAPTER 4. TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter proposes a way forward in developing further understanding of factors 
affecting the comprehension of potentially ironic utterances in a second language. The 
preceding chapter discussed problems with previous studies (Bouton 1988, 1990, 
1992b, 1994b, 1999; Lee 2002; Manowong 2011; Shively 2008; Yamanaka 2003) 
arguing that theoretical and related methodological issues cast some doubt on their 
results and identifying a significant gap in understanding what gives rise to differences 
in ironic interpretation between first language and second language speakers. 
Explanations have tended to refer to ‘cultural differences’ adopting a socio-pragmatic 
perspective, but not to say much about what those differences were and how different 
culture affects the interpretation processes. The fundamental basis of socio-pragmatic 
approaches is the desire to assert the importance of one’s own culture when its 
difference to the target language culture is overseen in cross-cultural communication. 
However, such approaches often result in mere descriptions of difference between two 
cultures and do not provide systematic explanations. 
It does seem natural to assume that cultural differences must play a role. However, 
looking at individual cases does not tell us much about it and definitely not explain how 
cultural differences would play a role in the interpretation processes of ironical 
utterance. There has not been much work on other possible explanations. Only some 
previous studies (Lee 2002; Manowong 2011; Shively et al. 2008 Yamanaka 2003) 
suggested two other factors: differences in the recognition of prosodic cues, and 
differences with regard to the (more limited) capacity of working memory, but not fully 
explored further. This chapter considers these possible explanations from the 
perspective of the relevance-theoretic approach adopted here and prepares the way for 
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experimental work reported in chapter 5, which begins to explore one of these 
explanations, differences in the recognition of prosodic cues. 
Section 4.2 considers culture-dependent differences, which previous experimental 
studies saw as the most important factor affecting interpretations. It argues that 
discussion of culture-dependent differences so far has been incomplete and has not 
provided a systematic explanation of how these differences affect interpretations. The 
discussion here suggests that a relevance-theoretic approach might explain how cultural 
differences affect the construction and access of contextual assumptions in ways which 
lead to interpretations different from those of native speakers (to varying degrees for 
different individuals, of course). 
Section 4.3 considers the contribution of prosodic cues in indicating the speaker’s 
communicative intention. This has been mentioned in previous studies but never fully 
explored. This section discusses findings of studies of the recognition of vocally 
expressed emotion in foreign language and considers possible universals and cultural 
differences in the recognition of prosodic cues to the speaker’s meaning in ironic 
utterances. 
Section 4.4 considers the possibility that processing linguistic inputs makes greater 
cognitive demands on second language speakers and this is a factor leads to different 
interpretations. It considers possible relationships between the automatisation of 
processing in L2 and the capacity of working memory. 
Based on a survey and review of studies that have considered cognitive aspects in 
work on comprehension in a second language, the chapter concludes by suggesting 
some new possible directions for empirical work on second language interpretation in 
general and on the interpretation of potentially ironic utterances in particular. Chapter 5 
reports empirical work which aims to take some first steps in one of these directions by 
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investigating the role of prosodic cues in guiding the interpretations of Japanese 
speakers of English as a second language. 
4.2 A cognitive perspective on cultural variation 
This section considers how the relevance-theoretic approach adopted here might 
account for how aspects of a specific culture contribute to and affect human 
communicative behaviour. The nature of L2 irony comprehension has been described in 
discussing the culture-dependent differences in contextualisation for interpretations and 
their reflection in inferential strategies (Bouton 1988; Bromberek-Dyzman, Rataj, and 
Dylak 2010; Lee 2002; Manowong 2011; Yamanaka 2003). This section aims to 
suggest a different way of looking at ‘culture’ by complementing the socio-pragmatic 
approach with a cognitive one. It first addresses a question of what ground the speaker 
and the hearer are expected to share, and discusses the issues associated with the notion 
of ‘mutual knowledge’. This discussion considers how the notion of ‘mutual 
knowledge’ has been rejected in favour of a notion of ‘mutual manifestness within the 
relevance-theoretic inferential model of communication (Smith 1982; Sperber and 
Wilson 1995). The idea of ‘socio-pragmatic competence/failure’ (Thomas 1983), which 
seems to underlie the socio-pragmatic approach to successful cross-cultural 
communication considers native speakers as ‘norm providers’ and ‘difference’ or 
‘deviation’ from native speakers’ language behaviour as ‘failure’ or ‘inability’ of non-
native speakers. As a reaction to this idea, this study also considers a question of the 
extent to which it is necessary to alter one’s cultural representations for successful 
communication. It suggests a systematic explanation about how culture influences the 
interpretation processes of ironical utterances within the framework of relevance- 
theoretic account. 
4.2.1 Considering ‘culture’ 
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Culture is notoriously difficult to define (Spencer-Oatey 2008: 3). Spencer-Oatey 
explained that numerous research projects have provided a definition of ‘culture’. 
Choosing and applying one definition from them to investigations is not easily done. 
However, it is necessary to clarify which stand this study takes with regard to ‘culture’ 
before moving on to the detailed discussion about the influence of culture in cross-
cultural communication. 
The central argument of previous studies (Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 
1994a) was that cultural diversity (i.e. culture difference and culture variations) affects 
mutual understanding of the context of the utterance between the speaker and the hearer. 
Those taking the socio-pragmatic approach suggested that native speakers and non-
native speakers have to understand each other and they have to share the same 
perceptions about the world in general and values and conventions in particular (Bouton 
1990, 1992a). However, a question of how much interlocutors in conversation can 
understand each other and what kinds of cultural knowledge they need to share is not 
clearly identified. 
The idea of ‘mutual knowledge’ suggested that for successful communication or 
more precisely for construction of the correct interpretation (‘correct’ as in the implied 
meaning that the speaker intended), the context intended by the speaker and the 
contextual information used for interpretation of a given utterance must be not only 
known by each party of communication but also mutually known (i.e. each knows that 
the other knows). Sperber and Wilson (1995) argued that ‘mutual knowledge’ is a part 
of the philosophy of language that does not function in reality: it is an empirically 
inadequate notion, and ‘shared information’ is conceptually vague. Relevance theoretic 
accounts of communication and cognition explain the problem of ‘mutual knowledge,’ 
to put it briefly, as that it is impossible to establish ‘mutual knowledge’ without going 
through infinitely regressing stages (‘infinite regress’): the speaker knows that the 
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hearer knows that the speaker knows that the hearer knows that the speaker knows that 
the hearer, and so on. For more detailed discussion, see Carston 2002; Clark 2013; 
Smith 1982; Sperber and Wilson 1995. Sperber and Wilson (1995) rejected the notion 
of ‘mutual knowledge’ and replace it with the weaker but more realistic notion of 
‘manifestness’ as a solution for the problem of ‘mutual knowledge’ which gives better 
explanation about communication. ‘Manifestness’ and ‘cognitive environment’ are 
defined as follows: 
Manifestness 
An assumption is manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if he is 
capable at the time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation 
as true or probably true. 
Cognitive environment 
The cognitive environment of an individual is a set of assumptions that are 
manifest to him.59  
(Clark 2013: 115; based on Sperber and Wilson 1995: 39) 
According to this view, an assumption becomes manifest to an individual if that 
individual is capable of mentally representing it and accepting that representation as 
true. A crucial difference between ‘knowledge or knowing’ and ‘manifestness or 
manifest assumptions’ is that in order for you to know something, it has to be true 
whereas assumptions are not necessarily true. In other words, you cannot know 
something if it is false. Consider the following sentence: 
(14)  The French president, Mr Hollande, has never won the Wimbledon tennis 
tournament. 
It is unlikely that you have entertained this before reading it here but it becomes 
manifest to you after you encounter it. The point is that to say that you ‘know’ it, you 
need to know that the simple proposition expressed by this sentence is true. What if the 
next sentence is presented to you after (14)? 
																																								 																				
59 Clark uses the word ‘assumption’ instead of ‘fact’, which had been used in Sperber and Wilson’s original 
definitions. Clark’s reason for this is that he assumes that a ‘fact’ is a ‘true proposition’ which is problematic here. In 
fact, Sperber and Wilson agree with Clark suggesting that a manifest assumption may turn out to be false. See Clark 
(2013: 368 notes 11 to Chapter 3). 
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(15) The French president, Mr Hollande, has won the Wimbledon tennis 
tournament. 
Since (14) and (15) contradict each other, they cannot both be true, and according to the 
definition of manifestness, they cannot therefore both be manifest to you at the same 
time. If you were told (14) by a reliable source, and have some independent evidence of 
your own to back it up, then you are most unlikely to change your mind on hearing (15) 
unless the speaker can provide convincing evidence that what she is telling you is “true 
or probably true”. And in that case, (14) will be manifest to you and (15) will not. 
Sperber and Wilson (1995: 39) pointed out that an individual’s total cognitive 
environment consists of not only all the assumptions that he is aware of, but also those 
that he is capable of becoming aware of in his physical environment. Given the 
definition of ‘manifestness,’ communication is perfectly explained: communication 
depends on what is or can become mutually manifest rather than presupposing what is 
fully shared.  Sperber and Wilson (1995: 45) suggested that the cognitive environment 
of a communicator and an addressee cannot be assumed to be the same. Assumptions 
available to the communicator are not necessarily the same as those to the addressee, 
and the degree of ability to represent assumptions and use them in inferential processing 
differ between two parties. This indicates that the responsibility for avoiding 
misunderstanding is left on the speaker’s abilities to decide which ostensive stimulus to 
use and to evaluate which contextual information is available to the hearer based on 
their mutual cognitive environment. All the hearer is required to do is use a given 
ostensive stimulus and contextual information most accessible for an inference. It 
should be mentioned that relevance theorists, replacing the notion of ‘mutual 
knowledge’ by ‘manifestness,’ do not attempt to suggest that there is no such a thing as 
‘shared information.’ They regard shared information as necessary for communication, 
and the communication process itself gives rise to shared information. 
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All this indicates that if it is on a right track to say that ‘mutual knowledge’ 
between non-native speakers and native speakers is not a prerequisite for successful 
intercultural communication, then, the influence of culture needs to be explained from a 
different perspective. 
As a psychoanalyst and an anthropologist, Hall (1976) described culture as a human 
‘medium’ suggesting ‘there is not one aspect of human life that is not touched and 
altered by culture (p.16).’ He suggested that culture influences human behaviour. Thus, 
culture can be described as a social group whose members share (or presume to share) 
similar representations (1976:16). 
Spencer-Oatey (2000/2008) and Žegarac (2008) suggested a slightly different view 
of ‘culture’ to this. According to Spencer-Oatey (2000/2008:4) and Žegarac (2008:52), 
members of the same cultural group or a population subgroup share cultural 
representations, and the shared cultural representations within the group are called 
‘regularities’. Such ‘regularities’ are related to a wide range of elements including 
‘basic assumptions,’ ‘fundamental values,’ ‘deep-seated orientations to life and beliefs,’ 
‘attitudes,’ ‘behavioural rituals, conventions and routines,’ etc. In this sense, ‘intra- 
cultural communication could be characterised as communication between participants 
who share most cultural representations, and inter-cultural communication as 
communication between participants who share few cultural representations (Žegarac 
2007: 39).’ Sperber and Hirschfeld (2004) have spoken of ‘culture’ as follows: 
'A cultural group is held together by a constant flow of information, most of 
which is about local transient circumstances and not transmitted much beyond 
them. Some information, being of more general relevance, is repeatedly 
transmitted in an explicit or implicit manner and can end up being shared by 
many or even most members of the group. ‘Culture’ refers to this widely 
distributed information, its representation in people’s minds, and its 
expressions in their behaviors and interactions. 
(Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004: 40) 
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This suggests that culture crucially influences not only the way humans represent and 
view the world (i.e. a representation) but also the way they attribute thoughts and 
behaviour to other people (i.e. ‘metarepresentation’ = representation of a 
representation). 
Spencer-Oatey (2008) suggested that ‘culture’ is manifested through co-occurring 
regularities within the social group (2008:4) and drew our attentions to the key issue: 
‘cultural regularities are not manifested in all members if a given cultural group or to 
the same degree of strength in all members (2008:4).’ She suggested that cultural 
representations such as norms or beliefs that members of the same group are assumed to 
share are the central tendencies of the group as what she described as ‘family 
resemblances.’ There are cases where representations and especially experiences that a 
single individual in the group has may differ to the group average. In addition, she 
(2008: 6) pointed out that the influence of cultural representations on human behaviour 
and attributions to others does not mean that it is the only factor that affects their 
behaviour, nor that cultural regularities determine their behaviour. Žegarac (2007, 
2008), using an analogy between cultures and epidemics, suggested that the existence of 
shared cultural representations or cultural regularities does not necessarily mean that all 
the members of a given cultural group hold exactly the same representations. Even in 
cases where members hold the same representation, the degree of its importance may 
not always be equal among individual members. This aspect of culture becomes very 
important to the following discussion. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 16) discussed the 
existence of individual differences within the same cultural/social group. They point out 
that aspects of human cognition such as attention, perception, or memory vary from one 
individual to another. They say: 
While it is clear that members of the same linguistic community converge on 
the same language, and they converge on the same inferential abilities, the 
same is not true of their assumptions about the world. True, all humans are 
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constrained by their species-specific cognitive abilities in developing their 
representation of the world, and all the members of the same cultural group 
share a number of experiences, teachings and views. However, beyond this 
common framework, individuals tend to be highly idiosyncratic. Differences 
in life history necessarily lead to differences in memorised information. 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 16) 
Even two people from the same cultural group with a similar background (e.g. living in 
the same town, having education from the same schools and institutions, having similar 
professions, etc.) may perceive the same situation differently since it is not always the 
case that each of them pays the same amount or kind of attention to the same objects or 
events. In addition, even in the case where two people pay attention to the same thing 
and share a similar perception, what and how much they remember will not be exactly 
the same. What an individual picks up from the flow of information is an individual 
matter. A range of information is available from cognitive sources for hypothesis 
construction, but it cannot be assumed that the resulting hypothesis is the same among 
individuals. It is not only members of different cultural groups who may vary with 
regard to the assumptions they can access. 
Spencer-Oatey (2008) claimed that while it is undoubtedly correct that individual 
behaviour is moulded under the influence of representations of the central dispositions 
of the group as a whole (e.g. country-level, race-level, etc.), group-level standards 
should not be applied directly to individuals. This leads to another question: for 
successful cross-cultural social interaction, to what extent it is necessary for non-native 
speakers to assimilate culturally into the target language culture. For development of the 
ability to interpret a given utterance in the same way as native speakers, do non-native 
speakers have to let go of their own cultural values? Whose knowledge about the world 
should be taken as representing the key assumptions for interpretation? And to what 
extent is it possible to alter one’s cultural representations and practices understood as 
values or norms shaped in an individual’s mind? Take my own example. After living in 
London for more than 10 years I often find it still difficult to accept straightaway the 
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sign that reads ‘good service’ on tube stations when the tube is running without severe 
delay or serious problems. The London underground service is notorious for its 
unreliability. From my representation of [PUBLIC TRANSPORT] that the basics of any 
public transport is punctuality and safety, punctuality is expected as how a public 
transport service should be: it is not worth mentioning or it is not worth describing with 
the adjective ‘good.’ Having numerous bad experiences caused by the unreliable service 
of London underground, I’ve equipped myself to afford some extra time on daily basis. 
However, it does not mean that my representation about public transport has been 
altered. To the contrary, it remains intact being stored in mental schema. Particular 
knowledge about the target language culture can be obtained through one’s experiences, 
and such knowledge is probably added to one’s cultural knowledge as new information 
without altering the core of it. One’s cultural representations and practice may not be 
substance that people can alter like codeswitching.60  
This discussion here suggests that it is possible that people from the same culture or 
sub-cultural group also have different assumptions. Along the lines that cultural 
differences are mediated by the minds of individuals and that it is possible to identify 
ways in which constructing different assumptions might happen or even that having a 
similar assumption, there might be still difference in degree, some assumptions or 
behaviours are quite individual and idiosyncratic while some are clearly affected by 
members of particular cultural group. Culture difference is one of the important factors 
that contributes to non-native speakers’ interpretation processes but this study suggests 
that focusing only on the cultural side would give no more scope for research on the 
comprehension of potentially ironic utterances in a second language than what has been 
																																								 																				
60 Link et al. (2009) have discussed L2 learners’ inhibition of L1 during immersing in L2 contexts. Their 
discussion was not focused on cultural representations but linguistic behaviour. See Link, Kroll and Sunderman 
(2009) for the details. 
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suggested so far. This different cultural-dependent factor should be looked into by 
complementing socio-pragmatic approaches with a cognitive one. 
4.2.2 The importance of culture in context selection 
Previous studies (Bouton 1988,1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1999; Lee 2002; 
Manowong 2011; Yamanaka 2004) have discussed the culture-dependent differences 
between native speakers and L2 speakers with reference to notions of context. They 
have described how they assume L2 speakers’ own cultural knowledge was represented 
and used in intercultural communication but have not explained how different cultural 
representations in the context bring about different interpretations. 
Clark (2013:7) points out that an adequate theory should be able to explain not only 
how people understand each other’s intentional communication but should also be able 
to explain why communication sometimes fails. Grice’s inferential model tells us that 
the intended interpretation is inferred by a process of making and evaluating hypotheses 
about the speaker’s implied meaning in the light of his Cooperative Principle and the 
maxims which constitute it. Any hypothesis that does not satisfy the expectations 
represented by the maxims can be eliminated. Grice, however, did not say much about 
how the hearer forms hypotheses about the speaker’s intended meaning. Neither did he 
mention the possibility that individuals might construct different hypotheses which can 
lead to misunderstandings. This may be partly why some studies (Divine 1982; Keenan 
1976) suggested that Grice’s approach is not universal, and this may be why Bouton 
(1992b: 40) criticised it as English-oriented. The relevance-theoretic approach to 
communication claims to be able to explain why communication sometimes fails. 
Wilson (1994) suggests that ‘difficulty of interpretation arises precisely because it is not 
clear what contextual assumptions we were intended to use’ (Wilson 1994: 41).’ The 
hearer’s job in recognising the intended meaning is to choose the assumptions that will 
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lead to the intended interpretation.61 This can be applied to the case of 
misunderstandings arising in intercultural communication and it also provides an 
explanation of how culture-dependent differences in contextualisation can affect 
inferential processes. 
‘Context’ has often been understood in a rather simple and narrow way as 
consisting of features of the preceding linguistic contents and/or the physical 
environment in which the utterance takes place. Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 
1995; Wilson 1994) assumes a dynamic and much broader sense to the nature of 
‘context.’ It suggests that context is also the set of assumptions (‘contextual 
assumptions’) brought to bear in arriving at an interpretation. The set of assumptions 
may be drawn from new information from immediately preceding texts or discourse, 
observation of the speaker and the state of affairs in the immediate environment. But it 
can be also drawn from a subset of the hearer’s beliefs and assumptions about the world 
including personal memories of particular things (i.e. events, places, or people), general 
cultural assumptions, religious beliefs, scientific knowledge, assumptions about the 
speaker’s emotional state and any shared or idiosyncratic information that the hearer has 
access to at the time of conversation (Blakemore 1992:18; Clark 2013:224-227; Wilson 
1994:41). In order to ‘explain’ but not ‘describe’ the influence of culture, understanding 
the notion of contextual assumptions is crucial for two reasons at least. First, contextual 
assumptions that individuals create in the process of interpretation may vary depending 
on their cultural background since many assumptions are drawn from cultural 
representations. As discussed above, although these mental representations vary at an 
individual level, it is also true that members of the same cultural group have a great deal 
																																								 																				
61 Wilson (1994:47) warned that there is no guarantee that the interpretation that satisfies the hearer’s 
expectation of relevance will the intended one since a fallible process of hypothesis formation and evaluation is 
involved in interpretation processes. To claim that a choice is rationally justified is not the same as claiming that 
it is invariably correct. See Wilson (1994) for the details. 
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in common. Hence, it is highly likely that members of the same cultural group construct 
and use similar contextual assumptions. Second, in order to arrive at an interpretation of 
an utterance, the hearer needs to select an appropriate set of contextual assumptions, 
which is the set of assumptions that are close enough to the one the speaker assumed the 
hearer can and will access for interpretation. Thus, successful communication depends 
on the selection of the appropriate set of assumptions. It is not necessarily that the set of 
assumptions that the hearer actually accesses and uses are those that the speaker 
intended (or that that speaker has a precise set of assumptions in mind). The speaker 
may misjudge the hearer’s ability to select the set of assumptions needed to access her 
intended meaning, or the hearer may not select and use the same assumptions as those 
the speaker expects the hearer to bring to bear. Misunderstandings occur in such cases. 
Thus, different cultural representations may affect the construction and use of 
contextual assumptions, and most importantly the influence of culture or cultural 
knowledge can be found in selecting the set of assumptions. Speakers and hearers from 
different cultural or social groups may not share the same or similar schemata of beliefs 
and assumptions are rooted in culturally defined social, moral or aesthetic norms, or 
general hopes or aspirations. ‘mismatches’ or ‘gaps’ between the set of assumptions 
envisaged by the speaker and the one selected by the hearer may be found more often in 
intercultural communication. 
While stressing the importance of culture, how culture affect the interpretation of 
non-native speakers has not fully been explained in previous studies (Bouton 
1988,1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1999; Lee 2002; Manowong 2011; Yamanaka 
2004). This section, considering culture from a more cognitive perspective suggests 
systematic explanation for it within relevance-theoretic account. If we are on the right 
track with regard to cultural influence on the interpretation processes, it is possible to 
consider the other factor, i.e. possible difference in recognition of prosodic cues (of 
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course, there is a possibility that cultural factors might influence how prosodic cues are 
recognised). 
4.3 Recognition of paralinguistic cues in foreign language 
This section surveys studies that focused on non-native speakers’ recognition and 
production of paralinguistic cues in a second language. First, it considers studies that 
investigated how vocally expressed emotions are recognised in foreign languages in the 
discussion of universal principles and culture-specific aspects. Then, it turns its 
attention to studies that highlight culture-specific attentional biases in recognising 
emotional expressions which are different for Japanese and American speakers. Lastly, 
it focuses on studies that explored similarities and differences in the use of English 
intonation between native speakers and second language speakers.  
4.3.1 Universality and cultural relativity in the recognition of vocally expressed 
emotion in foreign languages 
Elfenbein and Ambady (2002a) conducted a meta-analysis to examine evidence for the 
universality and cultural relativity of emotional expression through non-verbal 
behaviour. They analysed 97 separate studies, which included 87 articles that had 
empirically examined how ‘basic’ emotions (i.e. anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness, surprise, contempt) or subsets of these were vocally recognised cross-
culturally. The total number of participants participating in these 97 studies added up to 
more than 22,148 participants including 42 different nations, 33 different ethnic groups, 
and 2 regional groups. The studies had focused on different non-verbal channels of 
emotional expression such as facial expression, vocal expression, body language (body 
movement), silent video and combinations of these. Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) 
claimed that the evidence supported ‘cross-cultural accuracy’, i.e. that emotions could 
be recognised accurately across cultural boundaries. At the same time, they have also 
found evidence for the ‘in-group advantage’ in emotion recognition whereby ‘emotions 
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are recognised more accurately when they are both expressed and perceived by 
members of the same national, ethnic, or regional group (Elfenbein and Ambady 
2002a:216).’ Furthermore, Elfenbein and Ambady (2002a:219) suggested that greater 
cultural exposure (contact or/and familiarity) might moderate the degree of in-group 
advantage. Moreover, this meta-analysis (Elfenbein and Ambady 2002a:219-20; 
Paulmann and Uskul 2014) suggested that accuracy in recognising emotion varied 
according to non-verbal channel of expression: overall emotions were recognised less 
through the ‘dynamic channels (tone of voice or video)’ than through ‘static channels 
(photograph of face or body). 
While less rich compared to research on facial emotional recognition, there is 
psychology literature on the universality and cultural variability of the recognition of 
vocally expressed emotional expression (Bachorowski 1999; Elfenbein and Ambady 
2002a, 2003a, 2003b; Paulmann and Uskul 2014; Pell, Monetta, Paulmann, and Kotz 
2009; Scherer 1986, 1997; Scherer and Wallbott 1994; Scherer, Banse and Wallbott 
2001; Scherer, Banse, Wallbott, and Goldbeck 1991; Thompson and Balkwill 2006). 
Regardless of the experimental design adopted, these studies provided evidence 
supporting ‘dialect theory’ (Tomkins and McCarter 1964) which claims that ‘just as 
dialects of a language (e.g., American vs. British English) can differ in accent, 
grammar, and vocabulary, the universal language of emotion may also have dialects that 
differ subtly from each other (Elfenbein and Ambady 2003a: 162; Elfenbein, Beaupré, 
Lévesque, and Hess 2007).’62 These studies assume that a speaker intends to express her 
emotion or attitudes by varying prosodic features (i.e. pitch, loudness, voice quality, 
and/or speed) and a hearer makes inferences about the others’ emotion or attitudes by 
paying attention to such prosodic attributes (Paulmann and Uskul 2014:237). The results 
																																								 																				
62 See Elfenbein and Ambady (2003a) for details of ‘dialect theory’ in comparison with ‘neurocultural theory’ 
(Ekman et al. 1987) and ‘display rules and decoding rules’ (Matsumoto 1989, 1992). 
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of these studies showed that participants seemed to rely on universal principles or 
“inference rules” for vocal emotion recognition, which are innately shared across human 
cultures (Pell, Monetta, Paulmann and Kotz, 2009:519). At the same time, they also 
found evidence for an in-group advantage (Elfenbein and Ambady 2002a, 2002b, 
2003a, 2003b; Paulmann and Uskul 2014; Pell, Monetta, Paulmann and Kotz, 2009; 
Scherer et al., 2001; Scherer and Wallbott 1994; Thompson and Balkwill, 2006). As 
Elfenbein and Ambady described, an in-group advantage was evident in that 
‘perceivers’ emotion judgments are more accurate with culturally matched than 
culturally mismatched materials (2003a: 162).’ For instance, Scherer et al. (2001) 
adopted ‘‘unbalanced’’ experimental designs or what Paulmann and Uskul (2014:232) 
called “one against all” experimental design in which participants from different 
cultural groups were asked to identify emotions expressed by a member of a single 
cultural group. Scherer et al. (2001) investigated the accuracy of emotion recognition 
across nine countries in Europe, the United States, and Asia. They created ‘meaningless 
multilanguage utterances (2001:79)’ where sentences were artificially constructed by 
arranging meaningless syllables from each of six European languages (i.e. German, 
English, French, Italian, Spanish and Danish) into seven-syllable sequences. 
Professional German actors read these ‘meaningless multilanguage utterances’ 
portraying four different emotional states (i.e. anger, sadness, fear, joy) and a neutral 
state. They (2001:85) reported that overall these basic emotions were recognised 66% of 
the time across all countries. The results also showed that accuracy of participants from 
Germany was the best (74%) among nine countries. Although an in-group advantage 
was indicated, patterns of confusion did not vary significantly depending on the country 
of participants. Pell et al (2009), on the other hand, adopted an “all against one” 
approach whereby participants from a single cultural group were asked to identify 
emotions expressed by members of different cultural groups (Paulmann and Uskul 
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2014:232). Pell et.al (2009) tested monolingual speakers of Argentine Spanish to 
investigate their recognition of emotions vocally expressed in their own language 
(Spanish) and in three foreign languages (English, German, and Arabic). Their stimuli 
included five basic emotional states (anger, sadness, fear, joy, disgust) vocally 
expressed in pseudo-utterances that contained no semantic information about emotions. 
They reported that vocal emotion recognition of Argentine participants was not affected 
depending on language spoken and they could accurately infer the speaker’s emotional 
state vocally expressed not only in their native language but also in foreign languages. 
They (2009:118) also found an in-group advantage tendency: ‘there was a small but 
robust benefit of processing vocal cues to emotion when the participants listened to 
native Argentine speakers rather than to speakers of three foreign languages.’ Paulmann 
and Uskul (2014) adopted an “all against all (fully-crossed design)” approach in which 
participants from different cultural groups i.e. Chinese background and British 
background, were asked to identify emotions expressed by native speakers of Chinese 
and English. In their study both universal and culture-specific principles in vocal 
emotion recognition of six different emotional states (anger, disgust, fear, happy, sad, 
and surprise) and a neutral state were evidenced. While overall emotions were 
recognised successfully across two cultures, participants recognised emotions more 
accurately when emotions were expressed by a member of their own culture rather than 
by a member of the other culture. Their study showed no clear evidence that ‘acoustic 
cues’ (which presumably guided participants towards a particular emotion) were 
recognised differently by the two different cultural groups. Paulmann and Uskul 
(2014:239) suggested the conclusion that mechanisms for recognising vocally expressed 
emotion seemed similar across cultures. 
While accounting for both universality and cultural variability focusing on cross- 
cultural accuracy of vocal emotion recognition, these studies also attempted to look into 
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factors that moderate the size of the in-group advantage. Given that these studies used 
pseudo-sentences in which sentences were artificially constructed without semantic 
information, universal principles seemed to be applied regardless of linguistic ability 
(Pell, Monetta, Paulmann and Kotz, 2009). On the other hand, several potential 
moderators were suggested, including language or linguistic similarity (Scherer et al., 
2001; Pell, Paulmann, Dora, Alasseri, and Kotz 2009; Thompson and Balkwill 2006), 
stimulus duration (Beier and Zautra 1972; Paulmann and Uskul 2014), gender of the 
speaker (Pell, Paulmann, Dora, Alasseri, and Kotz 2009), amount of exposure or 
experience of the listener (Elfenbein and Ambady 2003b; Elfenbein et al., 2007; Scherer 
et al. 2001; Thompson and Balkwill 2006), and learning (Gilbert 1980; Neufeld and 
Schneiderman 1980, cited in Wennerstrom 1994:40). For instance, it was revealed that 
participants who had had more exposure to other cultures could recognise vocally 
expressed emotions more accurately (Elfenbein et al., 2007; Paulmann and Uskul 2014). 
Some authors (Gilbert 1980; Neufeld and Schneiderman 1980, cited in Wennerstrom 
1994:40) suggested that exposure to native speakers’ use of intonation and/or repetition 
exercises at early stages of learning had helped second language learners to work out 
auditory discrimination and ‘subvocalisation’ (e.g. mimicking intonation contours). 
However, these studies showed mixed results, and replications or further investigation 
have been suggested to provide firmer evidence about these moderators. An implication 
of these studies is that, although universal principles for the recognition of vocally 
expressed emotion certainly exist, (mis/) application or transfer of culture-specific 
emotionally relevant rules (e.g. to hide the feeling of disgust) from the native culture 
cannot be overlooked (see Elfenbein and Ambady 2002a for over view; Paulmann 
Uskul 2014; Pell et.al 2009; Scherer et al., 2001). 
Pell et al (2009:110) suggested that research on recognition of vocally expressed 
emotion should explore the potential of cultural variation not only in how prosodic cues 
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(i.e. tone of voice) that are assumed to signal the speaker’s emotions, but also in the 
interaction of these cues with context. Wennerstrom (1994) referring to Morley 
(1991:493) put extra stress on the important relationship between the context and 
suprasegmental information such as stress, rhythm, and intonation (cited Wennerstrom 
1994:400). She suggested that functions of intonation in L2 speech should not be 
investigated in isolation from the context. 
The echoic account claims that the point of irony is to implicitly express the 
speaker’s dissociative attitude towards an attributed thought. If such ‘inferential rules’ 
or even ‘in-group advantage tendency’ are universal as suggested, it is worth exploring 
whether the role that prosodic cues play in guiding hearers to the interpretation 
processes of utterances is also universal. 
4.3.2 Culture-specific attentional bias towards emotional vocal tone 
Studies by Ishii, Reyes and Kitayama (2003) and Kitayama and Ishii (2002) looked 
closely at the influence of cultural variation. These studies (Ishii, Reyes, and Kitayama 
2003; Kitayama and Ishii 2002) investigated whether one’s culture predicts differences 
in processing systems involving comprehension of emotional words.63 These two 
studies focused on cultural variation between American and Japanese participants in 
spontaneous attention to different aspects of linguistic inputs, namely verbal content or 
vocal tone. Hall (1976: chapter 7) proposed that thoughts attributed to others are 
unknowable in principle unless they are explicitly expressed verbally in some Western 
cultures and languages such as North America/English. On the other hand, in some East 
Asian cultures and languages, such as Japanese, attributed thoughts are knowable in 
principle once enough contexts are specified. Hall called the former a ‘low-context 
																																								 																				
63 Ishii, Reyes and Kitayama (2003) and Kitayama and Ishii (2002) used ‘speech’ or ‘utterance’ instead of 
‘words.’ However, the test material used in these studies included only a word of emotional state (e.g. 
‘grateful,’ ‘tasteful’) independently of any context. This is not a statement and it has no truth conditions, so it 
should not be regarded as speech or an utterance. Instead, it should be considered as a ‘word’ rather than 
‘speech’ or an ‘utterance.’ 
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culture’ and the latter a ‘high-context culture’. Hall (1976) has suggested that the 
speaker’s intended meaning is conveyed mainly by verbal content rather than contextual 
cues in low-context culture whereas it is dependent on the immediate social and 
relational context in high-context culture. 
Ishii et al. (2003) and Kitayama and Ishii (2002) modified a ‘stroop interference 
test’ in which subjects are shown colour words (e.g., ‘red’). These words are presented 
in either denoted by the name (e.g., the word ‘red’ presented in red ink) colour or not 
denoted (e.g., the word ‘red’ presented in blue ink instead of red ink). Then, subjects are 
asked to name the colour of the word. Response time is measured to demonstrate 
interference. They manipulated tone in word evaluation and word in tone evaluation 
(e.g., the word ‘happy’ is uttered in sad voice). In word evaluation participants were 
asked to make a judgment about whether the presented word by tone means ‘pleasant’ 
or ‘unpleasant.’ On the other hand, in tone evaluation participants were asked to make a 
judgment about whether the tone sounded ‘pleasant’ or ‘unpleasant.’ Participants were 
tested in their native languages. The response time of Japanese participants showed a 
significantly stronger interference effect with competing vocal emotion in the word 
evaluation judgment, which suggested that they had a tendency to have greater 
difficulty in ignoring vocal tone than ignoring verbal content. On the other hand, those 
of American participants showed significantly stronger interference effect with 
competing word evaluation in the vocal emotion judgment, which indicated that they 
had the opposite tendency to the Japanese participants. Ishii et al. (2003) and Kitayama 
and Ishii (2002) suggested that attentional bias to favour one aspect over the other is 
attributed to culture. Ishii et al. (2003) and Kitayama and Ishii (2002) have argued that 
these results can be seen as in parallel with Hall’s notion of high and low-context 
culture (1976). The role of contextual cues including non-verbal cues such as the 
speaker’s tone of voice is more important in a high-context culture than a low-context 
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culture (Ishii, Reyes and Kitayama 2003; Kitayama 2000; Kitayama and Ishii 2002; 
Miyamoto and Kitayama 2002). Kitayama (2000) also explained that European 
American cultural contexts are ‘analytic’ in that they demonstrate ‘a persistent tendency 
to focus on an object, along with a relatively lowered sensitivity toward contextual 
information (p.224).’ In contrast, Asian cultural contexts are ‘holistic’ in that people in 
such cultural contexts have a tendency to show more sensitivity to context. Differences 
in attentional bias found in the studies of Ishii, Reyes and Kitayama (2003) and 
Kitayama and Ishii (2002) (i.e. American participants’ attentional bias for verbal 
content and Japanese participants’ bias for vocal tone), therefore, can be seen as 
reflections of cultural variations. 
Kitayama and Ishii (2002) also argued that the nature of processing systems 
involving the comprehension of emotional speech reflected cultural divergences based 
on high- versus low-context patterns of communicative practices and conventions. 
Those suggestions and arguments are based on a cultural-psychological approach to 
human and social science that elucidates how cultures create and support psychological 
processes, and how these psychological tendencies in turn support, reproduce and 
sometimes change the cultural systems (Kitayama 2000: 219). Kitayama (2000) argued 
against the universalistic view that human cognition involves hard-wired mechanisms 
that exist irrespective of cultural variation. Kitayama (2000: 220-221) says: 
‘The mutually constructed relation between culture and the psyche is formed 
through human development. We are born into a culture with its own set of 
practices and meanings, laid out by generations of people who have created, 
carried, maintained, and altered them…Each individual is assumed to actively 
engage in cultural resources, which in turn have formative influences on his or 
her psychological processes. Hence, culture not only provides cognitive 
content, but it may also shape cognitive processes, some of which can be 
reasonably called basic …’ 
Kitayama (2000) has suggested that cultural variations predict biases in basic cognitive 
processes such as inference, reasoning, memory, and attention. Such cognitive 
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differences are fundamental, rooted deeply in their own cultural presentations, in other 
words, specific cognitive biases could stem from cultural differences. Kitayama and 
Ishii (2002) suggested that not only use of language but communicative practices and 
conventions also underlie cognitive mechanisms involving processing of verbal and 
non-verbal information. 
Studies by Ishii, Reyes and Kitayama (2003) and Kitayama and Ishii (2002) 
provided interesting results with regard to this. However, there are some problems with 
their assumptions about communication: ‘the implicit rule of thumb’ for communication 
in low-context cultures such as North America/English is that what is said in a word is 
what is meant whereas ‘the implicit cultural rule of thumb’ in high-context cultures such 
as Japan/Japanese is that what is said makes best sense only in a particular context 
(Kitayama and Ishii 2002:32). Kitayama and Ishii (2002:32) exemplified the difference 
between the two types of cultures in the way that the speaker’s meaning was inferred as 
follows: 
‘for example, in low-context cultures and languages…when someone says 
‘‘Yes’’, the listener ought to construe, first, the utterance to mean an 
affirmation of some kind. Only after this initial assignment of meaning may 
an adjustment be made on the basis of other contextual cues including the 
attendant vocal tone. Once socialised in such a linguistic and cultural system, 
individuals will have developed a well-practised attentional bias that favours 
verbal content. In contrast, in high-context cultures and languages, …when 
someone says ‘‘Yes’’ in a relatively reluctant tone of voice, the tone of the 
voice should figure more prominently, along with other available contextual 
cues, for the listener to infer the ‘‘real’’ meaning of the utterance. Once 
socialised in such a linguistic or cultural system, individuals will have 
developed a well- practised attentional bias that favours vocal tone.’ 
This cannot be right. From this explanation, in a low-context culture, contextual 
information is not taken into consideration until linguistic information is encoded. First, 
relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995) argues that verbal content or linguistic 
inputs are just pieces of evidence regardless of cultural background. The speaker’s 
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intended meaning is inferred by accessing information from various sources and 
integrating them with explicatures in which context plays the most important role. 
Given that all sorts of human communication are essentially inferential as relevance 
theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Sperber 1995) claims, it does not seem rational 
to say that contextual cues including tone of voice play a prominent role in one culture 
and a less prominent role in another. Second, there is no order for each inferential 
process as Kitayama and Ishii (2002) described here (i.e. contextual cues such as vocal 
tone is considered after mapping lexical meaning to a linguistic input). 
Kitayama and Ishii’s observation that Japanese participants’ have an attentional 
bias towards vocal tone is interesting. However, this does not indicate that 
interpretations of the speaker’s implied meaning are not context-dependent in North 
American culture or in English. 
4.3.3 Non-native speakers’ use of English intonational form as signals 
This section looks more closely at how non-native speakers of English use English 
intonation as cues toward their interlocutors in conversation. In the literature, it has been 
suggested that although links between the speaker’s intentions and choice of tones is to 
large extent universal, the exact realisations of pitch movement (falls and rises) seem to 
be language-specific (Jenkins 2000:43, Cruttenden 1997:163 cited in Pickering 
2009:251-2). Wennerstrom (1994) investigated the major similarities and differences in 
using the basic components of intonation (e.g. high-low pitch accents, phrase accents, 
and boundary tones) between English native speakers and L2 speakers of English. She 
found different tendencies in an oral reading task and a structured free-speech task 
between second language speakers and native speakers: second language speakers used 
a) less pitch increase to signal new or contrastive information; b) less decreased pitch 
and reduced volume on the redundant word; c) less frequently raised pitch at phrase 
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boundaries.64 According to Wennerstrom, those tendencies of L2 speakers indicated a 
possibility that they might miss important aspects of the discourse structure. She 
suggested that those differences could be attributed to a combination of the influence of 
L1 (how pitch functions in their native languages) and the amount of exposure to native 
spoken English (Wennerstrom 1994: 417). 
Pickering (2009) and Pickering and Litzenberg (2011), focusing on tone choice 
(pitch movement of falls and rises), key choice (change of pitch level between high, 
mid, and low), and placement of tonic stress, investigated whether there are differences 
between native speakers and L2 speakers of English in the use of intonation for 
signalling ‘trouble spots’ and negotiating solutions for them. Students of an Intensive 
English Program in the US were given a short set of questions about class time and class 
structure of the program and asked to discuss with classmates freely. Their 
conversations were recorded. The results from these two studies suggested that L2 
speakers employ some but not all aspects of intonation structure and functions common 
to native speakers (Pickering and Litzenberg 2011: 88). For instance, one of the 
recordings showed that L2 speakers’ intentional use of ‘falsetto voice’ (stylised voicing 
with a very high pitch)65 was evident in their study (Pickering and Litzenberg 2011). 
The results showed that L2 speakers used a very high pitch level in order to mimic the 
‘voicing’ of others (e.g. mimicry or quoting) in quoted speech. Other recording, on the 
other hand, showed that while native speakers raised tone instead of a falling tone to 
avoid overt contradiction to a previous speaker, there was no evidence of such use of 
‘socially integrative’ tone choice among L2 speakers. There were also cases observed in 
which L2 speakers completely misplaced tonic stress. Pickering (2009) and Pickering 
																																								 																				
64 See Wennerstrom (1994) and Beckman and Pierrehumbert (1986) for the details about linguistic influence of 
Japanese on the use of intonation in English. 
65 Szczepek Reed (2009:130) had defined the voicing of imaginary figures as ‘stylized   prosodic orientation’ 
(cited in Pickering and Litzenberg 2011:85). Pickering and Litzenberg (2011) referring to Szczepek Reed 
(2009:91-2) have suggested that native speakers use prosodic stylization in order to draw the audiences’ 
attention. See Szczepek Reed (2009) for the details. 
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and Litzenberg (2011) suggested that while pitch universals may exist, functions of 
intonation involving pitch movement and a change of pitch level are not necessarily the 
same for native and non-native speakers. 
Although these studies (Pickering 2009; Pickering and Litzenberg 2011; 
Wennerstrom 1994) have compared second language speakers’ production (use) of 
English intonation with that of native speakers, it is reasonable to assume that 
recognition of paralinguistic cues (i.e. tone, intonation) may be also affected by 
language and/or culture. If this assumption is right, then non-native speakers may not 
necessarily be able to recognise the ironic speaker’s prosody. Even if they could, a 
function of particular prosody may vary culture by culture, which leads to recognition of 
prosodic cues as a factor affecting non-native speakers’ interpretation processes of 
ironical interpretation. 
4.4 Cognitive demands on processing linguistic inputs in a second language 
This section considers the effects of processing demands in a second language. These 
effects were suggested as factors affecting ironic interpretations of non-native speakers 
(Shively et al. 2008). This section considers this possibility looking closely at findings 
from studies that investigated cognitive factors attributed to L2 proficiency development 
and outputs in L2. It first considers how automatisation of processing in L2 relates to 
overloaded cognitive demands. It then considers the relationship between non-native 
speakers’ less automatised processing and the capacity of working memory component.   
4.4.1 Automatisation of processing 
Poelmans (2003) pointed out that L2 speakers often face difficulties with listening 
comprehension, which is ‘the complex of processes that transform an auditory stimulus 
to a mental reconstruction on the part of listener of the speaker’s intention (2003:9).’ 
She (2003:1) suggested that L2 speakers might not be able to use the knowledge of 
language they have (e.g., vocabulary, grammar, and pronunciation) in a fluent (i.e. 
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accurate and fast) way. She argued that one of the important differences between 
listening comprehension and reading comprehension is use of language knowledge with 
or without time pressure. For instance, some studies (Hoover and Dwivedi 1998; Juffs 
1998, 2004, 2006; Juffs and Harington 1995, 1996) suggested that L2 learners seem to 
process syntactic information of texts in L2 in a similar way to native speakers. It was 
evident that they processed even ambiguous sentences such as ‘garden-path’ sentences 
in the same way as native speakers (Juffs 2006: 96). Contrary to this, some studies 
(Poelmans 2003; Randal 2007) reported differences between non-native speakers and 
native speakers which are assumed to relate to the speed of processing. Randal (2007) 
suggested that parsing processes in L1 are unconsciously executed, and processes are 
highly automatic. This however, is not the case for non-native speakers. It seems that 
non-native speakers consciously process lexical items and syntactical structures with 
greater effort. Considering time pressure during real-time listening, processing of inputs 
in L2 may be constrained more severely in listening comprehension. Before looking 
closely at the findings from experimental studies on the relation between listening 
comprehension and automatisation of lower-order processes, it is worth mentioning 
what automatisation involves. 
In the literature on a distinction between automatic and controlled processes, a 
difficulty with defining what exactly automatisation involves has been pointed out.66 
Poelmans (2003:30) reported that ‘automatisation’ has been considered as a continuum 
with controlled and automatised processes at each end with processes in between that 
involve a process of gradual quantitative change (speed-up) in the execution of task 
components, gradual improvement of the same process, or the ever more efficient use of 
rules and the ever faster retrieval of instances from memory. Recent theories have 
accounted for ‘automatisation’ not as a reflection of how much attention is required but 
																																								 																				
66 See Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) for very thorough discussions about the automaticity/control distinction. 
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as a reflection of how memory is used. Task performance will become faster and more 
stable after intensive practice.67 Dekeyser (2001) has further drawn a clear line between 
the concepts of ‘automaticity’ and ‘automatisation’.68 Dekeyser suggested that 
‘automaticity’ refers to the speed and ease with which tasks are carried out, and ‘it is the 
result of a slow process of ‘automatisation’ rather than automatisation as the process 
leading up to automaticity (2001: 130)’. This is saying that without practices and time 
spent, the process of ‘automatisation’ would not become speedy and easier. According 
to Dekeyser (2001:125), human ability to use language is an example of ‘automaticity.’ 
As speakers in a conversation, individual humans can convert thoughts and emotions 
into sound waves through complex strings of cognitive processes within a fraction of a 
second. At the same time, as interlocutors they can instantly convert those sound waves 
back into thoughts and emotions, and attribute those thoughts to others. Poelmans 
(2003:30) suggested that automatised processing will be achieved after the influence of, 
or the reliance on, slow and controlled processes is eliminated.69 
Goh’s study (2000) indicated that not only processes of sound-to-script or word-
referent mapping but also processing of parsing might be conscious and controlled in 
L2. Goh (2000), applying Anderson’s (1995) cognitive framework of the three-phase 
model of language comprehension, identified what kinds of problem Chinese L2 
learners come across at which phase of cognitive processing. According to this 
framework (Anderson 1995, cited in Goh 2000: 57), L2 listening comprehension 
processes can be divided into three different phases: ‘perception,’ ‘parsing,’ and 
‘utilisation.’ During the phase of perception processing, acoustic input (i.e. sounds) is 
																																								 																				
67 Based on a survey of the literature, Poelmans (2003:30) reported that earlier theories had suggested that the 
speed of the processes, the error rate, the effort required, the capacity used, and   the level of possible control 
were considered as aspects that distinguish mutually exclusive ‘automatised’ and ‘controlled’ processes. 
68 See Dekeyser (2001), Poelmans (2003, §2.6) for a good summary and references of literature on criteria for 
automaticity and characteristics of automatisation. 
69 There have been theories in the literature of second language acquisition that account for the place of 
automatisation in skill development. Two theories are the mainstream:  the rule-based ACT-R theory by 
Anderson (1993) and the item-based Instance theory by Logan (1988). See Dekeyser (2001), Poelmans (2003). 
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discriminated and segmented into phonemes from the continuous speech stream. The 
phase of ‘parsing’ involves segmenting an utterance based on syntactic structures. These 
segments (i.e. words) are recombined to form a mental representation. During the 
‘utilisation’ phase, such mental representations are compared with existing knowledge 
and stored in long-term memory as propositions or schemata. Already stored mental 
representations are retrieved during this ‘utilisation’ phase. These three phases are 
interrelated and recursive. They do not necessarily happen in this order and can occur 
concurrently. The data was collected from learners’ diaries, small group interviews and 
immediate retrospective verbalisations in which all participants were asked about 
learners’ processing strategies and descriptions of listening difficulties that they had 
experienced. The results showed that problems seemed to occur across all the three 
phases. During the perception phase, Chinese L2 learners seemed to fail to recognise a 
word as a distinct word or as groups of words from the sounds (slow recognition). 
Another problem that occurred during this phase was that they were slow to activate 
knowledge about the word. Goh explained that they could perceive sounds but they 
could not or could not quickly enough activate their knowledge about perceived sounds, 
which are already mentally stored (already learnt). During the parsing phase, Chinese 
L2 learners appeared to fail to allocate attention to relevant inputs from the stream of 
speech. Their attention was fixated on unfamiliar words or a particular text, and this 
attention fixation hindered learners from processing the flow of incoming information. 
One of the problems during the parsing process was related to what Goh called ‘quickly 
forget what is heard’: Chinese L2 learners cannot remember certain words and phrases 
they had just heard (Goh 2000: 60). Although they did understand certain words or 
phrases, Chinese L2 learners forgot them as soon as they started processing the next 
inputs. At the utilisation processing phase, the main problem was a failure to interpret 
the speaker’s intention. Even though they did manage to encode each word in a given 
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utterance they were not able to understand the point of the utterance. A comparison of 
high- and low-level listeners revealed that such a problem was more evident among 
high-level listeners. This did not suggest that low-level listeners did not have problems 
with interpretation. It was rather that low-level listeners did not get beyond the 
perception or parsing phases. Besides, the majority of problems that low-level listeners 
had occurred during the perceptual processing phase. Goh’s findings seemed to confirm 
the automatisation hypothesis (Segalowitz and Segalowitz 1993) that automatised 
processes of aural word recognition are conditional on successful listening 
comprehension (cited in Poelmans 2003:4). 
Poelmans (2003:4) made the similar suggestion that non-native speakers’ listening 
comprehension might be strongly related to automatisation of lower-order processes. 
She (2003:10) defined a proposed ‘word recognition’ module, one of the four sub- 
processes of the listening comprehension process as ‘breaking up the stream of sounds 
into linguistic units (morphemes, words) and retrieving their meaning from long-term 
memory.’ She suggested that the ‘word recognition’ process draws heavily on linguistic 
knowledge (i.e. lexical knowledge, knowledge of the rule system of the language) and 
that the difference between higher proficiency L2 learners and lower proficiency L2 
learners lies in the degree of automatisation of this process (2003:19). Poelmans (2003) 
investigated how the listening comprehension abilities of adult learners of Dutch were 
related to automatisation of spoken word recognition. She found that the process of 
spoken word recognition was more controlled compared to those of native speakers 
whose processing was automatised. Poelmans (2003:19) suggested that an automatised 
process of word recognition is necessary for successful listening comprehension, and 
language proficiency may predict the status of this process (ranging from more 
controlled to fully automatised). 
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It has also been suggested (Taguchi 2007, 2008a, 2008b) that speedy processing of 
lexical information seemed to facilitate the speedy processing of the speaker’s intention. 
Taguchi (2007, 2008a, 2008b) investigated how processing speed of interpretation of 
the speaker’s implied meaning in indirect refusal and indirect opinion related to lexical 
access skill (processing lower-order information, i.e. word meaning quickly). Lexical 
access skill was measured by a semantic judgement task (‘lexical access test,’).70 The 
results showed that reaction times of the pragmatic listening test were significantly 
related to development of lexical access skill: as Japanese L2 learners became faster in 
recognising individual English words and making semantic judgements on each word, 
reaction times in interpreting the implied meaning reduced. After they reached a certain 
threshold level of speed in the lexical access test (LAT), reduction of performance speed 
became less profound. Taguchi (2008b: 524) suggested that lexical access skill might 
underlie ‘conventionalized implicature’ comprehension mechanisms. As this process 
gets speedier, overall processing load becomes less and less, and this results in cognitive 
capacity becoming more available for higher-order processing such as processing of 
information from multiple non-linguistic sources. In the light of the results of her 
studies (2005, 2007, 2008a, 2008b), Taguchi (2008a) suggested that the developmental 
patterns of accuracy and processing speed were independent dimensions in L2 
pragmatic comprehension and follow separate developmental paths involving different 
L2 abilities. It was evidenced in her series of studies that the effect of general language 
proficiency on processing speed of interpreting the speaker’s implied meaning was not 
as straightforward as on accuracy in interpretation. Development of processing speed 
seemed to lag behind accuracy development: processing speed did not develop as 
quickly as demonstration of accuracy of pragmatic knowledge. It was revealed that 
																																								 																				
70 LAT was a computerized word recognition test which measured participants’ speed in semantic judgment of 
individual words. Judgments were based on whether each word refers to a living or non-living object (e.g. the 
boy = living; a pen = non-living).  
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accuracy rate in interpretation had improved along with development of general 
language proficiency and no significant relationship was found between accuracy and 
development of lexical judgement ability. Processing speed, on the other hand was 
found significantly related to development of lexical judgement speed. No relationship 
between processing speed and the growth of general language proficiency was found. 
Taguchi suggested that pragmatic comprehension competence is two-dimensional, 
involving knowledge and use of knowledge. This seems to parallel Poelmans’s 
suggestion (2003:4) that language knowledge is of little effect on L2 listening 
comprehension unless automatic processes of word recognition are achieved. 
Acquisition of adequate knowledge of language i.e. vocabulary and grammar, to 
construct grammatically sound sentences and the ability to use such knowledge under 
time pressure may be different. As Poelmans has suggested (2003:4), the latter involves 
abilities to access and retrieve the knowledge of language from mental lexicon 
automatically. 
4.4.2 Limited working memory capacity 
Working memory (WM) is a specific set of cognitive processes responsible for 
temporarily storing and manipulating information that is assumed to be necessary for a 
wide range of complex cognitive tasks from reading newspapers or calculating 
remaining time before an appointment to comprehension, learning, and reasoning 
(Baddeley 2003:189; Miyake and Shah 1999:1). There have been some studies (Call 
1985; Cook and Liddicoat 2002; Goh 2000; Taguchi 2008b) which have explored a 
potential relation between less automatic processes of L2 learners and limited working 
memory capacity. Taguchi (2008b: 524) suggested that as lexical access processes get 
speedier, overall processing load becomes less and less, and this, in turn makes 
cognitive capacity more available for higher-order processing such as processing of 
information from multiple non-linguistic sources (p.524). Goh (2000) also pointed out 
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that processes at perception phase need to flow automatically since information 
processed will be erased from the limited capacity of short-term memory in order to 
make room for new input unless it is associated with the information that has been 
processed earlier or that has been stored in long-term memory. Cook and Liddicoat 
(2002) suggested a relation between automatic processing and the capacity of space for 
processing. L2 learners’ processing of linguistic inputs was more controlled (not 
automatic). Cook and Liddicoat (2002) reported that the ability to interpret the speaker’s 
intention in request speech acts (direct request, conventional indirect request, non- 
conventional indirect) was affected by the degree of directness: the less direct a given 
utterance was, the less accurately L2 learners could interpret it. The results of their 
study also showed that L2 learners interpreted the speaker’s intention in request speech 
acts more accurately along with the growth of their language proficiency. They reported 
that lower L2 learners seemed to interpret a given utterance based on word-by-word 
interpretations rather than associating its linguistic form with appropriate contexts. 
Cook and Liddicoat explained that the effect of language proficiency on accurate 
interpretation might be related to the amount of processing capacity available to encode 
and interpret linguistic input: capacity for processing contextual information might be 
determined by how much capacity is devoted to processing linguistic inputs (Cook and 
Liddicoat 2002:30-31). They suggested that reliance on contextual knowledge may 
change depending on degree of indirectness of request speech acts: the more direct a 
request is, the more its interpretation depends on linguistic knowledge whereas the less 
direct a request is, the more its interpretation depends on contextual knowledge. Cook 
and Liddicoat (2002) suggested as an implication of this that L2 learners might use up 
much of their cognitive resources by accessing linguistic knowledge. Call (1985) 
surveyed earlier studies suggesting that there was a difference in short-term memory 
span between native language and target language, and that development of language 
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proficiency predicts an increase in the amount of input in a target language that can be 
processed at one time. 
In the field of psychology, Just and Carpenter (1992) and Just, Carpenter and Keller 
(1996) also suggested that all processing of linguistic inputs are drawn on in the limited 
capacity of memory. If this capacity is exceeded due to high demands of storing 
processed information and/or further processing of continuously incoming inputs, 
processing slows down or part of linguistic information is discarded from memory.71 
Randall (2007) also suggested that less automatic linguistic parsing and analysis 
imposes an increased cognitive load, and processing speed is slowed down, which 
leaves less capacity of cognitive resources available for (a) holding longer chains of 
language to combine with incoming information, and (b) processing the wider 
contextual environment, such as prosodic elements or visual contexts. Hoover and 
Dwivedi (1998) noted that extra sentence processing (parsing) might be delayed until 
working memory is freed up, and other things equal, longer reading time reflects greater 
processing load.72 Kormos and Sáfár (2008) suggested that larger capacity of working 
memory is correlated with the acquisition of syntactic and lexical knowledge. 
In the psychology literature, working memory has been considered as one of the 
most critical components of cognitive and linguistic achievement (Linck, Osthus, Koeth 
and Bunting 2013:863). In the field of psychology, a variety of models that account for 
WM exist (See Linck et al. 2013, Miyake and Shah 1999 for summary of other models). 
These models consider that working memory plays an essential role in complex 
cognition: ‘it orders, stores, and manages immediate sensory details until they can be 
properly incorporated into the cognitive process that must integrate that data (Linck, 
																																								 																				
71 See Waters and Caplan (1996), MacDonald and Christiansen (2002) for critiques of the capacity theory of 
sentence comprehension (Just and Carpenter (1992). 
72 See Hoover and Dwivedi (1998) for two theories account for cross-linguistic models of syntactic processing: 
module or experience-based.  
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Osthus, Koeth and Bunting 2013:862).’ After taking several steps in developing the 
theory (Baddeley 1986; Baddeley and Hitch 1974; Baddeley and Logie 1999; 
Gathercole and Baddeley 1993), Baddeley’s current multi-component model (Baddeley 
2000, 2003) explains that the unitary construct of WM consists of two systems: a 
system of short-term storage of information73 (i.e. a ‘slave system’) and an executive, 
attentional system that controls information between the slave system and ‘long-term 
memory’ where accumulated information is kept over a period of time (Linck et al. 
2013:862). Baddeley (2003) proposed to divide the unitary storage-based system into 
three separable components: ‘the phonological loop,’ ‘the visuo-spatial sketchpad,’ and 
‘the episodic buffer.’ ‘The phonological loop’ is responsible for phonological and verbal 
information whereas ‘the visuo-spatial sketchpad’ processes visual and spatial 
information. The episodic buffer, which has recently been proposed (Baddeley 2000), is 
considered a temporary storage system where information from a number of different 
sources is combined into chunks or episodes (Baddeley 2003:203). These three 
subsystems hold a limited amount of information for immediate, accurate recall 
(availability), and the speed that information can be recalled (accessibility) (Linck et.al 
2013:862). Information kept in these short-term storages is available only for seconds 
before fading from WM due to decay and/or interference processes. On the other hand, 
an executive, attentional system, called as ‘the central executive’, controls the three 
short-term storage mechanisms. Its primary function is to control attention necessary to 
maintain focus and inhibit information that might distract from or interfere with 
successful task execution (Engle and Kane 2004, cited in Juffs and Harrington 
2011:140). The central executive also controls processes of search and retrieval of 
previously stored information in long-term memory during task performance.  
																																								 																				
73 In the discipline of cognitive psychology, there has not always been a clear-cut distinction between working 
memory and the prevalent concept of “short-term memory (STM).” See Aben, Stapert, and Blokland (2012) and 
Miyake and Shah (1999) for discussion about distinction between WM and STM. 
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Linck, Osthus, Koeth and Bunting (2013) suggested individual differences in the 
capacity of WM (i.e. how much information can be processed). People differ in a) the 
ability to remember new information encountered while reading, b) the ability to make 
inferences about information encountered while reading, c) the ability to access 
knowledge from long-term memory, and d) the ability to integrate new information with 
knowledge from long-term memory (Daneman and Hannon 2007, cited in Linck, 
Osthus, Koeth and Bunting 2013:863). The notion of individual differences in ‘the 
capacity of WM (WMC)’ with language proficiency has been of great interest to 
researchers in the field of second language acquisition. In particular, a considerable 
number of investigations has been conducted looking into the role of WMC in simple 
tasks in L2 learning (i.e. learning of L2 vocabulary or L2 grammar, oral performance) 
and in more complex tasks such as reading comprehension, conversational interactions, 
and on-line processing (see Juffs and Harington 2011, Link and Weiss 2015, Nielson 
2013 for summary). Two studies of comprehensive meta-analysis concerning the 
relation between WM and L2 processing and outcomes (Daneman and Merikle 1996; 
Linck et al. 2013)74 suggested that a positive relation between WM and L2 outcomes is 
robust. Linck et al. (2013:880) reported that ‘the results are congruent with claims that 
WM is an important component of the cognitive processes underlying bilingual 
language processing and performance on measures of L2 proficiency.’ On the other 
hand, Juffs and Harrington (2011) pointed out that while the relation of WM with both 
the development of L2 proficiency and use of L2 is robust, which component of WM 
(short-term storage component or the executive control component) contributes to the 
effect has remained an open empirical question (p.142). Until recently it had not been 
firmly identified which component of WM namely short-term memory (STM) and the 
executive control has the effect, and the resulting suggestion had been inconsistent 
																																								 																				
74 Daneman and Merikle (1996) have analysed 77 studies involving 6,179 participants whereas Link   et al. have 
analysed 79 studies involving 3,707 participants. 
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across studies (see Juffs and Harrington 2011 for discussion and Linck et al. 2013 for 
recent review). Linck et al. (2013:875-6) reported that more contemporary studies 
provided more evidence that the amount of handling cognitive processing demands in 
L2 seems to relate more to greater WMC of executive control than short-term storage 
component, which are simply responsible for storing an active representation 
temporarily (Link and Weiss 2015). 
A possible relationship between WMC and processing of listening comprehension 
has not been explored. The number of studies focusing on listening comprehension has 
lagged behind reading comprehension studies. In the light of suggestions of existing 
studies concerning reading processing, it can be assumed that listening comprehension 
may also be constrained by WMC. In most of the cases of verbal conversation, the 
speed of flow of information, intake of information, or which information should be 
taken is beyond interlocutor’s control. Unless information is organised and safely stored 
in mind, the interlocutor cannot refer back to it. During real-time listening, non-native 
speakers are required to use language knowledge (including knowledge of phonetic, 
syntactic, semantic) and coordinate such linguistic properties of utterances with all sorts 
of contextual information available for adequate communication. Besides, all these 
requirements are under time pressure. Automatised lower-order processes may free up 
capacity of working memory for higher-order processes i.e. inferential processes. Given 
that processes are necessary for constructing a set of assumptions about the ironic 
speaker’s implied meaning (i.e. access to information from different sources and 
integration of the information with background knowledge stored in long-term 
memory), it seems more relevant to consider the capacity of the executive control 
system rather than simple short-term capacity in order to explore impacts on processing 
of ironic utterances.  
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It is, however, important to note that there have also been some studies that do not 
confirm the important role of WM in learning an L2. Juffs and Harrington (2011) 
argued that the importance of WM in relation to L2 processing might be overstated. 
They pointed out that inconsistent results across studies might be attributed to diverse 
research methodologies such as varying languages of WM assessment, sample size, L2 
proficiency level, stage of learning. For instance, Daneman and Merikle (1996) 
suggested while complex span tasks seem to have an advantage over simple span tasks 
as a measurement of L1 comprehension, both simple span tasks and complex tasks have 
been found as significantly useful to measure L2 processing and proficiency outcomes 
in L2 literature. Juffs and Harrington (2011) have suggested that measuring simple 
short-term storage capacity and measuring more complex component of WM 
(processing capacity) are two different things: the former can be measured by the 
number or span of unrelated digits or words whereas measurement of the latter needs a 
more complicated task involving simultaneous demands on both storage component and 
processing component. Given that those two different tasks measure the capacity of two 
different components, it suggests that the findings and suggestions of Daneman and 
Merikle (1996) are less reliable (Linck et al. 2013:863). Taguchi’s (2008b) study 
discussed earlier might be another example. Taguchi investigated the relation of WMC 
to the accurate and speedy comprehension of conventional implicatures. She measured 
WMC by reading span test (RST). The results revealed that working memory capacity 
had no relation to speed of interpretation processing or to accuracy in interpretation. 
Taguchi explained this result by pointing to two methodological problems. First, the 
RST that Taguchi used in this study was designed to measure WMC in L1, participants’ 
native language (Japanese). In addition, RST was designed to measure reading skill 
whereas pragmatic comprehension test was designed to measure listening skill. She 
acknowledged that this might have contributed to the results. She (2008b: 533) 
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suggested that working memory capacity available for L1 and for L2 might not be the 
same and gave an implication that it is necessary in future research to consider different 
modes of presentation (auditory and visual) and measuring different cognitive abilities 
(L1 and L2).  
4.5 Summary 
This chapter considered a range of factors that have been suggested as affecting non- 
native speakers’ comprehension of potentially ironic utterances: culture-dependent 
difference, differences in the recognition of prosodic cues, and differences in the 
assumed more limited capacity of working memory. Discussions in this chapter laid the 
groundwork for experimental work of the present study, which is reported in Chapter 5. 
The findings from these studies considered here gave a clear direction to the objectives 
of investigations in which the role of prosodic cues in guiding Japanese speakers of 
English as second language to potentially ironic interpretation is focused. 
First, this chapter taking a more cognitive stand towards the influence of culture 
aimed to give some systematic explanation of how cultural differences would play a 
role in the interpretation processes of ironical utterance. This study suggested a different 
way to look at a culture as a geographical bordered aggregate, which consists of 
individuals who have different culture representations. While accepting the influence of 
culture variations on interpretation processes, it stressed that overcoming differences in 
culture knowledge would not guarantee invariably “correct” interpretation, which 
indicated that misunderstandings in fact do occur in absence of cultural differences. 
Adopting ideas of a process of fallible hypothesis formation and evaluation from 
relevance-theoretic account (Wilson 1994), this study explained a role that culture might 
play in the hearer’s building up a rational basis for a choice of contextual assumptions.  
This chapter also considered differences in the recognition of prosodic cues as a 
factor contributing to differences in interpretations of the speaker’s communicative 
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intention between native speakers and non-native speakers. The ideas of the universality 
of ‘inferential rules’ and ‘in-group advantage’ found in the recognition of vocally 
expressed emotion in foreign language provided a clear and deeper insight into the 
potential of the recognition of prosodic cues to understand better the comprehension of 
potentially ironic utterances in a second language. Given that the possibility that 
efficient and fluent processing in a second language is constrained by greater cognitive 
processing demands of linguistic inputs, this study assumed that accessing information 
from different sources makes it more difficult and longer for non-native speakers to 
make an inference about the speaker’s meaning. 
Based on a survey and review of studies discussed here, this chapter suggested a 
focus on the recognition of prosodic cues as a direction of investigations on non-native 
speakers’ interpretation of potentially ironic utterances. The next chapter reports how 
the present experimental work investigated the role of prosodic cues in guiding the 
interpretations of Japanese speakers of English as a second language and what it has 
suggested about the comprehension of potentially ironic utterances in a second 
language. 
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CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTAL WORK 
	
5.1. Overview 
This chapter presents the findings of two experiments aiming to explore one factor 
which factor that might explain differences between first language and second language 
speakers in the interpretation of potentially ironic utterances. The aim was to explore 
and compare the effects of different kinds of prosodic cues in guiding the interpretations 
of first and second language speakers. The first part of this work, an experiment 
conducted using an online survey (‘SurveyMonkey’: http://www.surveymonkey.com/), 
provided surprising evidence, suggesting that in fact Japanese non-native speakers of 
English can respond to potentially ironic utterances in a similar way to native speakers 
of English (and this seemed not to be affected by individual differences with regard to 
language proficiency, length of residence in the UK or experience of living in English 
speaking countries). 
The second experiment, conducted in a laboratory, explored the effects of prosodic 
cues. The present experimental work used three kinds of prosodic form which were 
labelled here as a ‘baseline’ tone (a kind of default, unmarked form), a ‘deadpan’ tone 
(with a narrower pitch range), and an ‘exaggerated’ tone (with a wider pitch range). 
This found that Japanese speakers of English can perceive English prosodic structure in 
similar ways to native speakers and are affected by the different forms in similar ways. 
It also identified two specific differences in responses to prosodic cues. While the 
responses of Japanese participants were affected by these in similar ways to native 
speakers, the evidence also suggested that they might be affected less strongly by 
‘exaggerated’ intonation and slightly more strongly by ‘deadpan’ tones. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the rationale for the two 
experiments. It discusses how the experiments differ from and arise from discussion of 
previous experimental studies and how they address specific research questions and 
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hypotheses. Section 5.3 reports the first experiment, based on an online survey. The 
questionnaires used here were designed to explore the extent to which Japanese 
speakers recognise a potentially ironic speaker’s attitude in a similar way to native 
speakers and the extent to which this is affected by different backgrounds of individual 
Japanese speakers, with regard to language proficiency, length of residence in the UK, 
and experience of living or studying in English-speaking countries. Section 5.4 explains 
the development of the experimental design of Experiment 2. First it reports a pilot 
study, conducted with the aim of giving clearer directions and ideas for Experiment 2 
and suggesting adjustments to the materials. Although the pilot study had a fairly small 
number of participants (8 Japanese speakers and 16 native speakers), its preliminary 
findings indicated that the contribution of prosodic information to the speaker’s 
intended meaning might be a good variable to focus on in exploring similarities or 
differences in response trends between non-native and native speakers. It explains how 
the method was developed in the light of findings from the pilot study. Section 5.5 
reports the findings of Experiment 2, which explored the effect of the speaker’s tone of 
voice (prosody) and its interaction with context on potentially ironic utterances. The 
Japanese speakers’ response trends in preference for ironical interpretation were 
compared with those of native speakers of British English. The section ends with 
reporting the results and showing how they support the conclusions mentioned above. 
5.2 Research design 
5.2.1 Rationale 
The suggestion of previous studies that second language learners understand irony 
differently from native speakers was based on assumptions from misleading theory and 
flawed methods. The ironic speaker’s meaning was assumed to be the opposite of the 
proposition literally expressed by the utterance and these studies did not focus on the 
speaker’s attitude. Previous studies also compared the interpretations of non-native 
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speakers with those of native speakers with regard to a notion of ‘’correct” or “wrong” 
interpretations based on the assumption that native speakers’ interpretations are always 
“correct.” Previous studies referred to the idea of ‘cultural differences’ without making 
clear how exactly cultural variation related to inferential processes. They discussed 
individual cases where norms or beliefs varied across cultures (e.g. in Korea and Thai 
cultures), but the descriptions seemed to be arbitrary and they did not suggest a 
systematic account of how cultural differences can bring about different interpretations. 
The present study aimed to investigate the extent to which non-native speakers 
understand an ironic speaker’s attitude towards an attributed thought in the same or a 
similar way to native speakers and to explore possible factors that may affect inferential 
processes involved in ironic interpretation. A number of factors may affect inferential 
processes in a second language and so may lead to different ways of understanding 
potentially ironic utterances. These may involve not only cultural but also pragmatic, 
linguistic or/and cognitive aspects. One possibility is that aspects of irony (i.e. its 
nature, functions and types) may be different in difference cultures and so influence 
understanding. While it is usually assumed that irony exists in all (or almost all) 
cultures, irony may be used for different functions and/or in different social settings. 
Types of irony may also vary one culture after another. All the examples of irony used 
in previous studies followed the ‘classical’ prototype where we could see the speaker as 
saying one thing and meaning the opposite. However, there are other cases where 
interpretation is not derived by accessing the opposite of what is said, i.e. where 
speakers actually do mean what they have literally said but can still be taken to be 
speaking ironically. Not all the cases of irony fall squarely within the classical 
prototype. It is not known whether or not the type of irony involved affects 
interpretations of non-native speakers. A study I carried out earlier (Togame 2006) 
suggested that Japanese speakers might interpret certain types of irony, including 
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ironical understatement, in a different way to native speakers. It is widely accepted that 
what Japanese speakers term ‘hiniku’ is the Japanese equivalent of English verbal irony 
(Togame 2006). Since ‘hiniku’ is used as a means to express the speaker’s negative 
attitudes towards a particular person or a group of people, the existence of an 
identifiable target is necessary for ‘hiniku’ to be successful. Thus, its functions are much 
more similar to what is usually described in English as sarcasm. Given ‘hiniku’ has 
much narrower functions, it is possible that Japanese speakers might find it more 
difficult to understand ironical understatement where there is no clear target of the 
irony. Not only types of irony (e.g. typical type, ironical quotation, ironical 
understatement) but also various elements of the echoic nature of irony could be 
included in the list of the factors that potentially influence the interpretations of non-
native speakers. The echoic account of irony suggests that the ‘degree of echoing’ can 
range from immediate echoes to distant ones. Ironical utterances sometimes echo an 
actual utterance, and at other times echoes are less obvious (e.g., echoes of unspoken 
thoughts, hopes, fears, etc.). In the rich literature and extensive research on the 
comprehension of irony in a first language, i.e. on how irony is understood, it has been 
suggested (Wilson 2006, 2013; Wilson and Sperber 1992, 2012) that the ironic 
speaker’s intention may be, but need not always be, signalled by non- linguistic or/and 
linguistic cues. For example, non-linguistic cues such as paralinguistic cues (speaker’s 
tone of voice), non-linguistic cues (facial expression, body language, gestures), and 
contextual cues (the visual information from the situation where the conversation is 
taking place) may help a hearer to understand the ironic speaker’s intentions more easily 
and more quickly. Potentially ironic interpretation might partially depend on recognition 
of a linguistic indicator. Certain vocabulary choices (e.g., ‘yeah, right!’ ‘fine’), syntactic 
structures (e.g., repetitions, over-polite expressions, combination of adverbs and 
extreme adjectives) can trigger ironic interpretation (for summary see Yus 2000; for 
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discussion see Glucksberg 1995; Kreuz and Roberts 1995; Kumon-Nakamura, 
Glucksberg and Brown 1995; Seto 1998; Yamanishi 1998). Furthermore, not only these 
pragmatic, linguistic and cultural aspects but also their interaction with cognitive 
variables may cause further complications. As discussed in chapter 4, it has been 
evidenced that cognitive factors such as heavier processing load and reduced working 
memory capacity may interfere with inferential processes in L2. This list of possible 
factors is by no means complete.75 Ultimately, research on L2 irony comprehension 
necessarily needs to explore these potential factors one by one and to be able to account 
for their effects. The present study focused on one possible factor: to what extent 
prosodic information can affect interpretations. This seems to be a natural focus, given 
that the point of irony is expression of the speaker’s dissociative attitude towards an 
attributed thought, and that the speaker’s tone is often, if not always, associated with the 
corresponding attitudes or emotional state of the speaker. Evidence about the effects of 
the speaker’s tone has been provided by numerous experimental studies (including 
Ackerman 1983; Chevallier, Noveck, Happé and Wilson 2011; Happé 1993; Gibbs 
1986b; Gibbs and Colston 2007; Katz 2000; Keenan and Quigley 1999; Kreuz 2000; 
Pexman 2008; Pexman, Ferretti and Katz 2000; Pexman, Rostad, McMorris, Climie, 
Stowkowy and Glenwright 2011; Schwoebel, Dews, Winner and Srinivas 2000; 
Woodland and Voyer 2011). These studies have involved adults, typically developing 
children and atypical populations, and have provided evidence for the contribution of 
tone of voice to irony understanding. On the other hand, only a few previous studies 
have considered the role of intonation in L2 ironical interpretation (Lee 2002; 
Manowong 2011; Shively et al.2008; Yamanaka 2003). Yamanaka (2003) and Shively 
et al (2008) attempted to investigate recognition of various non-verbal and 
																																								 																				
75 See Rubin, J. (1994) for a review of studies on possible factors that affect second language listening 
comprehension in general. 
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paralinguistic information including the speaker’s tone of voice (e.g., prosodic 
information, facial expression, body language and information about the physical 
environment, etc.) on second language learners’ interpretations. However, neither of 
these studies investigated the effects of tone of voice. 
The present study aimed to contribute new understanding of L2 irony 
comprehension by conducting experiments which investigated the extent to which 
Japanese speakers understand a potentially ironic speaker’s attitude and how the 
speaker’s prosodic contour contributes to their understanding of potentially ironic 
utterances. 
5.2.2 Research questions 
The main aim of the present study is to explore the extent to which Japanese speakers as 
a sample of non-native speakers (NNSs) understand ironical utterances in the same way 
as native speakers (NSs). Two experiments were conducted to provide answers to this 
fundamental question. Experiment 1 focused on the comprehension of irony in reading. 
Experiment 2 focused on the contributions of tone of voice and its interaction with 
context in real-time listening comprehension. The following two research questions 
were addressed: 
Research question 1(RQ1): 
To what extent do Japanese speakers understand the speaker’s intention of 
potentially ironical utterances in the same way as native speakers when a stimulus 
is presented in texts? 
Research question 2(RQ2):  
To what extent does the interaction of tone of voice with context relation (relation 
between the context of a story and the proposition literally expressed in a target 
utterance) guide Japanese speakers to potentially ironic interpretation in the same 
way as native speakers?  
RQ1 was explored in Experiment 1 where written material was used under untimed 
conditions (giving participants as much time as they needed to respond). 
Methodological issues in previous studies cast a certain amount of doubt on their 
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claims. This experiment aimed to explore to what extent irony is an ‘obstacle’ for L2 
learners when methodological issues in the previous studies (Bouton 1988, 1992a, 
1992b, 1998, Lee 2002; Manowong 2011; Bromberek-Dyzman and Ewert 2010) were 
resolved. Agreement ratings on the speaker’s attitude were measured using not only the 
classical prototype (describable in terms of the speaker communicating the opposite of 
what was said) but also a wider range of types of ironical utterances. 
Experiment 2 explored RQ2. Experiment 2 was not designed to measure Japanese 
speakers’ understanding of irony in terms of ‘response accuracy’, i.e. by assigning 
values of ‘correct/error’ or ‘right/wrong’ responses in comparison to those of NSs. 
Instead, it looked at ‘response trends’ with regard to preferences for ironical 
interpretation and processing speed. It considered whether there was a particular 
disposition to interpret a given utterance ironically depending on the interaction of the 
speaker’s tone of voice with context. Response trends of Japanese speakers were 
compared with those of native speakers to see whether there were similarities across the 
groups. It was assumed that looking for similarities in response trends would be a better 
way to consider how irony is understood in L2 rather than assuming that native speakers 
produce ‘correct’ interpretations and that the question is about whether second language 
participants also produce ‘correct’ responses. 
5.2.3 Hypotheses 
The central claim of the echoic account is that understanding an utterance as ironic 
involves recognition of the speaker’s implicit expression of a dissociative attitude 
towards an implicitly attributed thought or utterance. A key to successful 
communication is selecting the speaker’s intended assumptions (i.e. ones which the 
speaker assumed that the hearer will and can access for interpretation). The hearer 
constructs a set of assumptions by processing new information from immediately 
preceding texts or discourse and the immediate environment, integrating this with 
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information from other sources that the hearer has access to at the time of conversation 
(information about the hearer’s own beliefs, religious beliefs and scientific knowledge, 
assumptions about the world, general cultural assumptions, any shared or idiosyncratic 
information, or memories of particular things, and so on). Then, the task for a hearer is 
to select appropriate contextual assumptions from a set of assumptions accessed. It is 
assumed that recognition of discrepancy of some degree between reality and 
expectations leads to selection of the appropriate contextual assumptions for ironical 
interpretation. 
The reading comprehension tasks in Experiment 1 were not subject to a time limit. 
Non-native speakers had plenty of time to reread the sentences or phrases and to pause 
to think. This means that they had all the time needed to access the information 
necessary for the construction and selection of contextual assumptions. This test then 
was designed to provide evidence to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis related to 
RQ1 (to what extent do Japanese speakers understand the speaker’s intention of 
potentially ironical utterances in the same way as native speakers when a stimulus is 
presented in texts?), which is that Japanese speakers would understand the speaker’s 
attitude in a similar way to native speakers. If Japanese speakers can process utterances 
in similar ways to native speakers in the absence of time constraints, then differences 
between Japanese speakers and native speakers would be found only in examples that 
describe a situation in which irony would not normally be used in Japanese cultural 
contexts (i.e. in ironical understatements). 
It has been suggested that the use and recognition of prosody in showing and 
inferring basic emotions is universal (Bachorowski 1999; Elfenbein and Ambady 2002a; 
Pell, Monetta, Paulmann and Kotz 2009; Paulmann and Uskul 2014; Paulmann, and 
Kotz 2009; Scherer 1986, 1997; Scherer and Wallbott 1994; Scherer, Banse and 
Wallbott 2001; Scherer, Banse, Wallbott, and Goldbeck 1991; Thompson and Balkwill 
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2006). A speaker can intend to express her emotion or attitudes by varying prosodic 
features (i.e. pitch, loudness, voice quality, and/or speed) and a hearer then makes 
inferences about the others’ emotion or attitudes by paying attention to such prosodic 
attributes (Paulmann and Uskul 2014:237). Japanese child developmental studies 
(Katsuura 2009; Kondo and Hayashi 2015) provided evidence that, although the speed 
of development varies depending on a particular emotion,76 typically developing (TD) 
Japanese children are able to recognise the emotional state of others from prosodic 
contours as accurately as adults by the age of around seven. Some studies (Imaizumi, 
Kinoshita and Yamasaki 2008; Noguchi, Ozawa, Yamasaki and Imaizumi 2004) also 
tested Japanese TD children’s judgment of linguistic valence in linguistic tasks and 
emotional valence in emotional tasks.77 Simple phrases were taken out of context and 
were spoken in two contrasting affective manners: either a ‘congruent manner’ or an 
‘incongruent manner’ with regard to the literal meanings of phrases. The results of these 
studies revealed that Japanese TD children at the age of six could judge both linguistic 
valence and emotional valence as accurately as adults in praise phrases (positive 
comments spoken with positive prosody) and critic phrases (negative comments spoken 
with negative prosody). On the other hand, in ironic phrases (positive comments spoken 
in negative prosody) and jocular (joke) phrases (negative comments spoken in positive 
prosody), although judgment accuracy increased significantly with age, development of 
their abilities to understand the speaker’s intention in ironic phrases was much slower: 
the accuracy rates of 12-15 year old Japanese TD children still did not reach the same 
level of adults when the  phrase was uttered in an incongruent manner (Noguchi et.al 
2004). In particular, Japanese TD children showed a tendency to rely more heavily on 
linguistic valence than emotional valence. In other words, younger Japanese TD 
																																								 																				
76According to the study of Kondo and Hayashi (2015:5.6), while five-year-old typically developing children 
can recognise ‘anger’ and ‘sadness’ from voice by the age of five, they confuse ‘happiness’ and ‘surprise’. By 
seven years old they can distinguish ‘happiness’ from ‘surprise’ fairly accurately. 
77 For neurolingusitic studies on mechanisms for inferring the speaker’s intention from speech see Honma, 
Imaizumi, Ozawa, Maruishi and Muranaka (2007), and Homma, Imaizumi, Maruishi and Muranaka (2008). 
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children had difficulty ignoring literal meaning. Noguchi et.al (2004:274) stated that 
‘the ability to understand a speaker's hidden but true intentions by separating and 
integrating linguistic and emotional valences develops slower than estimated by 
conventional theory-of-mind tests based on false belief tasks.’ These findings indicate 
that Japanese adult speakers have already developed mindreading ability when 
interacting in Japanese during childhood. They also developed the ability to recognise 
the other’s emotion from voice. Thus, it can be assumed to be possible that adult 
Japanese speakers would be able to attend to these abilities during the interpretation 
process of ironic utterances. What remains unknown is how affective prosody interacts 
with contextual information. A number of studies (Bachorowski 1999; Elfenbein and 
Ambady 2002a, 2002b; Imaizumi et al. 2008; Noguchi et al. 2004; Pell et al. 2009; 
Paulmann and Uskul 2014; Paulmann, and Kotz 2009; Scherer 1986, 1997; Scherer and 
Wallbott 1994; Scherer et al. 2001; Thompson and Balkwill 2006) used phrases that 
were taken out of context. In listening comprehension, inference is drawn by 
concurrently accessing information from different sources and integrating it with 
explicatures derived from the utterance. A question is whether the assumed Japanese 
speakers’ comprehension abilities in reading tasks would be reinforced or diminished by 
a heavier processing load than expected in listening tasks. As revealed in a study by 
Shively et al. (2008), processing demands here are much higher than in offline (reading) 
comprehension. The performances of Japanese speakers in real-time listening tasks are 
assumed not to be the same as those in offline reading tasks. Cognitive processing 
demands in L2 are heavier than those in L1 (Hoover and Dwivedi 1998; Kormos and 
Sáfár 2008; Poelmans 2003; Randall 2007). As discussed in chapter 4, it is assumed that 
processing load affects the capacity of working memory specific to the executive 
control component (Daneman and Merikle 1996; Juffs and Harrington 2011; Linck et al. 
2013; Link and Weiss 2015). It would be more difficult than for Japanese speakers to 
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control processes of search and retrieval of information or/and to combine information 
from different sources. Such difficulties may predict failure in using contextual or/and 
non-verbal cues that would lead to ironical interpretations. As discussed in chapter 4, 
non-native speakers with relatively low listening skill have demonstrated a tendency to 
rely heavily on the information most recently processed (Taguchi 2002, 2005; Goh 
2000). High processing demands might hinder Japanese speakers from integrating 
information from tone with contextual information, and this in turn might cause 
overreliance on prosodic cues. The effects of tone of voice on the interpretations of 
Japanese speakers would then be stronger than effects from other aspects of the context. 
It is also possible that a difference across two groups would be found with regard to 
which type of prosodic contour leads to ironic interpretations. While it is assumed that a 
discrepancy between the context of the story and the proposition literally expressed by 
the target utterance would guide both Japanese and native speakers towards ironic 
interpretations, the strength of each type of prosodic contour as a signal of the speaker’s 
intention would not be the same for Japanese and native speakers: native speakers may 
respond to a particular prosodic contour more strongly and quickly while processing 
potentially ironical utterances than Japanese speakers, and vice versa. Because of 
cultural differences (Japanese vs. British) or/and linguistic difference (Japanese vs. 
English) the same prosodic contour might affect differently. Japanese speakers’ 
response trends in preference for potentially ironical interpretations may not be the same 
as those of native speakers. Both tone of voice and context would be considered when 
participants as an audience construct a set of assumptions about the speaker’s intention. 
However, given the discussion above, Japanese speakers may have difficulties 
eliminating an assumption based on information from the speaker’s tone when it 
contradicts an assumption based on contextual information. On the other hand, native 
speakers would not be so strongly affected by potentially contradictory assumptions and 
164		
manage to strengthen a particular assumption based on the context. Therefore, 
experiment 2 should provide evidence relevant to RQ2 (to what extent does the 
interaction of tone of voice with context guide Japanese speakers to potentially ironic 
interpretations in the same way as native speakers?). The present study hypothesised for 
RQ2 that, depending on how tone interacts with context, a different tendency towards 
potentially ironical interpretation would be found between Japanese speakers and native 
speakers. 
5.3 Experiment 1: Internet survey 
5.3.1 Methods 
Participants. 
A hundred and six participants accessed the link to the survey on the Internet, and 75 of 
them completed all conditions of this experiment, including 53 Japanese speakers (JP- 
participants) and 22 native speakers (NS-participants).  The 53 JP-participants (14 
males, 39 females) between the ages of 18 and 54 years held Japanese nationality. They 
had been recruited from advertisements circulated on social networking systems such as 
Facebook and by email. The majority of them (75.5. %) were professional and the rest 
were either students (13.2%) or unemployed (11.3%) at the time of taking part in the 
survey. The ages of NS-participants (5 were males and 17 females) ranged from 18 to 
64 years. Everyone speak English as a first language but their nationality varied (British 
= 17, American = 1, Jamaican = 1, Turkish = 1, Japanese = 2).78 The majority of NS-
participants were undergraduate students at Middlesex University who voluntarily took 
part. The rest of them were recruited from advertisements circulated on social 
networking systems such as Facebook and by e-mail. 
Materials. 
																																								 																				
78 Due to the nature of this survey (distributed on the Internet), a sample of NSs was not specific to native 
speakers of British English. When native speakers of English were specific to British English, it is mentioned 
as BNSs distinguishing from NSs. 
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The Internet survey consisted of two questionnaires: a ‘background information 
questionnaire and an ‘irony-understanding questionnaire’.79 
Background information questionnaire: 
All participants were asked to provide background information about ‘gender,’ ‘age,’ 
‘nationality,’ ‘occupation’ and ‘first language.’ The participants whose first language 
was not English were asked to provide additional information about language 
proficiency (self-assessment of language proficiency, results of official English 
proficiency tests, and how they had studied English as second/foreign language), the 
country they were living at the time of the survey, experiences of studying/living in 
English speaking countries and the time (the length) spent in those countries. 
Irony-understanding questionnaire: 
Twenty items were created based on examples of verbal irony introduced in the 
literature, actual conversation from radio shows, newspaper articles and TV 
programmes. Native speakers of English voluntarily proofread all the items to evaluate 
the extent to which each item sounded natural to them. Some alterations were made 
based on their feedback. Each item included a short story describing an interaction 
between two people (ranging from 48 - 57 words in length), and the target utterance that 
expressed the speaker’s attitude (ranging from 3 - 13 words in length). The target 
utterance in the same context was manipulated at two levels: a ‘tacit remark’ or an 
‘explicit remark.’ The speaker’s attitude was expressed implicitly in a ‘tacit remark’ 
whereas it was expressed directly in an ‘explicit remark.’ A ‘tacit remark’ created a 
discrepancy between the context and the proposition literally expressed by the target 
utterance and so potentially led to an ironical interpretation. A ‘tacit remark’ and an 
‘explicit remark’ were balanced in the word length as much as possible. All participants 
																																								 																				
79 The details of the two questionnaires are provided in Appendix A (background information questionnaire) 
and Appendix B (irony-understanding questionnaire). 
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completed 20 trials. In the 20 trials the number of each type of remark was 
counterbalanced (10 trials with a ‘tacit remark’ and 10 trials with an ‘explicit remark’). 
Participants were not given both types of remark in the same story. In this manner, 
potential response biases were avoided. One of the items is presented below. 
Sample of the test item and task questions in Internet survey 
 
Design. 
An independent measures design was used. The Internet survey was not designed to test 
JP-participants’ accuracy rate in interpreting a target utterance compared with NS- 
participants. Instead, it was designed to look into irony-level ratings of given utterances, 
investigating the extent to which irony ratings of JP-participants were similar to those of 
NS-participants. The Internet survey was also designed to provide evidence about 
whether or not JP-participants’ individual differences in background features had any 
influence on irony-level ratings. Note that it was not designed to test the hypotheses that 
higher language proficiency, experience of studying or living in English countries, or 
longer length of stay in those countries predicts higher accuracy in understanding 
ironical utterances. Irony-level ratings were measured with regard to participants’ 
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agreement with a statement in the task question. A Likert Scale was used to indicate 
agreement. The scale included five ordered categories consisting of: ‘not at all,’ ‘not so 
much,’ ‘some,’ ‘quite a lot,’ and ‘very much.’ The rationale for using a Likert Scale 
over other types of measurements was that a Likert Scale might elicit data about 
participants’ perception of the speaker’s attitude, feelings or beliefs (Field and Hole 
2003; Kasper and Rose 2002), and it might give participants more scope to indicate 
their varying degrees of agreement on a scale. 
Each trial included three task questions. The first task question, a ‘context 
question’, was designed to measure to what degree the participants remembered the 
context of the story. The second task question, an ‘attitude question’, was designed to 
measure to what degree the participants took the speaker’s attitude/emotion as 
dissociative or sincere. The last task question, a ‘dissociation/commitment question’, 
was designed to measure to what degree the participants estimated that the speaker was 
dissociating herself from or committing herself to her remark, in other words, it was 
taken to indicate to what extent participants took the speaker’s intention as ironical or 
non-ironical. Participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement to the 
statement described in each task question. 
Originally the Internet survey was designed with repeated measures. With each of 
the 20 items ending with either a ‘tacit remark’ or an ‘explicit remark’, there were 40 
stimuli. Two sets of materials, material A and material B were created so that the target 
utterance in each set was symmetrical: if one story ended with a ‘tacit remark’ in 
material A, the same story ended with an ‘explicit remark’ in material B. This was 
designed to compare rating scores between two conditions (‘tacit remark’ and ‘explicit 
remark’) in the same story as within-subject variables, and to compare the results of JP- 
participants with those of NS-participants in order to see to what extent there were 
similarities. Participants were assigned to either one set of material or the other 
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depending on their response to a neutral question asked at the end of the Background 
information questionnaires: ‘which computer operating system (OS) are you using to 
complete this survey, Windows or MAC?’ Participants were not told the nature of this 
question. However, it turned out that the number of participants assigned to both 
materials was not counterbalanced. None of the NS-participants were assigned to 
material B. This forced me to change the experimental design to use independent 
measures in which the data of each group (JP-participants and NS-participants) were 
compared on irony-level ratings. The data of 10 JP-participants who were assigned to 
material B were excluded from further analysis. 
Procedures. 
The Internet survey was distributed on the Internet using an online service 
(‘SurveyMonkey’: http://www.surveymonkey.com/) between October 2010 and April 
2011. This on-line service enables users to create their own web-based surveys, to 
distribute them on the Internet, and to collect data. An individual web address was given 
to each survey created on this service. 
On accessing to this web address, the website software first presented information 
about the study itself. Participants were informed that they could withdraw at any time 
without any negative consequences. Unless participants consented, the survey system 
did not move forward. After answering the basic questions about their background 
(‘gender,’ ‘age,’ ‘nationality,’ ‘occupation’ and ‘first language’), depending on their 
first language, participants were either moved forward to the Irony-understanding 
questionnaire (native speakers of English) or they were asked to provide additional 
background information (non-native speakers of English). Before the Irony- 
understanding questionnaire started, participants were informed about what they were 
being asked to do, how many trials they would have and how many task questions they 
were asked to respond to in each trial. When they were ready (indicated by clicking the 
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‘NEXT’ button on the screen), the Irony-understanding questionnaire automatically 
started. The survey system did not move forward unless they answered three questions 
in one trial. Participants were allowed to spend as long as they needed to complete the 
survey. The site of the survey was not automatically closed or refreshed. At the end of 
the survey, they were asked whether they were willing to take part in future experiments 
and to leave their contact if they wished. 
5.3.2 Data analysis 
Unless indicated otherwise, the results of the data analysis reported below are based on 
the data of 43 JP-participants and 22 NS-participants who were assigned to material A. 
Background information questionnaire: 
Background information of JP-participants was summarised question by question. 
Information specific to their language proficiency, the country where they were living at 
the time of responding to the survey, experience of study/living in English speaking 
countries was used for further analysis. The language proficiency of JP-participants in 
this experiment was assessed based on their scores in official English language tests (i.e. 
IELTS, TOEIC, TOEFL, and Cambridge test) acknowledged by the Common European 
Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR). CEFR sets three different groups with 
six proficiency levels: ‘basic user group’ including A1 (Beginner level) and A2 
(Elementary level), ‘independent user group’ including B1 (Intermediate level) and B2 
(Upper Intermediate level), and ‘proficient user group’ including C1 (Advanced level) 
and C2 (Proficiency level). CEFR proposes the description of what learners of each 
level are expected to be able to do using four skills (reading, listening, speaking, and 
writing). The detailed description is available on the website of CEFR 
(http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/CADRE1_EN.asp). If JP-participants had never 
taken any official English Proficiency levels, their proficiency levels were assessed 
based on their self-assessment of four skills. Each level was replaced with numerals for 
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data analysis: ‘1’ for ‘A1 Beginner,’ ‘2’ for ‘A2 Elementary,’ ‘3’ for ‘B1 Intermediate,’ 
‘4’ for ‘B2 Upper Intermediate,’ ‘5’ for ‘C1 Advanced,’ ‘6’ for ‘C2 Proficiency.’ 
Likewise, the length of study/living in UK or/and other English speaking countries was 
also replaced with numerals: ‘1’ for ‘less than a year,’ ‘2’ for ‘one year to less than three 
years,’ ‘3’ for ‘three years to less than five years,’ ‘4’ for ‘five years to less than seven 
years,’ ‘5’ for ‘seven years to less than 10 years,’ ‘6’ for ‘over 10 years’. 
Irony-understanding questionnaire: 
Data was analysed on version 21 of IBM SPSS Statistics (henceforth, SPSS). Responses 
from five ordered categories, i.e. ‘not at all,’ ‘not so much,’ ‘some,’ ‘quite a lot,’ and 
‘very much’ were replaced with numerical ranks form ‘1’ to ‘5’ respectively. Four 
categories except for ‘not at all’ were considered to indicate that participants agreed to 
some extent with the statement described in the task question. Although the statements 
of all the task questions under both conditions were manipulated so that responses of 
participants would lean towards higher-range ratings (‘quite a lot,’ ‘very much’), there 
were some statements where the responses leaned towards lower-range ratings (‘not at 
all,’ ‘not so much’) because of the wording of the questions. In such cases the rank 
order was reversed; ‘not at all,’ ‘not so much,’ ‘some,’ ‘quite a lot,’ and ‘very much’ 
with a rank of 5, a rank of 4, a rank of 3, a rank of 2 and a rank of 1 respectively. 
Prior to the statistical analysis, significant tests were conducted to check underlying 
assumptions. Data distributions showed values of both the skewness (tacit remarks = 
-.718, explicit remarks = -1.066) and the kurtosis (tacit remarks = .382, explicit remarks 
= 1.943) deviated from zero.80 Tests of significance of skew and kurtosis revealed that 
the z-score of skewness is 2.42 on tacit remarks (p < .05) and 3.59 on explicit remarks 
(p < .01). The kurtosis z-scores are .65 on tacit remarks (ns) and 3.32 on explicit 
																																								 																				
80 Note that SPSS uses methods that give values of zero in a normal distribution (Field 2013:182). 
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remarks (p < .01). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Shapiro-Wilk test were 
conducted to check the assumption of normality. Distributions of the data of JP- 
participants on both tacit remarks and explicit remarks were found to be abnormal: 
rating scores on tacit remarks D (43) = .936, p = .019, and those on explicit remarks, D 
(43) = .944, p = .035. Those of native speakers were found to be normal. On the other 
hand, the results of Levene’s test revealed that the assumption of homogeneity was met. 
Those significant test results were taken into account together with the fact that the 
nature of the Internet survey meant that the dependent variable was measured on an 
ordinal scale (ranks) and the sample obtained was relatively small. Given all of these 
aspects, I decided that non-parametric tests rather than data transformation were more 
appropriate for statistical analyses. 
Data was analysed by conducting the Mann-Whitney test to compare the data of JP- 
participants with those of NS-participants. First, the ratings of three questions were 
analysed in overall terms. Then, the ratings were analysed task question by task 
question and trial by trial. The Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to compare irony 
ratings of 10 tacit-remark-examples with each other. The influence of individual 
background aspects (i.e. language proficiency and the time spent in those countries) on 
irony-level ratings was examined by using Spearman’s correlation coefficient. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to assess the influence of the country of JP-
participants’ residence (at the time of participating in the survey). Since this survey did 
not look into the mere exposure effect of difference in the country of residence (living 
in the UK or the other countries), pairwise comparison instead of the Jonckheere-
Terpstra test was conducted as follow-up analysis. The adjusted p-value was applied to 
pairwise comparison to avoid type I error. 
5.3.3 Results 
Background information questionnaire: 
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It was revealed that the language proficiency of JP-participants was relatively high, and 
more than half of them had been or were exposed to British English culture and 
contexts. The average of language proficiency was between Upper Intermediate (B2) 
and Advanced (C1). There was no basic user (A1, A2) in the JP-participants. The details 
are presented in Figure 5.1. 
	  	
Figure 5.1: Language proficiency level of JP-participants 
Figure 5.2 shows that only three JP-participants had never had any experience of living 
in English speaking countries before. 18 JP-participants were living in the UK at the 
time of taking part in the Internet survey, and Figure 5.3 illustrates how long those JP- 
participants had been living in the UK. The majority of them (83.3%) had been living in 
the UK for longer than 5 years. Twenty-two JP-participants had lived before or were 
living in English speaking countries at the time of answering the survey: the UK (n = 
9),81 Ireland (n = 2), the US (n = 8) Canada (n = 2), New Zealand (n = 1), Singapore (n= 
1), Malaysia (n = 1), the Philippines (n = 1) and India (n = 1).82 Figure 5.4 illustrates the 
time spent (the length) spent in those countries. The average length was longer than 3 
years. 
																																								 																				
81 This includes the number of JP-participants who had lived in the UK before the time of participating in ‘Internet 
survey’. 
82 Some of them had had lived in more than one country. 
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Figure 5.2: Experience of living in English speaking countries  
	
Figure 5.3: Length of stay in UK 
Figure 5.4: The time spent in English speaking countries 
Irony-understanding questionnaire:  
- Irony-level ratings 
Only the data analyses of responses to tacit remarks are reported below unless the 
results of responses to explicit remarks indicated different tendencies between JP- 
participants and NS-participants. Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics of ratings of both 
sample groups and significance value between groups. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of ratings 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was conducted on responses to three task questions in the total. 
The results revealed that JP-participants’ ratings (Mdn = 134.0) did not differ 
significantly from those of NS-participants (Mdn = 129.5), U = 586.00, z = 1.57, p 
= .117, r = .19. The results of task question-by-task question analysis revealed that JP- 
participants’ ratings of ‘attitude’ questions (Mdn = 47.0) were statistically different from 
those of NS-participants (Mdn = 45.0), U = 623.00, z = 2.10, p < .05, r = .26. 
Comparisons of mean ranks between JP-participants and NS-participants (Table 5.2) 
revealed that JP-participants’ ratings of both ‘attitude’ and ‘dissociation/commitment’ 
questions in tacit remarks were higher than NS-participants indicating that their 
agreement ratings converged on higher-range categories. 
Table 5.2: Comparison of mean rank 
 
 
To break down significant differences, the data were analysed trial by trial. Table 5.3 
shows significant values of each trial by task question. The first task, the ‘context’ 
question, was designed to test how fully participants remember the story. Although 
differences in ratings of ‘context’ questions did not yield significant values in 10 trials, 
a statistical difference between two groups was found in three trials of tacit remarks: 
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[world cup], [one of those day] and [tennis match]. As Figure 5.5 shows, differences in 
those trials seem to lie in the proportion of the ‘quite a lot’ category and the ‘very much’ 
category. However, given that frequency distributions of both groups in each trial 
converged on higher-range categories ‘quite a lot’ and ‘very much,’ statistical 
differences found in these three trials do not indicate that JP-participants and NS- 
participants understood the story differently. 
Table5.3: Significant values* of each trial by task question 
 
*  Asymptotic significances (2-sided test) are displayed. The significant level is .05. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Comparison of frequencies of the trial where a significant difference was found in ‘context’ 
question
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The second task, the ‘attitude’ question, was designed to test how participants 
understand the speaker’s attitude. This is the task where JP-participants’ ratings were 
found to be significantly different from those of BNS-participants. The result of trial- 
by-trial analysis revealed that a difference between two groups was significant in two 
trials [shop assistant] and [drunk customer]. Below are the details of the [shop assistant] 
trial: 
	
The result of this trial showed that ratings of JP-participants (Mdn = 5.00) were 
significantly different from those of NS-participants (Mdn = 4.00) U =596.00, z = 2.02, 
p <. 05, r = .25 (Table 5.3). The plot on the left in Figure 5.6 displays a comparison of 
distributions of both groups in this trial. As shown, NS-participants opted for ‘very 
much’ and ‘quite a lot’ equally (45.5% each), whereas frequency of JP-participants 
converged on ‘very much’ (74.4 %) rather than ‘quite a lot’ (16.3%), the results indicate 
that JP-participants agreed more strongly with the statement that the speaker was 
annoyed. However, even though the difference in the proportion of the ‘very much’ 
category, over 90 % of participants in both groups took the speaker’s attitude expressed 
by a positive comment as negative. The results also revealed that no significant 
difference was found in ‘dissociation/commitment’ question in this trial. Thus, this 
statistical difference does not seem to suggest that JP-participants understood the 
speaker’s attitude differently from NS-participants. 
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Figure 5.6: Comparison of frequencies of the trial where a significant difference was found 
in 'attitude' question 
A significant difference in ‘attitude’ question was also found in the trial of [drunk 
customer]. Ratings of JP-participants (Mdn = 4.00) and those of NS-participants (Mdn = 
2.50) were also found significantly different, U =609.50, z = 1.96, p =. 05, r = .24. The 
details of the trial are shown below: 
 
Unlike the other trial [shop assistant], the ratings of both sample groups were widely 
distributed as the right plot in Figure 5.6 shows. Half of the NS-participants rated the 
statement ‘Alice was uncomfortable with the drunk customer’ with a low score, whereas 
almost all the JP-participants (95.3%) rated middle to higher categories. A possible 
explanation of this result is the quality of the task question. The statement of the task 
question did not seem to properly describe the speaker’s emotional state in the situation 
where the customer was complaining in an antagonising manner. It was not discomfort 
but should have been scorn or contempt. It is possible that the ratings of NS-participants 
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were scattering due to this inappropriate statement. Thus, task difficulties (difficulties 
with answering a faulty task) might have brought about a statistical difference found in 
this trial. 
The third task, the ‘dissociation/commitment’ question, was designed to test to 
what extent participants recognise the speaker’s dissociation from her own utterance. 
Rating in the [cold night] trial was significantly different between two groups. The 
details are shown below: 
	
The mean rank of JP-participants (35.86, N = 43) was higher than NS-participants 
(26.18, N = 22), which demonstrated that JP-participants ranked higher categories more 
than NS-participants. The top left plot in Figure 5.7 displays a comparison of 
frequencies in this trial. As shown, while the distribution of both sample groups was 
widely spread across all the five categories, a greater number of JP-participants rated 
higher-range categories than NS-participants. This seems to reflect that NS-participants 
were not as definitely certain about the speaker’s dissociation as JP-participants were: 
more NS-participants agreed to some extent with the speaker’s commitment to her 
utterance than JP-participants. Considering that distributions of both groups were almost 
the same in the ratings of ‘attitude’ questions in this trial, statistical significance found 
in the ‘dissociation/commitment’ question does not seem to suggest that JP- participants 
understood the ironic speaker’s intention in a different way from NS- participants. This 
trial was one of the examples of ironic understatement in which the speaker normally 
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means what she said to some extent while also speaking ironically (see section 2.2.2, 
section 3.5.1). The other two plots in Figure 5.7 display other trials of ironic 
understatements used: [drunk customer], [old drunk man]. These two trials also 
demonstrated no statistical difference between JP-participants and NS-participants. 
Similarly to the [cold night] trial, frequencies of both groups were widely distributed in 
all the examples. Such a distribution pattern was not found in other trials. 
	
Figure 5.7: Comparison of frequencies in 'dissociative/commitment' question in trials with 
ironical understatement 
The results suggested the possibility that culture-dependent differences might affect JP- 
participants’ responses. A significant difference was found in both ‘attitude’ questions 
and ‘dissociation/commitment’ questions in [dinner table], one of the trials with an 
explicit remark. The details of this trial are shown below: 
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The results of the Mann-Whitney test show a significant difference between JP- 
participants (Mdn = 3.00) and NS-participants (Mdn = 4.00) was found in rating of 
‘attitude’ question, U =311.5, z = -2.39, p < .05, r = -.30. The results of the 
‘dissociative/commitment’ question also showed that JP-participants (Mdn = 3.00) took 
the speaker as committing himself less strongly to his remark than NS-participants (Mdn 
= 4.00), U =289.5, z = -2.66, p < .05, r = -.33. Effect sizes for both questions were 
considerable (medium size effect). As the plot on the left in figure 5.8 shows, while 
nearly 70 % of NS-participants took the speaker as expressing his happiness sincerely, 
only 40 % of JP-participants took it as so. On the other hand, more than half of them 
rated lower categories (‘some’ ‘not so much’). Frequency distribution of the 
‘dissociative/commitment’ question (the plot on the right in Figure 5.8) also showed 
that 32.6% of JP-participants rated lower responses (‘not at all’, ‘not so much’). No 
significant difference was found in the ‘context’ task question, indicating that JP- 
participants had a fairly good understanding of the context of this item. Given these 
results, it is hard to assume that statistical significance found in the ‘attitude’ question 
and the ‘dissociation/commitment’ question can be attributed to understanding the 
context of the story differently from NS-participants. 
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of frequencies in the [dinner table] trial 
Although ratings for the ‘dissociative/commitment’ question were lower, this does not 
indicate that some of the JP-participants took this explicit remark as a mild case of 
irony. Rather, it seems to reflect virtue or the social decency not to express one’s 
negative feelings openly, which is respected in Japanese culture. It is not deception or a 
lie, but politeness. It may be highly likely that they took the speaker’s intent as to please 
or reassure the host by uttering ‘I’d be happy to’ while hiding the emotion of 
unhappiness at sitting next to the stranger. 
Correlation analysis test (i.e. Spearman’s correlation coefficient) was used to assess 
the relationship between irony-level ratings and individual background aspects. These 
aspects were language proficiency and the time (the length) of stay in those countries. 
Almost of all the non-UK resident JP-participants (n = 22) had had experience of 
studying/living in English speaking countries before. Thus, instead of the influence of 
previous experience, the influence of the time spent in English speaking countries on 
irony-level ratings was examined. Bias corrected and accelerated bootstrap 95% CIs are 
reported in square brackets. JP-participants’ language proficiency was significantly 
correlated with irony-level ratings of tacit remarks, r = .329 [.077, -.651], p = .012; but 
not correlated with those of explicit remarks, r = .184 [-.141, .501], p = .234. Another 
aspect, the time (the length) spent in English speaking countries was significantly 
correlated with both irony-level ratings of tacit remarks, r = .317 [.027, .600], p = .039 
and those of explicit remarks, r = .441 [.156, .676], p = .003. These results indicated 
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that language proficiency and/or the time spend are a predictor for the dependent 
variable. 
The influence of the country where JP-participants were living at the time of the 
survey was also assessed. The data of irony-level ratings were analysed in comparison 
between NS-participants (N = 22), UK resident JP- participants (n = 18), and non-UK 
resident (n = 25). It was revealed that the country of residence did not significantly 
affect ratings of tacit remarks, H (2) =3.82, p = .148, but it did significantly affect those 
in explicit remarks, H (2) =6.66, p < .05. Follow-up pairwise comparisons with adjusted 
p-values (the Kruskal-Wallis test) were performed on ratings of explicit remarks. None 
of the comparisons among groups revealed a significant difference: comparisons of NS-
participants with UK resident JP-participants (p = 1.00, r = .04), or with non-UK 
resident JP-participants (p = .053, r = .35). No difference was found in comparison 
between UK resident and non-UK resident within JP-participants (p = .151, r = .30). 
However, it should be taken into account that both comparison of non-UK resident with 
either NS-participants and with UK resident yielded medium-sized effect sizes. 
5.3.4 Discussion 
Experiment 1 concerned reading comprehension abilities. The Internet survey was 
designed to test a hypothesis relevant to RQ1 (to what extent Japanese speakers 
understand the ironical speaker’s intention when a stimulus is presented in texts) that 
Japanese speakers would understand the attitude that the ironic speaker intended to 
express in a similar way to native speakers. It was also hypothesised that a difference 
would be found in the case of examples of ironical understatement. This hypothesis was 
partially confirmed. Statistical differences were found in particular task questions of 
some trials. However, a direction of ratings was found the same (higher-rank categories) 
between two groups. It seems hard to suggest that JP-participants understood ironical 
utterances in a different way to NS-participants. The results of Experiment 1 suggest 
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that JP-participants responded to implicitly expressed speaker’s attitude in similar ways 
to NS-participants, including in the case of ironical understatements, and that JP-
participants understood that the speaker attributed her utterance to others. Experiment 1 
provided evidence that contradicts the suggestion made by previous studies (Bouton 
1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996,1999) that non-native speakers always 
have difficulties with understanding of irony in L2. The results indicate that Japanese 
speakers understood the speaker’s dissociative attitude and that Japanese speakers also 
understood that the speaker attributed the thought represented in her utterance to others 
in a similar fashion to native speakers. However, refuting the assumption that non-
native speakers have difficulties with understanding irony does not confirm that non-
native speakers and native speakers understand the ironic speaker’s attitude in the same 
way. Critics may point out the possibility of response biases in JP-participants due to 
the design of the survey. This survey did not include any trials with fillers (distractions). 
There were only trials of tacit and explicit remarks. In addition, this survey was a self-
paced reading test allowing participants to take as much time as they wanted. It did not 
require a prompt response. It may be possible that participants had become aware of the 
purpose of the testing towards the end of the survey. This should be borne in mind. 
The results of the Internet survey showed no significant difference between JP- 
participants and NS-participants in irony-level ratings in overall terms. From the results 
of ratings in the ‘contents’ questions it was clear that JP-participants’ understood the 
context of the story in each trial. At the same time, it is evident from frequency 
distributions of their responses to the ‘dissociation/commitment’ question that JP- 
participants did not take the target utterance literally. This seems to suggest that 
discrepancy between the context of the story and the proposition expressed in a target 
utterance helped Japanese participants to understand the speaker’s intended meaning. 
184		
The responses of JP-participants to the ‘attitude’ questions in overall terms were 
statistically different from those of NS-participants. The analysis of each trial also 
revealed a statistical difference between participant-groups in the two trials. However, a 
significant difference observed should be interpreted cautiously. As reported, patterns of 
distributions of the two groups were very similar. Each group’s frequency distribution 
showed a difference in the proportion of frequency between the ‘quite a lot’ category 
and the ‘very much’ category. Given that ratings of both participant-groups converged 
on higher-rank categories, it can be interpreted that differences between participant- 
groups are superficial and not definitive enough to conclude that Japanese speakers 
understood ironical utterances in a different way from native speakers. That rating of 
both participant-groups shows the same direction rather draws attention to underlying 
similarities between the two sample groups. The finding that Japanese speakers’ ratings 
converged on higher categories than those of native speakers may indicate that Japanese 
speakers have a tendency to interpret potentially ironical utterances in a more clear-cut 
way (as either ironic or not) compared to native speakers. It was interesting that the 
opposite pattern in mean ranks occurred in responses to explicit remarks: JP- 
participants’ mean ranks in explicit remarks were lower than those of NS-participants. 
There are at least two possibilities that could account for this result. First, it could be 
that the speaker’s attitude tacitly expressed is taken as more negative than the one 
expressed explicitly for JP-participants whereas it is the opposite for NS-participants. 
However, it was not possible to compare the mean scores between tacit remark 
conditions and elicit remark conditions in the same trials using repeated-measures since 
there were no data from the material B group to compare with. Thus, it does not seem 
safe to draw any conclusion either way from those analyses alone. Another possible 
explanation is that Japanese speakers might have felt subconsciously under pressure to 
answer ‘correctly’ despite the fact that they were told that there was no correct or wrong 
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answer and that this was not a test to assess their language proficiency. One might argue 
that statistically significant differences between the two participant-groups may stem 
from culture-dependent difference. The present study, however, does not make it 
possible to decide either way conclusively. Even if this was indeed so, it is difficult to 
suggest any systematic explanations. 
Contrary to predictions, the results provided no evidence of a difference between 
JP-participants and NS-participants in trials with examples of ironic understatement. A 
key feature of typical ironic understatements is that they are not false but true. Taking 
the speaker to commit herself to her utterance is ‘ludicrously’ inadequate in ironic 
understatement because of its blatant irrelevance if she was taken at face value (Wilson 
and Sperber 2012). Therefore, it is expected that responses to a 
‘dissociation/commitment’ question would not be as straightforward as for other types 
of irony. Participant confusion was evident from widely spread ratings in those trials 
with ironic understatements. For instance, in the trial [cold night], it is inadequate to 
take literally a comment that ‘it’s a bit chilly tonight’ on a freezing cold night with a 
blizzard. However, this inadequacy does not indicate that the proposition literally 
expressed by this utterance is false. Also, how cold one feels or/and how one expresses 
the coldness that one is feeling vary individual by individual. Thus, this proposition 
could be true to some extent. It is also possible that while some participants think it is 
ridiculous to describe such coldness as ‘a bit chilly,’ others might think that it is only 
inadequate to express it with the adverb ‘a bit.’ In the trials with examples of ironic 
understatement, a similar distribution as those of NS-participants was demonstrated in 
the frequency of JP-participants’ responses, which indicates that the pattern of 
confusion observed was similar between participant-groups. It seems reasonable to 
suggest that Japanese participants understand even the case of ironic understatement in a 
similar way to native speakers. In addition, the widely-spread distribution of NS- 
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participants confirmed that the responses of NS-participants vary in some cases, 
confirming that native speakers’ responses are not necessarily similar. Furthermore, 
while overstatements are often used in the Japanese equivalent of irony ‘hiniku,’ use of 
understatements is rarely seen. However, this language-specific characteristic does not 
seem to affect the interpretation of English irony. On the contrary, the results showed 
that JP-participants and NS-participants showed a similar understanding of the speaker’s 
attitude in ironic understatements. 
Previous studies (Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; 
Bromberek-Dyzman and Ewert 2010, Yamanaka 2003) suggested that a deeper 
immersion in terms of both quality (exposure) and quantity (length) might strongly 
correlate with development of the ability to understand irony. The Internet survey 
showed mixed results of the effects of exposure to the target language culture on irony 
ratings. First, language proficiency appeared to be a good predictor for JP-participants’ 
irony level ratings. While the country of residence did not seem to influence irony level 
ratings, the time (the length) spent in English speaking countries turned out to be 
significantly related to irony-level ratings of tacit remarks, which has supported the 
suggestion of previous studies. However, this result needs to be considered with 
caution. The result that this background aspect (the time spent in English speaking 
countries) is also correlated with responses to explicit remarks should not be 
overlooked. This indicates that the time spent in English speaking countries simply 
facilitates general English language level. From only these results, it cannot be said for 
certain that the longer immersion the better understanding of potentially ironical 
utterances.      
In sum, findings of the Internet survey provided evidence against the suggestion of 
previous studies that non-native speakers arrive at English ironical interpretation far less 
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often than native speakers. JP-participants understood ironic utterances in a similar way 
to NS-participants. 
5.4 Developing the experimental design 
This section the experimental design of Experiment 2 has been developed. First, it 
reports a pilot study in which a preliminary method was applied to a testing. Then, it 
discusses what was suggested from a pilot study and what should be taken into 
considerations for development of the method (section 5.4.2). It discusses how 
independent variables and an initial test had been designed (section 5.4.2). 
5.4.1 Pilot study 
A pilot study was conducted to test to what extent recognition of the speaker’s tone of 
voice could be useful as a variable to investigate similarities in response trends in 
understanding of irony between Japanese speakers and native speakers. 
Eight JP-participants (age: between 22 and 54; sex: 2 males, 6 females) and 16 
native speakers of English (age: between 18 and 24; sex: 2 males, 14 females) 
voluntarily participated in the pilot study. JP-participants had lived in the UK for 
between 7 years and 21 years. Two of them were postgraduate students and the rest 
were professionals working in London at the time of testing. English language 
proficiency of JP-participants was considered as advanced based on their self- 
assessment. NS-participants were first-year students from Psychology Department of 
Middlesex University. In exchange for participation, they obtained credit that was 
partial requirements of BA in Psychology. All the NS-participants and JP-participants 
reported no known hearing impairment or language disorder at the time of testing. 
Both a written material (‘off-line’ testing condition) and an audio material 
(‘pseudo-real-time’ testing condition) were used. Sixteen items were created and each 
item consisted of a short story that ended with the utterance in question (the target 
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utterance). Independent variables were the context of a story in both the written material 
tasks and the audio material tasks. In the audio material tasks, another independent 
variable prosodic pattern of the target utterance was included. The context was 
manipulated with three levels: it was manipulated in a way that the speaker’s meaning 
of the target utterance would be more likely to be taken either ironically (‘ironical’ 
context), or not ironically (‘non-ironical’ context). A story line of ‘neutral’ context is 
manipulated so that the speaker’s meaning of the target utterance would not be strongly 
biased towards one (ironical) or the other way (non-ironical) only from its context, and 
further information or indication for the speaker’s meaning is needed for its 
interpretation. The prosodic pattern of the target utterance was manipulated with three 
levels (‘default’/ ‘stylised’/ ‘dead-pan’). ‘Default’ tone of voice was characterised as 
tone of voice that corresponds to what is likely to accompany the literal meaning. 
‘Dead-pan’ tone and ‘stylised’ tone were marked prosodic patterns in contrast with a 
‘default’ tone of voice. The audio-martial was read aloud by professional actors. They 
were instructed to narrate stories and to act as a character of the story speaking the 
target utterance in one of the prosodic patterns. In addition, ‘distracter’ items were 
created. The target utterance in ‘distracter’ stories was spoken in only ‘default’ tone of 
voice. Both material tasks included such ‘distracter’ items in order to minimise the risk 
of response biases and the likelihood that the participants might notice the aim of the 
test. One of the examples of trials can be found below.83  
Participants were randomly assigned to the ‘off-line’ testing condition group (with 
written material) or the ‘pseudo-real-time’ testing condition group (with auditory 
material). Tasks were either to listen or to read each item, and to answer a question of 
whether or not the speaker commits herself to the proposition expressed in a target 
utterance by choosing ‘YES,’ ‘NO,’ or ‘I DON’T KNOW.’ There were counter- 
																																								 																				
83 All the scenarios and questions are found in Appendix C. 
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balanced 12 trials (including 8 distractors) in both types of materials. The ‘off-line’ 
testing condition group read each story including a target utterance presented on the 
computer screen. The ‘pseudo-real-time’ testing condition group listened to the 
recorded material through headphones. Once the test started, the audio material was 
played without a stop all the way through; a certain period of time was set for each trial 
(length of time limit varied depending on number of words of the story in length). 
Participants were given 10 seconds to answer to each question by circling one of three 
choices on a given response sheet, and the next trial automatically started after 10 
seconds. Each trial was played only once. After they completed all the trials, JP- 
participants were individually invited to an informal chat with the researcher to talk 
freely in Japanese about how they found the test. Participants were also asked the reason 
why they had chosen ‘I DON’T KNOW’ in particular trials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190		
Sample of the test item of pilot study 
 
The results revealed that while no difference in responses was found between the 
‘off-line’ testing condition group and NS- participants, the ‘pseudo-real-time’ testing 
condition group responded differently to NS-participants. Differences were found when 
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the target utterance was spoken in default tone in ironical context, was spoken in 
stylised tone in non-ironical context, and was spoken in deadpan tone in non-ironical 
context. Below were main comments collected from JP-participants: 
• ‘I was confused with the dialogue where the context and the intonation 
contradicted each other.’ 
• ‘From the intonation, I thought the speaker was being sarcastic but the 
context wasn’t, so I chose ‘I don’t know.’ 
• ‘At first, I thought the speaker was sincere with what she said, but then the 
intonation made me change my answer…’ 
• ‘The intonation the speakers used and the context didn’t match!’ 
• ‘I was annoyed by the intonation!!’ 
5.4.2 Reflections 
Response differences between JP-participants and NS-participants were found under the 
conditions where prosodic patterns were manipulated against the given contexts. In 
other words, there was incongruence between a given context and the speaker’s 
particular attitude with which a given tone is often associated. The responses of NS- 
participants under those conditions weakly indicated that they chose the answer on the 
basis of its context. On the other hand, JP-participants chose the ‘I DON’T KNOW’ 
option under such conditions. It was interesting that their comments in the interview 
revealed their confusion with the manipulated interaction of tone of voice with the 
context. The pilot study suggested that recognition of the speaker’s tone of voice might 
be a useful variable to look into similarities and differences between non-native 
speakers and native speakers concerning ironical interpretation. 
The pilot study has provided informative insights into how the experimental design 
of Experiment 2 should be developed. One of the basic drawbacks was its assumption 
that a particular context or a particular type of tone leads to ironical interpretation. The 
pilot study had presupposed that the speaker’s meaning should be taken as ironic under 
‘ironical’ context and when the speaker’s remark was spoken in ‘deadpan’ or 
‘exaggerated’ tone. But on further reflection this cannot be taken for granted. What 
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should be investigated is not whether or not participants are capable of “choosing” 
presupposed response based on such assumptions. Instead, it should be investigated 
under which tone by context interaction ironical interpretation is favoured. Another 
drawback was the way of comparing the data of responses to written material with those 
to auditory material. It was suggested in the pilot test that comparisons of responses to 
pseudo-real-time task condition with those of the off-line task condition did not elicit 
any possibility that heavier processing load might or might not undesirably affect the 
interpretation process of ironical utterances. The way of setting additional processing 
loads on task performance needs to be taken into account. 
A question was also raised concerning the quality of the materials. First, it concerns 
the quality of prosodic contours. The auditory material had been tried out on native 
speakers. They pointed out that some of the recording of a ‘dead-pan’ prosodic pattern 
sounded too robotic. As discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.3), the same prosodic pattern 
(e.g., deadpan tone of voice) could sound slightly different depending on the context. 
The details of prosodic contours should be more explored. It is suggested that the 
experimental design should be created in a way that potential biases are cancelled out as 
much as possible. It was also pointed out that material should be counterbalanced: a) a 
number of words in a story and a target utterance varied a great deal across trials; b) a 
number of each condition included in the trials was not counterbalanced either (i.e. three 
trials of ironical context condition, three trials of non-ironical context and only two 
trials of neutral context condition). A disadvantage of a rating scale with ‘YES/NO/I 
DON’T KNOW’ options was also concerning. It is hard to distinguish whether 
participants chose the option of ‘I DON’T KNOW’ because they were not sure of ‘YES’ 
or ‘NO,’ or because they simply could not care less to choose either one or the other 
option. It has been noted that the rating scale with three options made it complicating to 
interpret results and this, in turn makes results less reliable. Native speakers had also 
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proofread items of the materials. They pointed out that use of the same names in 
different stories was confusing. While reading or listening to a story with certain names, 
participants had a natural tendency to create an idiosyncratic narrative, or a certain 
assumption about characters even where it is not required. For instance, if “Mary” and 
“John” were a wife and a husband in a story, this information may be encapsulated as 
background knowledge. When they come across the same names again in a different 
story as a teacher and a student, they cannot help but access the information stored 
(“Mary” and “John” as a wife and a husband), which may interfere with new 
information about characters of the same name. 
5.4.3 Developing the experimental design 
The method of Experiment 2 has been developed taking the following discussions into 
account. 
Measuring ‘response trends’ in preference for ironical interpretation and processing 
speed: 
The most important is that the present study does presuppose that neither a particular 
tone of voice nor a particular context relation is robustly associated with ironical 
interpretation. It does not treat responses of native speakers as ‘correct.’ Therefore, this 
experiment does not attend to ‘response accuracy.’ Instead, it concerns response trend to 
see under which condition ironical interpretation is favoured.  
Independent variables. 
Three independent variables are set up in order to investigate research questions: types 
of tone of voice (prosodic patterns), types of context relation and degree of echoing 
(locations of the echoing source). Below discuss how these variables have been 
established. 
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Prosodic patterns: The prosodic pattern for expression of a characteristic attitude 
may vary depending on the speaker, the context of the utterance and/or what kinds of 
attitude the speaker intends to express from a range of dissociative attitudes. As 
discussed in section 2.2.5 Chapter 2, the present study considers that there is no one 
solid tone of voice that would be associated with all the cases of ironical utterances. The 
challenge for the present study is then, how it could establish tone of voice that may 
lead hearers to potentially ironical interpretation. For the purpose of Experiment 2, three 
prosodic patterns have been established: ‘baseline tone,’ ‘deadpan tone’ and 
‘exaggerated tone.’ Those types of tone are different in acoustic features that determine 
prosodic contours distinctively from each other. First, ‘baseline tone’ has been 
established. ‘Baseline tone’ is what might be thought of as tone of voice that is often 
used in a context where the speaker commits herself to her utterance. Two other types of 
tone in which the same target utterance is spoken have been established such a way that 
their acoustic features such as pitch, intensity (loudness), duration (length), and tempo 
(speed) deviate from those of ‘baseline tone.’ In comparison with ‘baseline tone’, 
‘deadpan tone’ is a flat tone with narrow pitch range: a particular syllable is pitched at a 
certain level and subsequent syllables do not fluctuate. No special emphasis on any 
words so that utterance is spoken with a pitch that rather stays at a flat level. It has the 
least intensity. On the other hand, ‘exaggerated tone’ has wider pitch range than 
‘baseline tone’: a particular syllable is pitched at a certain level and subsequent 
syllables fluctuate up and down heavily. A stretch of speech is rather loud and tempo is 
slower than ‘baseline tone.’ The images of waveform84 in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 show 
a visual representation of each tone used as independent variable in Experiment 2. Table 
5.7 highlights a difference in pitch variation and intensity (loudness) whereas Table 5.8 
highlights a difference in duration (length) and tempo (speed) between the three types of 
																																								 																				
84 These images were taken from audio tracks data of recorded on ‘Audacity version 2.0.2.’ 
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tone. The vertical scale on the left displays amplitude, which is the level or magnitude 
of a signal. When the top and bottom of the waveform are closer to +/- 1, the audio is 
louder, on the other hand, when they are closer to the centre (a zero line), the sound is 
quieter. 
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Table 5.4: Comparison of pitch variation and intensity (loudness) 
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Table 5.5: Comparison of duration (length) and tempo (speed) 
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Types of context relation: The relation between the context of a story and the 
proposition literally expressed in a target utterance is manipulated at three levels. In an 
‘inconsistent context’ there is a discrepancy between them whereas there is no 
discrepancy in a ‘consistent context.’ A ‘neutral context’ does not strongly suggest 
understanding the intended meaning of the target utterance in one or the other way. In 
other words, it is a context which neither suggests a clear interpretation of the utterance 
based on specific assumptions derived from the given context nor suggests a sharp 
inconsistency with the context.  
Degree of echoing: The third independent variable, degree of echoing is added in 
order to see the influence of processing load on interpretation. Degree of echoing refers 
to the location of the echoing source, i.e. at which point of the conversation the original 
utterance or thought that the speaker attributes appears. This is manipulated at two 
levels, ‘immediate’ or ‘distant’. The echoing source appears just before the target 
utterance under the ‘immediate echo’ condition. A filler sentence is inserted before a 
target utterance so as to make the echoing source apart from the target utterance under 
the ‘distant echo’ condition. Filler sentences were neutral in order not to change or 
affect the context of each story. 
Importance of an initial test. 
The present study considers that it was important to assess the ability of participants to 
discriminate a given tone from others before the experiment. To this end, the following 
four tasks had been developed: 
(a) discrimination task 
Task is to listen to a playback of the recording twice and to decide whether the recording 
in the first playback and the one in the second sounded the same or different. 
(first playback)  
‘Lovely to see you.’ 
(spoken with either ‘conventional’,’ exaggerated’, or ‘dead-pan’ tone of voice) 
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(second playback)  
‘Lovely to see you.’ 
(spoken with either ‘conventional’,’ exaggerated’, or ‘dead-pan’ tone of voice) 
Question: Did two playbacks sound the same or different to you? 
YES / NO 
(b)  forced choice matching task 
Task is to listen to a playback and to decide which one of the feelings best describes the 
speaker’s feeling. 
(Playback) 
‘Lovely to see you.’ 
(spoken with either ‘conventional’,’ exaggerated’, or ‘dead-pan’ tone of voice) 
Question: Which one of them best describes how the speaker feels? 
a) The speaker is happy. 
b) The speaker is annoyed. 
c) The speaker is bored. 
 
(c) Alternative forced choice matching task 
The speaker’s state of emotion is presented.  
‘The speaker is annoyed.’ 
Task is to listen to a playback of the recording three times in which the speaker saying 
the same phrase but using a different tone each time, and to choose one that best 
conveys the speaker’s state of emotion. 
(first playback) 
‘Lovely to see you.’ (spoken with conventional tone of voice)  
(second playback) 
‘Lovely to see you.’ (spoken with exaggerated tone of voice)  
(third playback) 
‘Lovely to see you.’ (spoken with dead-pan tone of voice) 
Question: Which playback best conveys that the speaker is annoyed? 
Answer: first playback/second playback/third playback 
(d) Effect discrimination task 
Task is to listen to a playback of the recording of a phrase spoken in a particular tone, 
and to decide how the playback sounded on a scale of ‘extremely positive’ on one side 
and ‘extremely negative’ on the other side. 
(Playback) 
‘Lovely to meet you.’ 
(spoken with either ‘conventional’,’ exaggerated’, or ‘dead-pan’ tone of voice)  
Question: To what extent did the playback sound positive to you? 
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After taking both merits and demerits of each approach into consideration it was 
decided to use (a) discrimination task as an initial testing. The rationale for this was 
rather simple: only the discrimination task can test the ability to discriminate prosodic 
patterns from each other. The other approaches involve a task of discriminating the 
‘effect’ of each tone of voice. Take an example of saying ‘Lovely to see you’ in 
‘exaggerated tone’ in approach (b) and approach (d). It is possible that the speaker is 
sincerely expressing her positive feeling (happy) to meet her interlocutor, but at the 
same time it is also possible that the speaker intends to express her negative feeling 
(annoyed/contemptuous) implicitly by uttering the same sentence with ‘exaggerated’ 
tone of voice. It is not realistic to assess the effect of each tone of voice. In addition, 
tasks in (b)-(d), discriminating the ‘effect’ of tone are in fact, similar to the task 
questions in Experiment 2. Repetitive tasks risk response biases in the main testing 
trials. 
5.5 Experiment 2 
5.5.1 Method 
Participants: 
Ethics approval was obtained from ‘School of Arts and Education’ at the time when the 
approval was granted in November 2010 and School of Health and Education in 
Middlesex University. Sixty-five participants completed all the conditions of this 
experiment: 30 were native speakers of British English (BNS-participants) and 35 were 
Japanese speakers of English (JP-participants). All the participants were reported no 
known hearing impairment or language disorder at the time of testing. 30 BNS-
participants (four are male and 28 were female) participated. Two of BNS-participants 
were professionals and the rest were students from Psychology department at Middlesex 
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University who took part in exchange for partial course credit of BA in Psychology. 
Testing was taken place in a psychology-testing cubicle at Middlesex University during 
two weeks between January to February in 2013. 
All the participants of JP-participants (five are male and 30 are female) voluntarily 
took part in the experiment. All of them were born in Japan and their first language is 
Japanese. They were living in the UK at the time of the experiment using English as 
second language (27 students, six professionals, two housewives). They were recruited 
through advertisements. Advertisements were circulated by lecturers or/and 
international student office at universities in the UK, by posting on websites and on 
Facebook, by flyers placed at organisations, communities, shops, restaurants and local 
social clubs that were involved in Japanese people in London. Testing was carried out at 
two separate occasions; two weeks between April to May in 2013 and two weeks 
between November and December in 2013. Most of JP-participants were tested either in 
a psychology-testing cubicle at Middlesex University, in a meeting room of the 
Psychology and Language Sciences Division of University College London (UCL), or 
in a lecture room at Essex University. Eight JP-participants could not participate in 
during daytime because of other commitments so that testing was arranged at 
participants’ preferred place (six participants were tested at their houses and two 
participants were tested in public places). The average length of living in the UK was 30 
months (range from 1 month to 204 months). Based on JP-participants’ score of 
IELTS,85 the average level of their language proficiency was reported as independent 
user level (equivalent of IELTS score between 6.0 and 6.5) set by CEFR.86  
Materials: 
																																								 																				
85 Language proficiency of each Japanese participant was described in the score of IELTS that corresponded to 
the score of other official English tests that JP-participants had taken before. 
86 This does not include four JP-participants who had never taken any official English test. 
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Initial test. The following six phrases were recorded with three different types of 
tone, adding up to 18 stimuli. 
• Thank you very much 
• It’s not awkward at all. 
• I really appreciate your help. 
• Lovely to see you. 
• Fantastic 
• Yay 
A task was to listen to a playback of a stimuli twice and to decide whether the stimuli in 
the first playback and the one in the second sounded the same or different. Participants 
were asked to indicate their answers by pressing the appropriated response key 
designated ‘2’ (SAME) or ‘3’ (DIFFERENT) on the separate keyboard. In total there 
were 54 trials to complete. The trials were automatically played in random order 
without a stop. 
Listening comprehension test (LCT). 22 brief stories were created (including four 
for practice). Some of them were completely original and the other were developed 
based on materials gathered from literature, TV programme, newspaper, actual 
everyday conversations, novels and so on. Each story described an interaction between 
two people. Each story included ‘story’ sentence/s (length of each sentence was ranging 
from 22-28 words), a ‘context sentence’ (ranging from 6-28 words in length) 
with/without a ‘filler’ sentence (ranging from 13-18 words in length), and ended a target 
utterance (stimuli). The number of words in each context type was as counterbalanced 
as possible. The words used in all the stories were carefully chosen based on the list of 
the vocabulary provided by Longman dictionary of contemporary English (2003) in 
which learners of English at intermediate level were expected to have learnt. Colloquial 
words or phrases and phrasal verbs were replaced with the words or phrases already 
taught if necessary. 
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For recording the auditory material, a discussion session was taken place under the 
supervision of an expert in the field of phonetics and phonology (Dr Jill House at UCL) 
to establish how each tone of the target utterance should be produced considering the 
context of each story. All the items of the material were then recorded by a professional 
male actor and Dr House herself. Each story except for its target utterance was narrated 
in a clear voice at a comfortable rate. Target utterances were recorded in three different 
tones of voice (‘dead-pan,’ ‘exaggerated,’ and ‘conventional’) acting a character of the 
story. Story parts and the target utterances were recorded separately. The auditory 
material was digitally recorded in a soundproof recording studio at UCL. After 
recording, a story part was dubbed together with a target utterance spoken with one of 
three different tones of voice. All the editing was done using the computer software 
‘Audacity version 2.0.2.’ Edited materials were transferred to ‘SuperLab version 4.0’ in 
order to put all together. Table 5-11 presents an example from materials.87 A desktop 
computer equipped with Windows operation system was used for testing, which took 
place in a psychology-testing cubicle at Middlesex University. When testing took place 
outside Middlesex University, a notebook (DELL) with Windows operation system and 
a separate keyboard were used. A set of headphones was provided for listening to the 
auditory materials. Participants were allowed to use their own earphones if they 
preferred. Stimulus presentation and data collection were controlled using ‘SuperLab 
version 4.0.’ 
Based on some feedback from native speakers who had taken part in a test-run of 
the method, some adjustments were made on the material and the procedure. Some 
stories in auditory format were too long or too complicated to hold in, and it was quite 
hard even for native speakers to follow the contents of the recording with undivided 
																																								 																				
87 Full detailed materials are found in Appendix E. 
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attention. Taken these suggestions into account, some stories and some sentences had 
been made much simpler and shorter in length. The procedure was also changed into 
presenting captions of the audio material on the computer screen while the recording 
was being played. 
Sample of the test item in Experiment 2 
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Design: 
A repeated measure design was used. There were three independent variables: context 
relation, the speaker’s tone of voice and degree of echoing. These three variables 
completely crossed over, producing 18 experimental conditions. The context of each 
story was manipulated at three levels depending on its relation to a proposition literally 
expressed by a target utterance: ‘inconsistent context relation,’ ‘consistent context 
relation,’ or ‘neutral context relation.’ The tone of voice in which the target utterance 
was spoken was also manipulated at three levels: ‘baseline tone,’ ‘dead-pan tone,’ or 
‘exaggerated tone.’ The third independent variable was degree of echoing, which was 
manipulated at two levels: ‘immediate echo’ or ‘distant echo.’ There were two 
dependent measures that were analysed separately: responses preferred to ironical 
interpretation and response time. Participants took part in all the 18 conditions of the 
experiment and the number of stimuli was counterbalanced across the participants. 
Eighteen trials were presented in random order. Trials were presented to participants in 
a counterbalanced way across types of context relation, tone of voice, and degree of 
echoing, so that the same interaction across three independent variables was not 
presented in different trials. In this manner potential response biases were avoided. 
Each trial had a set of three task questions: ‘attitude’ question, ‘interpretation’ 
question and ‘memory’ question. The first task, ‘attitude’ question was designed to elicit 
understanding of the speaker’s attitude and it was measured with forced-choice 
(YES/NO) measurement. It was made in the way that the response of ‘YES’ reflects the 
speaker’s positive attitude and the response of ‘NO’ reflects the speaker’s derogatory 
(negative) attitude. The second task, ‘interpretation’ question was designed to elicit 
understanding of the speaker’s dissociation from or commitment to her utterance (the 
target utterance). This task question was measured with multiple-choice measurement. 
Among four choices one choice indicates attribution of thought to others, one choice 
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indicates the speaker’s commitment to her utterance, and the other two choices are 
irrelevant to the context of a given story. The last task question ‘memory’ question was 
designed to elicit to what extent participants remember contents of the story. This task 
was also designed to check whether or not their responses were at random, and to help 
confirm or disconfirm that responses to the other two questions were reliable enough. 
The ‘memory’ question was measured with multiple-choice measurement, and there 
was only one choice that distinctively and correctly describes the contents of the story. 
This question was asked at the end in order to avoid a possibility that contents of the 
multiple choices might cause response biases. 
Procedures: 
Each participant completed the tasks individually. Before they started the tasks, an 
information sheet was handed to all the participants in order for them to understand in 
advance what the experiment involved, what they were expected to do, what kinds of 
instruments were being used, and how long the test itself lasted. The researcher made it 
sure whether participants understood the nature of the experiment. Then, they were 
asked to sign the written informed consent forms if they had agreed to participate in.88 
Participants and the researcher retained a copy of the informed consent form one each. 
Before the testing started, participants had had time to familiarise themselves with the 
equipment (i.e. how to adjust volume of headphones, which key they were expected to 
hit on the keyboard and so on). 
Some of the participants were randomly assigned to take the initial test before 
Listening Comprehension Test (LCT) and the others stated LCT straight away. Forty- 
two participants: (15 were BNS-participants and 27 were JP-participants) took part in 
initial test. The present study acknowledges that it is ideal to conduct an initial test with 
																																								 																				
88 A sample of the information sheet and the informed consent form are found in Appendix D. 
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different participants to those who take part in the main experiment. However, due to 
difficulties with recruiting sufficient number of participants, the initial test was 
conducted on the same participants. 
Instructions for LCT were verbally explained to participants. The tasks of 
Experiment 2 were to listen to the recorded story with a target utterance through 
headphones and to response to the corresponding task questions. While the recording 
was played, captions that transcribe on-going recording appeared on the computer 
screen. Participants were told that it was not necessary to read captions while listening 
the recording if they preferred not to do so. There was no caption of the target utterance 
on the screen. Contents of all the task questions were presented in text on the computer 
screen. Participants were asked to choose the answer as quickly as possible without 
sacrificing accuracy in judgment by pressing the response key that designated 1, 2, 3 
and 4 on the separate keyboard. After instructions were explained, participants were 
asked to do four trials as a practice. Step-by step instructions in text were displayed on 
the screen of the computer during the first trial of practice. At the end of the practice 
session participants were given some time to ask questions if any. They were instructed 
to press the spacebar to start LCT when they were ready. Immediately after the 
recording of a target utterance was played, the first task question appeared on the 
computer screen, and it automatically moved on to the next task once they pressed the 
response key. The recording of each trial was played only once. The next trial would 
start when participants pressed the space bar after responding the third task question. 
Participants were debriefed after they completed LCT.89  
5.5.2 Predictions 
																																								 																				
89 Debriefing sheet is found in Appendix F. 
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If the proportion of participants favouring ironical interpretation differs depending on 
tone by context relation interaction, then a certain interaction leads to potentially 
ironical interpretation more strongly than others. If processing speed varies depending 
on tone by context relation interaction, then a certain interaction leads to potentially 
ironical interpretation more quickly than others. It is predicted that both JP-participants 
and BNS-participants would favour ironical interpretation more strongly and more 
quickly if the target utterance were spoken in deadpan tone, and the least number of 
participants would favour ironical interpretation if it were spoken in basic tone. A 
different response trend would be found between JP-participants and BNS-participants 
if the target utterance were spoken in exaggerated tone. While the effect of exaggerated 
tone on ironical interpretation would be as strong as the effect of deadpan tone for BNS- 
participants, its effect on JP-participants would be much weaker than the effect of 
deadpan tone and much closer to the effect of basic tone. 
It is predicted that the proportion of participants in both groups favouring ironical 
interpretation would be highest if the type of context relation were inconsistent and it 
would be lowest if it were consistent. Given this, it is predicted that highest proportion 
of both JP-participants and BNS-participants would opt for ironical interpretation if 
deadpan tone interacted with inconsistent context, and the least proportion of 
participants in both groups would opt for them if basic tone interacted with inconsistent 
context. 
As discussed in section 5.2.3 it is hypothesised that JP-participants would be more 
affected by manipulation of tone of voice. On the other hand, context relation would be 
stronger predictor than the tone of voice for BNS-participants’ ironical interpretation. 
This would lead to a different response trend between sample groups. Thus, it is 
predicated that a greater number of JP-participants than BNS-participants would opt for 
ironical interpretation if deadpan interacted with consistent context relation. 
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Considering a prediction that JP-participants may show a different tendency if a target 
utterance were spoken in exaggerated tone of voice, difference between two groups 
would be evident if exaggerated tone of voice interacted with inconsistent context 
relation and if it interacted with neutral context relation. Under both conditions, the 
proportion of BNS-participants opting for ironical interpretation would be much higher 
than JP-participants. 
5.5.3 Data analysis 
Data was collected by using ‘SuperLab version 4.0’ and was imported into Microsoft 
Excel. ‘Response trend’ in preference for ironical interpretation was measured by the 
proportion of choosing ironical interpretation in task question 1 (‘attitude’ question) and 
task question 2 (‘interpretation’ question) in LCT. If the response to ‘attitude’ question 
was ‘NO,’ it was replaced with ‘1,’ if not, ‘0’. If the response to the ‘interpretation’ 
question represented ironical interpretation, it was replaced with ‘1,’ if not, ‘0.’ The 
proportion of participants who opted for ironical interpretation was calculated condition 
by condition and compared with each other. Ratings for ironical interpretation were 
based on the total of mean ratings of these two task questions. Prior to the statistical 
analyses, data distributions were examined to check underlying assumptions. Both mean 
ratings for ironical interpretation was found to be abnormal. Several attempts (trimming 
outliners, using robust method, i.e. bootstrapping, transforming data. i.e. log 
transformation, square root transformation) were made in order to reduce the biases. 
However, none of those attempts improved the assumption of normality. Levene’s test 
confirmed homoscedasticity at significant level (p > .001). Mauchly’s test revealed that 
the condition of sphericity was met (p > .05) indicating that the variances of the 
differences between JP-participants and BNS- participants are roughly equal. The 
effects of participant-group variable, the tone variable, and the context relation variable 
on response trend in preference for ironical interpretation was analysed using a mixed 
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design ANOVA (2 x 3 x 3) as both the within-group variables and the between-group 
variables. However, considering that the assumption of normality is not met and that the 
scores range only from 0 to 2, the results of statistical analyses are underpowered. So 
that a series of between/within group comparisons were performed using nonparametric 
comparisons in order to back up the power of statistic results from mixed design 
ANOVA. The effect of the degree of echoing (location of the source of echoing) on 
response trend was compared with those of distant echoes using Wilcoxon test as 
within-group variables. 
Separated from responses to the other two questions, the response to task question 3 
(‘memory task) was analysed based on the correct choice from a multiple-choice 
question (response accuracy). Accuracy was calculated by replacing the correct choice 
with numerical rating ‘1,’ and other choices with ‘0.’ This task question was designed to 
test the extent to which participants remembered contents of the story. Among four 
multiple choices only one choice described contents of the story correctly and thus, 
responses to ‘memory’ task questions were analysed as accuracy not as tendency. 
Processing speed trend was examined by measuring reaction time (RTs) to 
‘attitude’ question. RT was measured in milliseconds from the onset of each stimulus 
(the target utterance) to the instant when the response button was pressed. The data were 
cleaned up by eliminating outliners before statistic tests: RTs shorter than cut-off point 
(a miss) at 2000 milliseconds and long RTs with more than 2 STDEVs away from the 
mean of each individual participant were trimmed. The effects of the tone variable and 
the context variable on processing speed were designed to be analysed using factorial 
repeated-measures ANOVA as within-group variables. The effect of the degree of 
echoing was designed to be analysed using a paired-sample t-test as within-subject 
variables. However, on analysing the data of RTs, the number of participant was 
dramatically dropped due to the trim of outliner data. The same occurred when using 
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instead the non-parametric statistic tests. The present study considered this situation as 
that analyses of the reduced number of participants makes the results of the study 
seriously underpowered. Thus, it decided not to analyse the data of reaction time 
further90 and data analyses will focus only on the data from response trends. 
Each of 18 conditions is abbreviated depending on interaction of three 
independent variables: each abbreviation was in order of ‘context relation,’ ‘tone of 
voice,’ and ‘degree of echoing.’ Henceforth, the following abbreviations are used in this 
chapter: 
 
5.5.4 Results 
Initial test: 
The accuracy rate of initial test indicated that participants of both JP-participants and 
BNS-participants were capable of discriminating the sounds of different prosodic 
patterns from each other. In total 27 JP-participants and 15 BNS-participants took part 
in the initial test. The data of seven participants (two were JP-participants and five were 
NS-participants) were excluded from analysis due to technical problems that occurred 
during data collection and unreliability of the data collected in LCT (the data of 
																																								 																				
90 After thorough examination of the situation, the problem with analysis of processing speed was solved. The 
problem involved how ‘outlier’ data (reaction time which was shorter than cut- off point (a miss) at 2000 
milliseconds and long RTs with more than 2 STDEVs away from the mean of each individual participant) had been 
treated in the analysis. When removing ‘outlier’ data, they were not replaced with the mean score of each 
participant. This was how the number of participants was dramatically lowered in output of SPSS. The data of 
reaction time was analysed and the results of analysis regarding reaction time are added into the appendix. See 
Appendix G for the details. 
212		
participants who did not take part seriously). Thus, the data of 25 JP-participants and 10 
BNS-participants were analysed. JP-participants (N = 25) completed 54 trials in 7.7 
minutes (SD = 1.4) on average and mean score of response accuracy was 50.6 (SD = 
3.14). On the other hand, BNS-participants (N = 10) completed the test in 7.0 minutes 
(SD = 0.47) on average and mean score was 50.60 (SD=6.40). This includes the data of 
one BNS-participant whose accuracy rate was much lower (61.6%) in comparison with 
the average of accuracy rate of the rest of BNS-participants (97.3%). When the data of 
this participant was excluded, the mean score increased to 52.56 (SD = 1.74). The data 
of this participant was excluded from further analysis. 
Next, independent t-test was conducted to compare the performance in LCT 
between participants who had taken part in the initial test (the experiment group) and 
those who had not taken part (the control group). The results revealed that the 
experiment group of JP-participants (n = 25) had higher accuracy (M = 39.36, SE = 
1.04) than the control group (n = 6) of JP-participants (M = 35.50, SE = 2.17). This 
difference, 3.86, BCa 95% CI [-0.414, 8.707] was not significant t (29) = 1.632, p 
= .114, r = .08. The same trend was found in the case of NS-participants: the experiment 
group (n = 9) had higher accuracy (M = 41.78, SE = 1.44) than the control group (n = 9) 
(M = 39.67, SE = 1.19). The difference, -2.11, BCa 95% CI [-2.846, -1.370] was not 
significant t (22) = -1.111, p = .280, r = .05. The results suggested that task 
performances in LCT were not undesirably affected by the conditions whether or not 
participants took part in initial test. 
Listening comprehension test (LCT): 
The results of ‘memory’ task question are reported first. The results of descriptive 
analysis showed that in overall terms JP-participants remembered the contents of the 
stories correctly at 85.3% of the time under conditions of immediate location variable, 
whereas BNS-participants remembered them correctly at 85.2% of the time. Under 
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conditions of distant location variable, JP-participants remembered the contents of the 
stories at 81.7% of the time whereas BNS-participants remembered them at 84.3%. 
Accuracy rate was also analysed between-group variable using Mann-Whitney test. This 
indicates that JP-participants understood the context of a given story as much as BNS- 
participants, and suggests that their responses to other two questions do not seem to be 
based on limited understanding. 
Both ‘attitude’ question and ‘interpretation’ question were designed to look into 
participants’ preference for potentially ironical interpretation under each condition. The 
data of JP-participants were compared with those of BNS-participants in order to 
explore if any similarities between two participant-groups could be found in response 
trend. 
Descriptive statistics of frequencies revealed the proportion of participants who 
preferred ironical interpretation under each condition (Figure 5.9). The proportion was 
based on the data of participants whose response to ‘memory’ question was correct. The 
left plot shows the ratio under each condition of immediate echoing variable in which 
the target utterance appeared just after the echoing source, and the right plot shows the 
one under each condition of distant echoing variable in which the source that the target 
utterance echoes was distant. 
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Figure 5- 9: The proportion of preference for ironical interpretation 
As is shown, JP-participant group’s frequency of each condition of immediate echoing 
variable distributed in similar fashion as BNS-participant group. Both JP-participants 
(88.9%) and BNS-participants (87.5%) favoured ironical interpretation most under IDI. 
On the other hand, ironical interpretation was least favoured under CBI by both JP- 
participants (9.3%) and NS-participants (6.8%). A slightly different trend between the 
two groups was found under some conditions of distant location variable. While JP- 
participants favoured ironical interpretation most under IDD (84.8%), BNS-participants 
favoured them most under IBD (84.1%). Both groups favoured ironical interpretation 
least under CBD, but much greater number of JP-participants (19.6%) favoured them 
more than BNS-participants (6.3%). 
Next, a mixed-design ANOVA was performed to see main effects of participant- 
group, tone of voice and context relation, and interaction effects across tone, context 
relation and participant-groups. The effects were analysed based on means of opting for 
ironical interpretation. All effects are reported as significant level at p < .05 unless 
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otherwise stated. The effects of degree of echoing (immediate location and distant 
location) were analysed separately. 
The main effect of participant-group on preference for ironical interpretation was 
not found statistically significant under conditions of immediate location variable in 
total, F (1,53) = .61, p = .437, r = .08, and also those of distant location variable in total, 
F (1,53) = 2.47, p = .122, r = .15. On the other hand, the main effects of tone of voice 
were found statistically significant representing considerable sized effects: under 
conditions of immediate location variable in total, F (2, 106) = 27.90, r = .46, and under 
conditions of distant location variable in total, F (2, 106) = 6.73, p < .05, r = .34. The 
main effect of context relation was also found significant representing large-sized 
effects: under conditions of immediate location variable in total, F (2, 106) = 78.17, r 
= .65, and under conditions of distant location variable in total, F (2, 106) = 75.87, r 
= .65. These results indicate that potentially ironical interpretations are affected 
depending on the tone with which the target utterance was spoken or the relation 
between the context and the proposition literally expressed by target utterance. 
However, when these main effects of tone and context relation were compared by 
between-group variables, these effects disappeared. The main effects of tone showed no 
significant difference between JP-participants and BNS-participants: under conditions 
of immediate location variable in total, F (2, 106) = 2.68, p = .073, r = .16, and under 
conditions of distant location variable in total, F (2, 106) = .77, p = .466, r = .08. The 
main effects of the context relation also had similar effects on interpretations of JP-
participants and that of BNS-participants: under conditions of immediate location 
variable in total, F (2, 106) = .02, p = .983, r = .01, and under conditions of distant 
location variable in total, F (2, 106) = 1.78, p = .174, r = .13. This indicates that 
although the speaker’s tone and the context have certain effects on potentially ironical 
interpretation, interpretations of JP- participants were affected by these two variables 
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independently or not independently in similar ways to those of BNS-participants. The 
result of a mixed ANOVA test also revealed that when tone variable by context relation 
variable interaction effects were analysed by between-group variable, no significant 
difference was found between two participant groups: under conditions of immediate 
location variable in total, F (4, 212) = .43, p = .789, r = .04, and under conditions of 
distant location variable in total, F (4, 212) = .60, p = .665, r = .05. 
Next, the main effect of each independent variable was analysed within-subject 
variable comparing three levels with each other. The results of comparisons across the 
three levels of tone under conditions of immediate location variable revealed that 
deadpan tone led to ironical interpretation more strongly than both exaggerated tone, F 
(1, 53) = 9.88, p < .05, r = .40, and basic tone, F (1, 53) = 65.49, p < .05, r = .74. Both 
contrasts yielded large- to massive-sized effect, which highlights that preference for 
ironical interpretation were strongly affected by tone. The effects of exaggerated tone 
were significantly higher than basic tone, F (1, 53) = 16.68, p < .05, r = .49, 
representing large effect size. On the other hand, contrasts across levels of tone under 
conditions of distant location variable revealed slightly different patterns to those found 
under those of immediate location variable. Ironical interpretation ratings were not 
significantly different between deadpan tone and exaggerated tone, F (1, 53) = .11, p 
= .74, r = .05; however, this contrast represented large-sized effect. Contrast between 
basic tone with other two types showed that when basic tone was used, ironical 
interpretation ratings were lower than deadpan tone, F (1, 53) = 12.55, p = .001, r = .44 
and exaggerated tone, F (1, 53) = 9.29, p < .05, r = .39, both contrasts yielded medium- 
to large-sized effects. However, there was no statistic difference between the effect of 
deadpan tone and that of exaggerated tone, F (1, 53) = .11, p = .74, r = .05. These 
results indicate that the effect of each tone on potentially ironical interpretation varies: 
(when other two variables context relation and participant-group were ignored), the 
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effect of deadpan was strongest among three types and that of basic tone was weakest. 
The effect of exaggerated came in the middle. 
Next, the main effects of the three level of tone were analysed between JP- 
participants and BNS-participants. From the result of a mixed ANOVA, a significant 
difference was found only a contrast between exaggerated tone and basic tone under 
conditions of immediate location variable, F (1, 53) = 5.11, p < .05, r = .30, 
representing medium-sized effect. Any of other contrast did not reach at significant 
level. 
The main effects of context relation variable were also analysed both within group 
variable and between group variable comparing the three levels of context relation with 
each other. First it reports the results of within group variable. The results of 
comparisons across the three levels of context relation under conditions of immediate 
location variable revealed that ironical interpretation were more favoured when context 
type was inconsistent than both consistent context, F (1, 53) = 129.84, p < .05, r = .84, 
and neutral context, F (1, 53) = 59.04, p < .05, r = .73. Both comparisons yielded 
massive effect sizes. At the same time, ironical interpretation ratings under neutral 
context conditions were significantly higher than consistent context conditions, F (1, 
53) = 30.53, p < .05, r = .60, yielding massive-sized effect. The results of the same 
contrast but under conditions of distant location variable showed the same patterns as 
those of immediate echoing conditions. Ironical interpretation was more favoured when 
context type was inconsistent than consistent context, F (1, 53) = 143.30, p < .05, r 
= .85, or than neutral context, F (1, 53) = 50.86, p < .05, r = .70. Both comparisons 
represented massive-seized effect. Ironical interpretation ratings under neutral context 
conditions were significantly higher than consistent context conditions, F (1, 53) = 
29.16, p < .05, r = .60 yielding massive-sized effect. Those results indicate that ironical 
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interpretation was favoured more in the order of inconsistent context relation, neutral 
context relation and consistent context relation. 
Next, it reports the results of between-group variable. The results of a mixed 
ANOVA test revealed that no significant difference between JP-participants and BNS- 
participants was found in any contrasts of the effect of each level of context relation. 
The same reading was obtained in the results of non-parametric test, Friedman’s test. 
Next, tone by context relation interaction effects were analysed within-subject 
variables. The effects of any interactions of tone by context relation were not significant 
when consistent context was compared with either inconsistent context or neutral 
context. The results revealed that the IDI condition (interaction of inconsistent context, 
deadpan tone, and immediate location) led to potentially ironical interpretation 
significantly stronger than the NBI condition (neutral context, basic tone and immediate 
location), F (1, 53) = 12.03, p < .05, r = .43. It is also revealed that the IDD condition 
(interaction of inconsistent context, deadpan tone, and distant location) led to potentially 
ironical interpretation significantly stronger than the NBD condition (neutral context, 
basic tone and distant location), F (1, 53) = 7.64, p < .05, r = .35. This suggests that 
participants considered both tone and context relation for irony level ratings. 
To break down those interaction effects, the interaction effects were analysed 
between-group variable. Figure 5-10 illustrates each group’s mean scores of each 
interaction. The top two plots display the mean scores under each condition of 
immediate location variable. The top left plot displays the mean scores of JP-
participants, and the top right one displays those of BNS-participants. The bottom two 
plots display the mean scores under each condition of distant location variable. The 
bottom left plot displays the mean scores of JP-participants, and the bottom right one 
displays those of BNS-participants. At a glance, similarities in a tendency towards 
ironical interpretation between two groups are visible under almost all conditions: 
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regardless of types of tone both participant-groups favoured ironical interpretation when 
the context was inconsistent to the proposition literally expressed by the target utterance 
and ironical interpretation was least favoured when the context was consistent to the 
proposition literally expressed by the target utterance.  
Figure 5- 10: Mean scores of interaction between tone, context relation and participant- group 
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Mann-Whitney test was conducted to compare mean scores of JP-participants with 
those of BNS-participants. A statistically significant difference between these two 
participant-groups was found only in the CBD condition (consistent context relation, 
basic tone, distant location). JP participants (Mean rank = 31.21, Mdn = .00, SE = .72) 
favoured ironical interpretation more strongly than BNS participants (Mean rank = 
23.85, Mdn = .00, SE = .45) when the target utterance with distant echoing location in 
consistent context relation was spoken in basic tone, U = 471.50, z = 2.275, p < .05, r 
= .31. In other conditions, no effect was found. However, as it was shown in Figure 5-
10, different trends were visible in the effects of exaggerated tone and its comparison 
with deadpan tone. While the effect of exaggerated tone and the effect of deadpan tone 
on ratings for ironical interpretation of BNS-participants were not much different under 
conditions of both immediate location and distant location variables, a difference in 
mean scores of JP-participants between these two types of tone looks greater than a 
difference in those of BNS-participants. Non-parametric test was performed in order to 
back up this observation. The result of Wilcoxon test revealed that for JP-participants, 
the effect of deadpan tone (Mdn = 2.00) on ironical interpretation was significantly 
stronger than that of exaggerated tone (Mdn = 2.00) under inconsistent context 
condition of immediate location variable, T = 5.44, p = .02, r = .32. The effect of 
deadpan tone (Mdn = 1.00) under consistent context condition of immediate location 
variable was also significantly stronger than that of exaggerated tone (Mdn = .00), T = 
4.77, p = .03, r = - .31. For BNS-participants, no significant difference was found in 
comparisons between deadpan tone and exaggerated tone. The result of Wilcoxon test 
also revealed that the effect of exaggerated tone and that of basic tone on BNS-
participants’ responses were significantly different. For BNS-participants, the effect of 
exaggerated tone (Mdn = 2.00) on ironical interpretation was significantly stronger than 
that of basic tone (Mdn = 2.00) under neutral context condition of immediate location 
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variable, T = 11.00, p = .006, r = .56. The effect of exaggerated tone (Mdn = .00) under 
consistent context conditions of distant location variable was also significantly stronger 
than that of basic tone (Mdn = .00), T = 7.50, p = .02, r = - .37. Under neutral context 
conditions of distant location variable, the effect of exaggerated tone (Mdn = 2.00) was 
also significantly stronger than that of basic tone (Mdn = .00), T = 46.00, p = .02, r = 
- .46. For JP-participants, no significant difference was found in any comparisons 
between exaggerated tone and basic tone. This indicates that deadpan tone led JP-
participants toward ironical interpretation more strongly than exaggerated tone whereas 
for BNS-participants the effects of these two types of tone were similar. It also indicates 
that exaggerated tone of voice led JP-participants toward ironical interpretation more 
strongly than BNS-participants. 
Next, the effects of degree of echoing variable were analysed within-group variable 
using Wilcoxon test. The results revealed that JP-participants’ response trend to ironical 
interpretation did not significantly differ depending on location of echoing source 
(degree of echoing) under any conditions. Effect sizes (r) represented by comparisons of 
each condition between immediate location and distant location were between small and 
medium sized, which suggests that variance is under 10%. For BNS-participants, 
response trends in preference for ironical was not affected by this variable either under 
any conditions, and effect size of each comparison represent very small-sized effect, 
which suggests that variance could be ignored. 
5.5.5 Discussion 
Experiment 2 was conducted to investigate a research question (RQ2) about to what 
extent the interaction of tone of voice with context relation (relation between the context 
of a story and the proposition literally expressed in a target utterance) guides Japanese 
speakers to potentially ironic interpretation in the same way as native speakers. The 
results confirmed that JP-participants could perceive and respond to prosodic cues in 
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English. They also confirmed that similar effects of each of three variables on 
potentially ironical interpretation were found between JP-participants BNS-participants. 
Significant main effect of tone on ironical interpretations was observed. This result 
is in line with some experimental studies (Ackerman 1983; Bryant and Fox Tree 2002; 
Creusere 1999: Nakassis and Snedeker 2002; Rockwell 2000; Woodland and Voyer 
2011) showing that the speaker’s tone of voice plays a fairly important role in 
understanding of the speaker’s intention and attitude. Both JP-participants and BNS- 
participants showed similar trend that basic tone gave rise to potentially ironical 
interpretation less strongly. What was not predicted was that the ironic interpretation of 
JP-participants was affected slightly more strongly than those of BNS-participants by 
deadpan tone. Although the effect of deadpan tone on the interpretation of BNS- 
participants was evident, as the results showed, for BNS-participants the effect of 
exaggerated tone was almost equally as strong as deadpan tone. A difference between 
the effects of exaggerated tone and deadpan tone was marginal for BNS-participants. 
On the other hand, the effects of exaggerated tone and basic tone was marginal for JP- 
participants. As predicted, a different trend was found in interaction of exaggerated tone 
with inconsistent context relation, and in interaction of exaggerated tone with neutral 
context relation. Exaggerated tone did not guide JP-participants to potentially ironical 
interpretation as strongly as BNS-participants. This suggests that the ironic 
interpretations of JP-participants were affected less strongly than those of BNS- 
participants by exaggerated tone. As discussed in chapter 2, different prosodic features 
correspond to the same label of prosodic contour. The best example is that the label 
‘ironic tone of voice’ has been used without consistency of phonetic features (Bryant 
and Fox 2005). Using the same label, its prosodic features are left alone to individual 
experimenter (Wilson 2014:10). In the literature, ‘deadpan’ tone is assumed to be 
associated with the speaker’s attitude of “derogatory,” “blame,” or “sneer,” whereas 
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‘exaggerated’ tone is assumed to be associated with attitude of ‘mockery’ or ‘pretense’ 
(Anolli, Ciceri, and Infantino 2002; Clark and Gerrig 1984; Laval and Bert-Erboul 
2005; Rockwell 2000; Sperber 1984; Wilson 2013, 2014). The present study used both 
‘deadpan’ tone and ‘exaggerated’ tone in 18 different contexts in a counterbalanced 
way. This means that there is no systematic relation between the context of the stories in 
the material and the strength of ‘exaggerated tone’ as a predictor for potentially ironical 
interpretation. In other words, it is hard to suggest that an ‘exaggerated tone’ is 
associated with particular attitudes while a ‘deadpan’ tone is not. What the present study 
can suggest from these findings is that the ironic speaker’s dissociative attitude towards 
an attributed thought can be expressed by two different types of tone, which is in line 
with the suggestion made by Bryant and Fox Tree (2005) that there is no one particular 
‘ironic tone of voice.’ This finding also provides evidence for Wilson’s assumption that 
‘irony may be conveyed by two slightly different routes (2014:11)’. A question of 
whether these two types of tone are linked to different mechanisms or whether this is a 
reflection of gradual nature of irony needs to be explored further in future research. 
Then, why for JP-participants, exaggerated tone is weaker indicator for ironical 
interpretation? The present study has found no adequate explanation. It may be possible 
that JP-participants took this tone as associated with the speaker’s overjoyed emotion or 
friendly and polite attitude toward the others, which both are common in Japanese 
society. It may be also possible that JP-participants as second language learners had 
been taught English intonation in an over stressed way in a classroom. When teaching 
new words to foreign students, EFL teachers tend to pronounce these words slightly 
stronger than usual in order to stress correct phonetic features of vowels and syllables. 
Even if this difference was contributed to either way, it appears to be difficult to show 
any conclusive evidence only from the results of this experiment. Future research needs 
to explore these possibilities further.  
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Furthermore, the main effects of context relation on ironical interpretation were 
clearly evident. Both participant-groups showed a tendency to prefer potentially ironic 
interpretation under inconsistent relation conditions where the context of the story and 
the proposition literally expressed by literal contents of the target utterance generates a 
discrepancy, but they did not when a discrepancy was missing (consistent context 
relation). This result parallels with most major theories of irony (Clark and Gerrig 1984; 
Kreuz and Glucksberg1989; Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg, and Brown 1995; Sperber 
and Wilson, 1995, 1998, 2006; Wilson and Sperber, 1992, 2012, 2013) and 
experimental studies (Colston 2001, 2002, 2007; Colston and O'Brien 2000a, 2000b; 
Gerrig and Goldvarg 2000; Ivanko and Pexman 2003; Kreuz, R. J. 1996). 
The hypothesis that JP-participants would be more affected by manipulation of tone 
of voice was not confirmed. The present study hypothesised that due to overloading 
processing demands Japanese speakers may have some difficulties with eliminating an 
assumption based on information from the speaker’s tone when it contradicts an 
assumption based on contextual information. However, against this hypothesis that for 
JP-participants the effect of tone would override the effect of contextual discrepancy, 
the results showed that regardless of tone of voice just as BNS-participants JP- 
participants had a tendency to interpret a given utterance ironically as long as contextual 
discrepancy exists. This indicates that both Japanese speakers and native speakers 
consider the speaker’s tone of voice and context relation when they construct and select 
the intended assumption. 
The effects of degree of echoing on interpretation were found to be small. Extra 
processing load did not seem to affect either JP-participants or BNS-participants. 
However, this finding is partial. Since there was no data of processing speed, the present 
study cannot speak of its effect. The effects of processing load on non-native speakers’ 
interpretation processes of potentially ironical utterances should also be investigated. 
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Apart from the effects of processing speed, the present study provides significant 
and new insight on L2 irony understanding. Experimental work of the present study was 
conducted within theoretical framework of cognitive-oriented relevance-theoretic 
account of irony. It found that Japanese speakers can recognise the ironic speaker’s 
attitude in similar ways to native speakers. This finding indicates that recognition of 
other’s attitude from prosody seems universal, hence relevance-theoretic pragmatic 
principles would be likely taken as universal. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter reported experimental work of the present study. Two experiments were 
conducted within a theoretical framework of the echoic account of irony. These 
experiments did not look into response accuracy in choosing the same interpretation as 
native speakers. Instead they looking into similarities of response trend in preference to 
ironical interpretation, have explored 1) to what extent Japanese speakers understand the 
ironic speaker’s attitude, 2) to what extent the speaker’s tone of voice affects the way 
ironical utterances are interpreted. The results suggested a conclusion different to the 
main claims suggested in previous experimental studies and gave new insights to the 
study on comprehension of L2 irony. Japanese speakers demonstrated a similar way of 
understanding the speaker’s attitude expressed by ironical utterances, which makes it 
seem unrealistic to suggest that non-native speakers have difficulties with ironical 
interpretation. The results of Experiment 2 suggested that Japanese speakers’ response 
trend in preference for potentially ironical interpretation was similar to those of native 
speakers of British English. Similar effects of tone of voice by context relation 
interaction suggested that both Japanese speakers and native speakers of British English 
consider context and prosody when they infer the speaker’s meaning in ironical 
utterances. However, while statistical tests revealed that the difference between 
Japanese speaker and native speakers of British English was not statistically significant, 
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Japanese speakers appeared to react to exaggerated tone of voice slightly different way 
compared to native speakers of British English. Chapter 6 pointing to some limitations 
of the present study discusses findings from two experiments and outline implications 
for future research. 
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CHAPTER 6 GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Overview 
This chapter summarises the discussion above, presents again the main conclusions, 
outlines some limitations of the findings discussed here and suggests possible future 
research. The summary and main conclusions are in section 6.2. Limitations of this 
study are in section 6.3 followed by the ideas for future research in section 6.4. 
6.2 Summary 
This study explored the extent to which Japanese speakers of English understand 
potentially ironical utterances in a similar way to native speakers (here of British 
English). It pointed out problems with the theoretical frameworks (mainly based on 
Gricean/’classical’ accounts) adopted by much of the previous research in this area and 
adopted instead the more fully developed relevance-theoretic framework. It also 
identified further methodological issues with previous studies and developed a new 
approach applied in two experiments. The first experiment contradicted previous 
assumptions in suggesting that Japanese speakers can respond to potentially ironic 
utterances in similar ways to native speakers. The second experiment found that they 
can both perceive and respond to prosodic cues in English in a similar way to native 
speakers. There are some limitations to the findings of the experimental work but they 
suggested interesting new lines of research on the details of how Japanese speakers 
respond to prosodic cues, as well as further theoretical, and pedagogical, implications. 
The starting point for this work was the general assumption that second language 
speakers appear to struggle with second language irony and the specific assumption that 
Japanese speakers appear to struggle with irony in English. It began, in chapter 2, by 
presenting the echoic account of irony (Sperber 1984; Wilson 2006, 2009, 2013, 2014; 
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Wilson and Sperber 1989, 2012), developed within relevance theory (Clark 2013; 
Sperber and Wilson 1995, 2005: Wilson 2014; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2012). It 
compared this approach to the Gricean approach (Grice 1975, 1978), which treated 
irony in a similar way to the classical/traditional view in assuming that irony involves 
communicating ‘the opposite’ of what speakers seem to be saying. The echoic account 
rejects this central claim and offers a fuller explanation of the range of ways in which 
irony occurs and is used. It claims instead that irony is a vehicle for expressing the 
speaker’s attitude. It is an echoic use of language which serves to show that the speaker 
intends to express her dissociative attitude or reaction to an attributed thought or 
utterance (Wilson 2013: 46). Irony is not seen as a clearly definable natural kind 
(Wilson 2006:1732) and interpretations are seen as more or less ironic depending on the 
extent to which the speaker can be taken to be implicitly attributing a thought or 
utterance and implicitly dissociating herself from that thought or utterance. No 
substitution mechanism is required for ironic interpretation: an audience applies the 
‘relevance-guided comprehension heuristic’ proposed by relevance theory to construct 
and evaluate hypotheses about the speaker’s meaning. Taking a path of least effort, a 
hearer arrives at an interpretation that satisfies his expectations of relevance (Sperber 
and Wilson 2005:360). Naturally, these features of the echoic account have implications 
for work on understanding irony in L2. Given the indefinable nature of irony as 
language use (i.e. that we cannot always definitively say whether an interpretation 
counts as a case of irony or not), investigations cannot be designed on the assumption 
that there is a definitive answer to the question of whether an utterance is intended to be 
taken as ironic. From this point of view, this study argued that it was problematic for 
earlier experimental studies to assume that there is a ‘correct’ interpretation of a given 
utterance with regard to its potential as ironic. Implications from the relevance-theoretic 
account guided the empirical work of the present study to consider instead the extent to 
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which second language speakers’ responses are similar or different to those of first 
language speakers with regard to potentially ironic utterances. 
Chapter 3 considered previous research specifically on how non-native speakers 
interpret ironical utterances. It pointed out some theoretical and methodological 
problems with work conducted within a theoretical framework based on the Gricean 
account (by Bouton 1988, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999, Lee 2002, 
Manowong 2011, Yamanaka 2003). The main problems included: a) problems that stem 
from the adoption of generally Gricean/classical assumptions about irony; b) problems 
with how these previous studies understood the term ‘implicature’; c) problems with 
their assumption that native speakers always or typically interpret ironical utterances 
‘correctly’ and in the same way; d) problems with how they assessed whether non- 
native speakers interpret ironical utterances in the same way as native speakers (when in 
fact native speakers did not always make the same assumptions with regard to whether a 
given utterance was intended as ironic; e) problems with their assumption that 
‘difference’ or ‘deviation’ from native speakers’ language behaviour represents ‘failure’ 
or ‘inability’ of non-native speakers; f) problems with their assumption that non-native 
speakers and native speakers need to mutually share perceptions about representations 
of the world for successful communication. While this discussion cast doubt on many 
conclusions suggested by previous research, nevertheless their work did confirm 
differences between first and second language speakers in responding to the same 
stimuli, i.e. the critical discussion of previous work developed here did not cast doubt 
on the general assumption that second language speakers often respond differently from 
first language speakers to potentially ironic utterances. 
Chapter 4 looked more closely at some possible explanations for differences 
between native and non-native speakers. First, it considered the assumption made by 
many previous researchers that ‘cultural differences’ were responsible for different 
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interpretations. It is, of course, not helpful to refer to cultural differences as a potential 
explanation without saying something about the nature of those differences. This thesis 
did not aim to develop an account of how cultural differences affect non-native 
speakers’ understanding of language behaviour in a second language. However, it did 
discuss how cultural differences could be seen to play a role within a relevance- 
theoretic approach. The discussion focused on how the construction and access of 
contextual assumptions during interpretation is affected by ‘culture’. It addressed the 
question of the extent to which non-native speakers and native speaker need to mutually 
share cultural assumptions or representation of the world. It considered the notion of 
‘mutual manifestness developed by Sperber and Wilson (1995) in accounting for 
varying access to particular assumptions. A notion developed within relevance theory 
which can play a key role is the notion of ‘mutual manifestness (Sperber and Wilson 
1986), which is less strong than the notion of ‘mutual knowledge’ which runs into a 
number of problems, including the often-discussed problem of ‘infinite regress’ needed 
to establish that it exists (see discussion in Sperber and Wilson 1995, chapter1, section 
3, section 5; Smith 1982:62-63). A crucial difference in considering the role of cultural 
assumptions is that assuming ‘mutual knowledge’ of these would require cultural 
assumptions to be fully shared by members of particular cultural groups and for all 
parties in a communicative act to mutually know that others share the same 
assumptions. By contrast, assumptions can be mutually manifest to varying degrees and 
individual assumptions do not even need to be entertained at a specific time in order be 
mutually manifest. This weaker notion more accurately reflects some of the varying 
ways in which cultural assumptions can affect communication. Further, this account 
allows for membership of cultural groups to shape one’s contextual assumptions 
without individuals necessarily being aware of this, and for some assumptions to be 
affected by membership of a cultural group while still being individual or 
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‘idiosyncratic’. The key question about cultural assumptions is not a straightforward 
question of whether two or more individuals share the same assumptions but a more 
complex question about the extent to which the sets of assumptions manifest to more 
than one individual are similar and about the possibility of particular assumptions being 
or becoming mutually manifest during communication. Communication depends on 
what is or can become mutually manifest rather than presupposing what is fully shared. 
The chapter then considered two factors which have been mentioned in previous 
studies but never fully explored: the effects of paralinguistic cues, in particular prosodic 
cues, and the effects of processing load. A survey of studies on the universality of 
prosodic effects in the recognition of emotion and on the (more limited) capacity of 
working memory available to second language speakers helped to direct the design and 
execution of the experimental work presented in chapter 5. Previous research suggested 
or assumed that speakers can express emotion or attitudes by varying prosodic features 
(i.e. pitch, loudness, voice quality, and/or speed) and that hearers make inferences about 
the speaker’s emotion or attitudes by paying attention to such prosodic attributes 
(Paulmann and Uskul 2014:237). Many studies suggest that such ‘inference rules’ in the 
use and recognition of prosody in the showing and inferring of emotion are universal 
(Bachorowski 1999; Elfenbein and Ambady 2002a; Pell, Monetta, Paulmann and Kotz 
2009; Paulmann and Uskul 2014; Paulmann, and Kotz 2009; Scherer 1986, 1997; 
Scherer and Wallbott 1994; Scherer, Banse and Wallbott 2001; Scherer, Banse, 
Wallbott, and Goldbeck 1991; Thompson and Balkwill 2006). At the same time, many 
studies suggest an ‘in-group advantage’ where particular basic emotions are recognised 
slightly better when emotions are both expressed and perceived by members of the same 
cultural group (Elfenbein and Ambady 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b; Paulmann and 
Uskul 2014; Pell, Monetta, Paulmann and Kotz, 2009; Scherer et al., 2001; Scherer and 
Wallbott 1994; Thompson and Balkwill, 2006). These suggestions gave the present 
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study a rationale to investigate whether such universal ‘inference rules’ and a similar 
‘in-group advantage’ also applied to the case of second language speakers’ 
understanding of irony in a second language. Findings from these studies were based on 
stimuli that were either taken out of context or created in pseudo utterances 
(meaningless utterances). This suggested that it would be useful to explore whether 
similar tendencies with regard to the recognition of vocally expressed emotion would be 
found when stimuli allowed for the potential of the effects of context. 
This chapter also considered the possible effects of processing load and the capacity 
of working memory, i.e. how much information can be processed at a specific time 
(Call 1985; Cook and Liddicoat 2002; Taguchi 2008b). Less automatic processing of 
linguistic inputs in a second language means that processing imposes greater cognitive 
demands on second language speakers (Hoover and Dwivedi 1998; Kormos and Sáfár 
2008; Poelmans 2003; Randall 2007), and this in turn means that less working memory 
capacity is available for higher-order processing such as processing information from 
multiple non-linguistic sources (Daneman and Merikle 1996; Juffs and Harrington 
2011; Linck et al. 2013; Link and Weiss 2015). The higher language proficiency 
develops, the more working memory capacity becomes available. Given this 
relationship between the development of L2 proficiency and the capacity of working 
memory in general and ‘the central executive’ component in particular is robust, 
individual differences in the capacity of working memory may be more evident between 
first language speakers and second speakers. While the growth of language proficiency 
facilitated the ability to understand implicature in a second language, previous studies 
(Bouton 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1999; Yamanaka 2003) did not find any effect on L2 
irony interpretation. The present study did not consider the effects of language 
proficiency, per se, but it assumed that individual differences in the capacity of working 
memory would follow from differences in proficiency level, potentially affecting the 
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interpretation processes of ironical utterances. These assumptions guided the design of 
the present study to investigate the effects of prosody in the presence of specific 
contextual clues. Assuming that processes of accessing information from a range of 
different sources need to be automatically executed to construct contextual assumptions, 
if the manipulation of prosodic information constrains second language speakers’ 
processing load, individual differences in the capacity of working memory between first 
language speakers and second speakers could also be a factor leading to different 
interpretations. 
In the light of theoretical discussion in the preceding chapters, the empirical work 
of the present study explored the extent to which Japanese speaker participants 
understood English ironical utterances in a similar way to native speaker participants. I 
carried out and reported two experiments: Experiment 1 involved self-paced reading 
irony comprehension and Experiment 2 involved real-time listening irony 
comprehension. The present study offers a new perspective on how second language 
speakers understand irony in a second language. The primary findings are: 
(1) that Japanese speakers of English can respond to potentially ironic 
utterances in similar ways to native speakers; 
(2) that Japanese speakers of English can both perceive and respond to 
prosodic cues in English; 
(3) that prosodic cues affect the interpretations of Japanese speakers of 
English in similar ways to how they affect the interpretations of native 
speakers; 
(4) that the interpretations of Japanese speakers of English are may be 
affected less strongly by ‘exaggerated’ prosody and more strongly by 
‘deadpan’ prosody than those of native speakers; 
(5) that Japanese speakers of English respond to the interplay between tone 
of voice and context in similar ways to native speakers. 
These findings refute some of the suggestions of previous studies (Bouton 1988, 1990, 
1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999; Bromberek-Dyzman and Ewer 2010; Lee 
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2002; Manowong 2011; Shively et al. 2008; Yamanaka 2003). Just like native speakers, 
the Japanese participants in this study were able to recognise the speaker’s attitude as 
implicitly attributive and as implicitly dissociative, in understanding a range of 
potentially ironical utterances. Further, the amount of confusion over various ways of 
interpreting the interaction of tone and context appeared to be similar for Japanese 
speakers and native speakers. Adopting an idea from ‘dialect theory’ (Tomkins and 
McCarter 1964:127 adopted from Elfenbein and Ambady 2003a:162) that is that just as 
dialects of a language which differs in accent, vocabulary, and grammar, the 
universality of the recognition of emotion have dialects which differ subtly from each 
other, this thesis suggests that, while prosody affects the interpretation of ironical 
utterances in similar ways for Japanese speakers and English speakers, differences in 
the effects of ‘exaggerated’ contour between English speakers and Japanese speakers 
might share properties of variation among ‘dialects.’ The manipulation of the interplay 
of these two variables did not affect Japanese speakers’ interpretation processes 
significantly differently. Japanese speakers and native speakers responded to 
manipulation of these variables in a highly similar fashion. Increasing processing effort 
by manipulating the nature of echoing (i.e. whether the echoed source comes from an 
immediate or distant location) did not affect Japanese speakers’ interpretation processes 
more strongly than those of native speakers. Experiment 2 revealed no significant 
patterned differences between the responses of Japanese speakers and native speakers. It 
is possible that data provided by a measure of processing speed (reaction time) would 
have given a better indication of this and so this is a possible line of further 
investigation.91 
																																								 																				
91As mentioned in footnote 90, the results regarding reaction time are added into the appendix. See Appendix G 
for the details. 
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To sum up, this study suggests the possibility that non-native speakers’ ways of 
understanding potentially ironic utterances are not significantly different from those of 
native speakers.	
6.3 Limitations of the experimental work 
This section discusses some limitations of the experimental work reported here and 
considers some of the conclusions we can draw with more or less confidence. 
There were a number of methodological difficulties to negotiate in designing the 
experiments reported here and several limitations which follow from the nature of the 
experimental design. One of the shortcomings of Experiment 1 is that the survey did not 
include any trials with fillers (distractors) in the material. It seems highly likely that 
participants may have been unnecessarily alerted to the purpose of the survey (i.e. the 
potential for ironical interpretations) towards the end of the survey. For future research, 
such a risk (i.e. response biases) should be avoided by adding more test items (fillers), 
so that the measurement would be more reliable. The design of similar investigations in 
the future should take this into account. Another is that the comparison between 
Japanese speakers and native speaker participants was performed only in tacit remark 
conditions. There was an artefact of allocating participants equally into groups 
associated with two different testing conditions. A procedure was designed to assign 
participants to one set of materials (group A) or the other (group B) depending on their 
response to a neutral question (which computer operating system (OS) are you using to 
complete this survey, Windows or MAC?). However, it turned out that the number of 
participants assigned to both materials was not counterbalanced (no native speaker 
participants were assigned to group B), so that the data from 10 Japanese speakers 
assigned to group B were excluded from further analysis. This resulted in a change of 
the experimental design from repeated measure to independent measure, which limits 
the scope for interpretation of the results. Given that the survey was distributed online, it 
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was not possible to control allocation procedure. The question that determined 
allocation could have been constructed more carefully. A possible solution for this 
would be distributing a survey on a separate occasion using each a set of material 
controlling the number of participants who complete the survey. Although it would be 
not easy to conduct in this way since the final number of participants would be 
unknown from the start. The size of the sample also should be considered. While the 
difference did not reach a significant level, a considerable size effect was found in some 
cases, so that the risk of Type I error could not be reduced. It awaits replication of the 
investigation with bigger size. 
The complexity of the experimental design of Experiment 2 (2 participant-groups x 
3 types tone x 3 types of context relation x 2 types of degree of echoing) led to some 
difficulties with data analysis. There are several factors which need to be taken into 
account in evaluating the findings of the empirical work. Critics might point to issues of 
coherence given that parametric analysis was performed on the scores ranging only 
from 0 to 2 where non-parametric tests would have been more applicable. However, a 
mixed design ANOVA (2 x 3 x 3) was the only option for statistical significance 
analysis to measure the effects of these independent variables in mixed design since 
there is no equivalent non-parametric test. As a solution, a series of nonparametric tests 
using between/within group comparisons (i.e. Mann-Whitney test, Friedman’s ANOVA 
and Wilcoxon test) was performed in parallel with a mixed design ANOVA test in order 
to increase the reliability of the results. As ever, experimental design needs to be 
considered with all due caution. 
In addition, this study looked into response trends in favouring ironic 
interpretations in particular. In the experimental design of Experiment 2, the context 
variable and the tone variable were manipulated against each other. For data analysis, 
the scores that indicated preference of an ironical interpretation under each condition 
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were counted. Although this study did not presuppose that certain conditions would give 
rise to ironical interpretation, there were certain numbers of stimuli that clearly 
indicated otherwise. For example, when a consistent context variable interacted with a 
‘deadpan’ tone variable, the majority of the participants did not favour ironic 
interpretations. Hence, the mean score to be measured for analysis was low. This means 
the mean score of the response trends under such a condition included not only the 
number of participants who indeed favoured an ironic interpretation but also the number 
of participants who may have been unsure and chose this option as a guess. Although 
measuring response trends rather than response error/accuracy was a priority of this 
experiment, a better measurement needs to be considered in future experiments. 
Another drawback is the decision that the present study would not analyse one of the 
other dependent variables, ‘reaction time’. This decision was made on the basis of the 
preliminary results which showed that the number of participants was dramatically 
lowered as a result of removing ‘outlier’ data (reaction time which was shorter than cut- 
off point (a miss) at 2000 milliseconds and long RTs with more than 2 STDEVs away 
from the mean of each individual participant). In consequence, the effects of tone on 
processing speed were not measured, and the effects of processing load on the 
interpretation of potentially ironic utterances by second language speakers has been left 
for future research.92 
Difficulties with research on irony comprehension with regard to methodological 
aspects seem mostly related to its indefinable nature. Experimental design (how and 
what to measure) has been a big challenge for researchers. Due to the nature of irony, 
what should be elicited (i.e. the speaker’s attitude, discrepancy, etc.) varies on a gradual 
scale which makes it difficult to represent each statement in task questions, statements 
																																								 																				
92 As mentioned in footnote 90, the results regarding reaction time are added into the appendix. See Appendix G 
for the details. 
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of choices in multiple-choice question, or descriptors. One of the difficulties the present 
study had was about how to represent the speaker’s attitude. In particular, the speaker’s 
attitude in an ironical utterance covers a range of more or less dissociation shading off 
with no clear cut-off point into cases which would not be consistent with irony. Forced 
choice questions with a response of either YES or NO to the statement describing a 
particular attitude (used in Experiment 2) did not appear to be the best way. In some 
examples, the speaker’s attitude was not appropriately described. Even if it were so, it is 
still difficult to present a subtle difference between particular emotions or attitude (e.g. 
the speaker may not be flabbergasted but upset). A better measurement would be a tick- 
all-applicable task question as used in the study by Shively et al. (2008). However, this 
type of measurement is very difficult to analyse. 
Another difficulty concerns the authenticity of dialogues used in the test examples. 
The examples used in the empirical work in this study were created based on examples 
of verbal irony discussed in research literature and on actual conversation from radio 
shows, newspaper articles and TV programmes. Previous experimental studies on 
second language learners’ pragmatic comprehension abilities used examples from 
similar sources. However, there are problems with each type of source. For examples, 
adopting examples of sarcasm, irony, humour, jokes, cynicism, banter and so on from a 
sitcom TV programme needs to be handled with caution. Usually dialogues from TV 
drama or film are made for some sorts of effects aiming to get the audience to 
understand a certain effect. This may make the test example too obvious and, in turn, 
easier for participants to grasp the idea behind the testing. Ifantidou (2014:40) pointed 
out that in closed-end discourse completion tasks or multiple-choice questions using 
artificial mini-scenarios, the range of pragmatically inferred meanings which may be 
communicated in real-life situation is simplified, restricted and underrepresented. Of 
course, these difficulties do not arise only for the present study. There has been 
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considerable discussion of methods for assessing second language speakers’ pragmatic 
comprehension abilities in the last two decades (see, for example, Kasper and Rose 
2002; Rover 2001, 2005, 2011; Kasper and Dahl 1991; Ifantidou 2013, 2014). There is 
no quick fix to solve these problems. 
Another methodological implication is that it is advisable to adopt psycholinguistic 
techniques in research on the same area. Ren (2013) points out that research on 
interlanguage pragmatics has tended to follow one particular tradition: descriptions of 
language use in L2 learners’ performance rather than investigations of their cognitive 
processes (Robinson 1992: 31). Roberts (2012) suggested the use of online methods in 
which the performance of non-native speakers is assessed in real-time processing. This 
makes sense given that some problems non-native speakers have relate to difficulties in 
accessing relevant knowledge and integrating information from different sources. Felser 
(2005:95) demonstrated how the use of on-line psycholinguistic techniques borrowed 
from areas of psychology could contribute to understanding of aspects of L2 
performance involving language processing. She explained that such techniques enable 
researchers to explore aspects of processing in L2 that are not otherwise open to direct 
observation. Noveck and Sperber (2004, 2007) suggest an experimental pragmatic 
approach to research on the psychology of reasoning. They point out some limitations of 
traditional studies of the psychology of reasoning (in pragmatics and psycholinguistics). 
While theoretical research in the field of pragmatics has been mostly based on 
intuitions, which are kinds of educated guesses, and observational data (Noveck and 
Sperber 2004:12), psycholinguistic experimental approaches often overlook phenomena 
of comparable empirical importance resulting in imbalanced coverage of topics (e.g. 
investigating a topic related to ‘metaphor’ in detail while ignoring cases of ‘irony’ due 
to inattention to work in the discipline of pragmatics (Noveck and Sperber 2004: 14). 
They suggest that both study traditions would have much to gain if they systematically 
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put pragmatic hypotheses to the experimental test while dealing in part with the same 
material at the same level of abstraction (Noveck and Sperber 2004:15). 
From this discussion, it seems that a more integrated framework based on current 
pragmatic theory and using methods borrowed from research in psychology could prove 
useful in guiding future investigations of the understanding of pragmatically inferred 
meanings in general and of irony in particular. 
6.4 Implications for future research 
This section suggests some lines of future research. This study investigated the effects 
of prosodic contours as a first step in exploring the comprehension of potentially ironic 
utterances in a second language. Future research on L2 irony comprehension necessarily 
needs to explore other possible factors and investigate their effects one by one in order 
to account for their effects. This has implications for future research focusing on the 
recognition of prosodic cues, as well as on other factors which contribute to 
explanations of differences between non-native speakers and native speakers. 
This study focused only on Japanese speakers as non-native speakers of English. It 
would be interesting also to compare the effects of prosody on native Japanese 
speakers’ ironic interpretation in English as L2 with those on interpretation in Japanese 
L1 and to compare native English speakers’ ironic interpretation in English as L1 with 
those on interpretation in Japanese as L2, as focused on in work by Bromberek-Dyzman 
and Ewert (2010) and Bromberek-Dyzman et al. (2010) which compared irony in 
English as a second language with irony in Polish as a first language. Investigation 
using different categories would expand the scope of understanding of L2 irony 
comprehension. This study only tested Japanese speakers of English as a sample of non- 
native speakers and native speakers of English as a sample of native speakers of 
English. Testing non-native speakers of English from different cultural groups in 
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comparison with native speakers of English from different English speaking countries 
(e.g. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, etc.) might provide different insights. 
The present study did not explore further the question of whether Japanese 
speakers’ lesser reliance on ‘exaggerated’ tone for ironic interpretation is a cultural or a 
linguistic reflection. While it suggested the possibility that ‘exaggerated’ tone is used in 
EFL classrooms when teachers focus on accurate pronunciation of newly introduced 
words, we do not know definitively whether the difference observed in the present study 
was a reflection of linguistic difference in prosodic feature between Japanese and 
English or whether this has more to do with Japanese culture with regard to expressing 
friendliness or/and politeness towards others in conversation. It would be interesting to 
explore this difference further from a comparative linguistic approach and/or a 
sociopragmatic approach. 
The present experimental study used three types of prosodic contours (‘dead-pan,’ 
‘exaggerated,’ and ‘basic’) with an assumption that both ‘dead-pan’ tone and 
‘exaggerated’ tone have the potential for ironical interpretations. While the results of 
this study have provided evidence that potentially ironical utterances seem to be 
produced not only with the regular ironical tone of voice (‘dead-pan’ tone) but also with 
the overly enthusiastic tone (exaggerated tone), it cannot be suggested from the results 
of the present experimental work that these two types are the only prosodic patterns that 
strongly lead to potentially ironical interpretations. There might be prosodic contours 
which facilitate ironic interpretations other than these two types. Future research could 
benefit from using a greater variety of contours for testing. As discussed, these two 
prosodic contours, ‘deadpan’ and ‘exaggerated’, do not lead only to ironic 
interpretations. A future research aim could also be to explore the effects of these two 
types on the interpretation of other kinds of utterance. 
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There are a number of potential explanations for differences in interpretation 
between native speakers and non-native speakers, involving not only cultural but also 
pragmatic, linguistic or/and cognitive aspects. In addition, a combination of these 
aspects needs to be considered. More studies are definitely needed. As discussed, there 
is a rich literature on relations between working memory capacity and L2 processing 
and outcomes (Daneman and Merikle 1996; Linck et al. 2013). The effects of 
processing load in relation to working memory capacity would be a good start. There 
has been evidence in more recent experimental study (Linck and Weiss 2015) that the 
ability to control cognitive processing demands in L2 might be more closely connected 
to the executive control component of working memory. Given that this component is 
an executive attentional system, another possible cognitive factor affecting 
interpretation processes might be attention allocation (Bialystok 1993; Segalowitz 2003; 
Skehan 1995, 1998; Robinson 2003). 
Inferential abilities are a part of general human cognitive abilities (Taguchi 
2007:328). Mindreading mechanisms are prominent automatic procedures for 
attributing mental states to others in order to explain and predict their behaviour 
(Wilson and Wharton 2006:1565). To my knowledge, only the study by Bromberek- 
Dyzman et al. (2010) has explored the possibility that mindreading abilities which have 
been already developed in one’s first language operate in the processes of utterance 
interpretation in L2. If this possibility is confirmed, this would provide support for the 
idea of ‘the universal pragmatic principle’ (Blum-Kulka 1991; Brown and Levinson 
1987; Gumperz 1982; Kasper and Rose 2002; Leech 1983; Levinson 1983; Mey 1993) 
that ‘specifies the discourse, pragmatic and sociolinguistic competencies that adult 
learners bring to the task of acquiring the pragmatics of an additional language’ (Kasper 
and Rose 2002:308). In the field of interlanguage pragmatics, while investigating which 
speech acts this idea can apply to (Kasper and Rose 2002: 165-166), investigation of 
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‘the universal pragmatic principle’ have not been explored from cognitive perspective. 
If Bromberek-Dyzman et al. (2010) were right to suggest that mindreading abilities 
operate regardless of language, then it seems rational to consider that this ability would 
underlie ‘the universal pragmatic principle.’ This would shed insight into the debate 
about the primacy of pragmatics over grammar (Bardovi-Harlig 1999) and the notion 
that L2 pragmatic ability can be seen as, in a sense, ahead of knowledge of grammar. 
This thesis also suggests one pedagogical implication with regard to second 
language speakers’ recognition of prosody. Chun (2002) points out that neither the use 
of intonation nor its role in communicative competence has received much attention in 
the field of second language acquisition. She suggests that applied linguists have 
overlooked the importance of intonation, referring to Brazil, Coulthard, and Johns 
(1980) who suggest a focus on ‘what is actually done by language rather than what is 
said’ and that ‘language learners are not taught how to use intonation to signal discourse 
strategies’ (adapted from Chun 2002: 295). This thesis suggests that language learners 
would benefit from work aiming to develop awareness of the role prosody plays and 
possibly of differences in the effects of prosodic cues in their own language and the 
target language. 
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APPENDIX 
	
	
Appendix A 
Information sheet, Consent form and Background information questionnaire in ‘Internet 
survey’ 
- Information sheet and consent form 
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- Background information questionnaire 
 
	
(If the answer is ‘YES’ here, the page automatically moves to question 34) 
		
(If the answer is ‘NO’ here, the page automatically moves to question 9) 
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WHEN	
	
SCORE	
	
800	to	less	than	
850	
750	to	less	
than	800	
700	to	less	
than	750	
650	to	less	
than	700	
500	to	less	
than	650	
450	to	less	
than	
380	to	less	
than	
320	to	less	
than	
290	to	less	
than	
200	to	less	
than	500	 450	 380	 320	 290	
	
WHEN	
	
SCORE	
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WHEN	
	
SCORE	
	
295	
	
229	to	less	than	240	
280	to	less	
than	295	
213	to	less	
than	229	
273	to	less	 260	to	less	 240	to	less	
than	280	 	 than	273	 	than	260	
197	to	less	 173	to	less	 140	to	less	
than	213	 	 than	197	 	than	173	
				132	to	less	than	
140	
prefer	not	to	
answer	
	
	
	
WHEN	
	
SCORE	
	
120	
	
89	to	less	than	
117	to	less	
than	120	
80	to	less	than	
112	to	less	
than	117	
71	to	less	than	
105	to	less	
than	112	
61	to	less	than	
95	to	less	
than	105	
50	to	less	than	
95	 89	 80	 71	 61	
40	to	less	than	 30	to	less	than	 20	to	less	than	 10	to	less	
than	
prefer	not	to	
50	 40	 30	 20	 answer	
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WHEN	
	
SCORE	
	
	
 (If the answer is ‘Window’, then the page automatically moves to material A 
group, if the answer is ‘MAC’, then the page automatically moves to material B 
group.) 
 
	
(Before Irony understanding questionnaire) 
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Appendix B 
Example stories and task questions in ‘Internet survey’ 
1. [another drink] 
Susan and Ben were drinking in a pub. Susan had noticed that Ben was already quite drunk. He 
had been drinking more than usual and he had become repetitious. When Ben stood up to order 
another, Susan shook her head and gave him a warning look. She said to him, 
(explicit) ‘I don’t think you should drink anymore.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think Ben was drunk? 
Q2. To what extent do you think Susan was worried about Ben?  
Q3. To what extent do you think Susan meant what she said? 
2. [shop assistant] 
Erica remembered she had to get some food for tomorrow morning. She ran to her local 
supermarket as fast as possible. When she got there, it was just before closing time, but the shop 
assistant refused to let her come in. When she came back empty-handed, she said to her 
husband, 
(tacit) ‘The shop assistant very helpfully shut the door right in my face.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think Erica managed to get what she wanted?  
Q2. To what extent do you think Erica was annoyed? 
Q3. To what extent do you think Erica meant what she said? 
3. [pizza] 
Fiona and Anna ordered pizza for dinner. It was delicious. When they finished, their flat mate 
Joe came back. He came into the kitchen saying that he was hungry. Fiona and Anna hadn’t 
ordered extra pizza for Joe but they offered him last two pieces. Joe said to them, 
(explicit) ‘That’s very kind of you guys.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think Joe was hungry?  
Q2. To what extent do you think Joe felt appreciated? 
Q3. To what extent do you think Jo meant what he said? 
4. [being late] 
Jack had a reputation for being late. When Samantha and Jack arranged to meet up one evening, 
he said to her, ‘I’ll come at five. You won’t have to wait.’ That evening, Jack did not show up 
on time. It was nearly 5:45 pm. when he finally arrived. Samantha said to him, 
(tacit) ‘I’m so glad I didn’t have to wait.’ 
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Q1. To what extent do you think Jack did what he said he would do?  
Q2. To what extent do you think Samantha was annoyed? 
Q3. To what extent do you think Samantha meant what she said? 
5. [breaking the news] 
Daniel, Tracy and Diana were flat mates who had lived together for long time and they had 
become good friends. Unknown to Diana, Daniel and Tracy had fallen in love and decided to 
move out. When they broke the news, Diana was furious. She screamed at them to just get out. 
Tracy said to them, 
(explicit) ‘I’m sorry this is so upsetting for you.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think Diana was angry? 
Q2. To what extent do you think Tracy was sorry to disappoint Diana?  
Q3. To what extent do you think Tracy meant what she said? 
6. [in the corridor] 
When Michel was waiting for Professor Miller in the corridor, his friend Rebecca passed by and 
found Michel. She rushed up to him and started telling him her terrible news. While she was 
still talking, Michel saw Professor Miller coming out to the corridor. Michel broke away from 
Rebecca and rushed off. She called after him, 
(explicit) ‘You are so rude.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think Michel was polite to Rebecca?  
Q2. To what extent do you think Rebecca felt neglected? 
Q3. To what extent do you think Rebecca meant what she said? 
7. [drunk customer] 
Alice and Richard were working in a local supermarket. A man came in and started complaining 
loudly about some broken eggs he had bought in the shop earlier. He shouted at Alice in front of 
some other customers, stamping his foot and shaking his fist. When he had finally gone, Alice 
said to Richard, 
(tacit) ‘He looks a bit upset.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think the man was seriously complaining?  
Q2. To what extent do you think Alice was uncomfortable with the man?  
Q3. To what extent do you think Alice meant what she said? 
8. [job interview] 
Mary had a job interview. As usual, she prepared very thoroughly for it. She was very nervous 
during the interview and felt it didn’t go very well. When she came home, her husband John 
asked how it went. Mary said that she didn’t think she would get the job. John said, 
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(explicit) ‘These things often go better than you think.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think Mary was feeling that the interview went bad?  
Q2. To what extent do you think John sympathised with Mary? 
Q3. To what extent do you think John meant what he said? 
9. [dinner table] 
Helen invited Andrew to her dinner party. When he arrived at her house, he found a lot of 
familiar faces there. When Andrew was called to the dinner table, however, Helen introduced 
the girl he had never met before and asked him if he minded sitting next to her. He said to 
Helen, 
(explicit) ‘I’d be happy to.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think there were guests that Andrew had met before?  
Q2. To what extent do you think Andrew was happy to sit next to the girl? 
Q3. To what extent do you think Andrew meant what he said? 
10. [World Cup] 
Before the World Cup between England and Japan, English newspapers suggested that England 
would give Japan a beating. From the start, however, Japan controlled the match and it was 
obvious to the world that England was no match for them. In the end, Japan won 8-0. A fan of 
the Japanese team said, 
(tacit) ‘England gave Japan quite a beating.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think it was a well-matched game? 
Q2. To what extent do you think the Japanese fan was happy with the result of the match? 
Q3. To what extent do you think the Japanese fan meant what s/he said? 
11. [one of those days] 
Mark had one of those days when everything went wrong. He poured coffee into his cereal 
instead of his mug, put on different coloured socks, and missed his train to work. When he 
finally arrived at his office 45 minutes late, he fell over and hurt himself quite badly. He said to 
himself, 
(tacit) ‘I’m having a good day.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think Mark was having a good day? 
Q2. To what extent do you think Mark was content with how his day had been going?  
Q3. To what extent do you think Mark meant what he said?  
12. [promotion] 
David called home and said to his wife Cathy that he had been promoted to executive manager 
and offered a better salary. Cathy knew how hard he had been working for this. She prepared a 
lavish meal with a bottle of champagne and decorated a room with flowers and candles. When 
he saw everything, David said, 
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(explicit) ‘I really appreciate you going to this trouble.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think Cathy wanted to congratulate David on his promotion?  
Q2. To what extent do you think David was grateful to Cathy? 
Q3. To what extent do you think David meant what he said? 
13. [old drunk man] 
Jenny and Will were walking down the street. When they were passing the ‘Red Lion’ pub, an 
old drunk man came out onto the street and started shouting at passers-by. He stank of alcohol 
and could hardly stand up. People on the street seemed annoyed and they walked quickly past 
him to avoid getting involved. Will said, 
(tacit) ‘He’s a little intoxicated.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think the old man was drunk? 
Q2. To what extent do you think Will believes the old man was drunk?  
Q3. To what extent do you think Will meant what he said? 
14. [packing] 
Nick was packing in preparation for moving house. It was tiring work. He had been working 
non-stop since early morning and there was still much left to be packed. Rachel dropped by and 
said she had afternoon free. She hung out in the room watching Nick working hard. Nick said to 
Rachel, 
(explicit) ‘I wish you would help instead of just watching.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think Rachel helped Nick? 
Q2. To what extent do you think Nick was upset with Rachel?  
Q3. To what extent do you think Nick meant what he said? 
15. [new film] 
Steve asked Kate to go to see a new film. Kate was not interested in the movie but Steve said 
that ‘Some critics said it should have won an Oscar.’ Kate agreed to see the film. The film was 
terrible. Kate and Steve both thought it was a complete waste of money. Kate said, 
(tacit) ‘It really should have won an Oscar.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think the movie was bad? 
Q2. To what extent do you think Kate was disappointed with the movie?  
Q3. To what extent do you think Kate meant what she said? 
16. [mobile phone] 
Peter heard someone’s mobile phone ringing while he was studying in the library. A girl sitting 
next to him answered and started chatting loudly. Peter shushed her, but she kept talking. Five 
minutes later, she was still chatting. Unable to put up with her, Peter screamed piercingly and 
went quiet. He turned to her and said, 
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(tacit) ‘I am so sorry. I do hope I didn’t disturb you.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think the girl’s chatting was disturbing other people in the library? 
Q2. To what extent do you think Peter was annoyed with the girl’s chatting over the mobile 
phone? 
Q3. To what extent do you think Peter meant what he said? 
17. [tennis match] 
James and his friend Patricia went to watch Scott in a tennis match. Before the match, Scott was 
confident he would win. But he played terribly and lost in straight sets. At the end of the match, 
Scott came up to James and Patricia and said, ‘I almost won.’ Patricia turned to James and said, 
(tacit) ‘He almost won.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think Scott played well? 
Q2. To what extent do you think Patricia believed that Scott was very close to winning the 
match? 
Q3. To what extent do you think Patricia meant what she said? 
18. [help] 
Tom and his friend Paul were walking towards the canteen chatting about their exam results. 
Tom slipped as they were going down the staircase. He tried to hold on to the handrail but lost 
his balance and fell down. Meanwhile, Paul just watched him and did nothing to help. Tom was 
embarrassed and said, 
(explicit) ‘Couldn’t you have done something for me?’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think Paul helped Tom? 
Q2. To what extent do you think Tom was embarrassed?  
Q3. To what extent do you think Tom meant what he said? 
19. [cold night] 
One night, Harry and Emma went to the cinema. When they came out, they found the 
temperature had dropped dramatically. It was freezing cold and snowing heavily. On the way to 
the tube station, Harry and Emma felt their limbs becoming stiff with cold. When they finally 
arrived at the station after a long walk, Harry said,  
(tacit) ‘It’s a bit chilly tonight.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think it was cold that night?  
Q2. To what extent do you think Harry found it cold? 
Q3. To what extent do you think Harry meant what he said? 
20. [French lesson] 
Mathew had an audition for a play in which he had to speak French. He asked his French friend 
Isabelle to help him with his accent. Isabelle found the script quite simple and thought it 
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wouldn’t take long to help him. When Mathew started to read, however, Isabelle saw him 
struggling. She said, 
(explicit) ‘It’s going to take longer than I thought.’ 
Q1. To what extent do you think Mathew was speaking French fluently? 
Q2. To what extent do you think Isabelle was worried about how long it would take to help 
Mathew? 
Q3. To what extent do you think Isabelle meant what she said? 
 
	
(At the end of Irony understanding questionnaire)
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Appendix C 
Example stories and task questions in Pilot study 
Context-controlled stories 
[(a) – ironical scenario] 
Mary was going to fly back to New York for her Christmas holiday. Her suitcase was filled with 
lots of Christmas presents and books that she planned to read during the holiday. When she got 
to Heathrow Airport, she realised that the lifts to the departure floor were out of order. She had 
no choice but to take the stairs instead. While she was dragging her heavy suitcase up the 
crowded stairway, a young guy bumped against her and passed without saying anything.  Mary 
said, 
“That was nice.” 
[(a)’ - literal scenario] 
Mary was going to fly back to New York for her Christmas holiday. Her suitcase was filled with 
lots of Christmas presents and books that she planned to read during the holiday. When she got 
to Heathrow Airport, she realised that the lifts to the departure floor were out of order. She had 
no choice but to take the stairs instead. While she was dragging her heavy suitcase up the 
crowded stairway, a young guy offered to help her with her suitcase and brought it up the stairs 
for her.  Mary said, 
“That was nice.” 
-Test Question for (a) and (a)’ 
Does Mary believe that the young guy’s behaviour was nice? 
YES / NO / I DON’T KNOW 
[(b) – ironical scenario] 
When Peter was at home in his flat, there was a buzz at the front door. As soon as he opened the 
door, Mary jumped inside speaking rather loudly, “You won’t believe what happened to me at 
work...”  Peter closed the door behind her and said, 
“Would you like to come in?” 
[(b)’ - literal scenario] 
When Peter was at home in his flat, there was a buzz at the front door. When he opened the 
door, he found Mary standing there. She looked upset and she grumbled, “You won’t believe 
what happened to me at work...”  Peter said, 
“Would you like to come in?” 
 -Test Question for (b) and (b)’ 
Does Peter want Mary to come into his house?  
YES / NO / I DON’T KNOW 
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[(c) - ironical scenario] 
Mary was trying to sell her house. The day before the first viewing, she asked her flat mate John 
to clean up his room. “Morning John. I’m just off to work. Some people are coming to view the 
house tomorrow. I’ve already cleaned up the living room and the kitchen. Could you do your 
bedroom before you leave tonight?”  John said, “No problem, Mary. I’ll make sure I do it before 
I go.” When Mary came back home, she found that John hadn’t cleaned up his room and that he 
had even made more of a mess in the living room.   Mary said, 
“This is great!” 
[(c)’ - literal scenario] 
Mary was trying to sell her house. The day before the first viewing, she asked her flat mate John 
to clean up his room. “Morning John. I’m just off to work. Some people are coming to view the 
house tomorrow. I’ve already cleaned up the living room and the kitchen. Could you do your 
bedroom before you leave tonight?”  John said, “No problem, Mary. I’ll make sure I do it before 
I go.” When Mary came back home, she found that John had not only cleaned up his room but 
also left some fresh flowers on the living room table.   Mary said, 
“This is great!” 
-Test Question for (c) and (c)’ 
Does Mary believe that what John has done is great?  
YES / NO / I DON’T KNOW 
Neutral context stories  
[(d)-neutral context] 
Peter worked in the customer service centre of a mobile phone company. Because of a recent 
recession, the company was trying to reduce costs and switch off the central heating system 
unless the temperature was below zero. There were lots of complaints from staff. As a staff 
representative, Peter arranged a meeting with managers and several of his colleagues.   After the 
meeting, Peter said to his colleagues, 
“That went well.” 
-Test Question for (d) 
Does Peter believe that the meeting went well?  
YES / NO / I DON’T KNOW  
[(e)-neutral context] 
Mary and Peter were having a dinner party at the weekend. Mary was in charge of the dinner 
menu and Peter drew up the guest list. When Peter showed Mary the list of people he was 
planning to invite to the party, Mary said, 
“I see, you’re inviting Susie. That’s an excellent idea, darling!” 
-Test Question for (e) 
Does Mary believe that inviting Susie to the party is an excellent idea? 
YES / NO / I DON’T KNOW 
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Distracter stories  
[(f)-distracter] 
Mary was 16-weeks pregnant. One day, Mary went to the hospital to have an ultrasound scan 
and overall check-up. After the check-up was finished, the doctor said to Mary, “All your tests 
look fine. Are you interested in knowing the sex of the baby? I could tell you whether it’s a boy 
or a girl right now.”   Mary said to the doctor, 
“Thank you, doctor, but I’d rather wait.” 
-Test Question for (f) 
Does Mary want to know the sex of the baby before the baby is born? 
YES / NO / I DON’T KNOW 
[(g)-distracter] 
Mary and Peter were having dinner together and telling each other how the day had been. Mary 
said, “I had a very strange conversation with John today. He was talking about money, rules, 
and friends. It didn’t make any sense. I have absolutely no idea what he was talking about.”   
Peter said, 
“I had the exact same conversation with him yesterday, too!” 
-Test Question for (g) 
Does Peter mean that he had the same conversation with John?  
YES/ NO / I DON’T KNOW 
[(h)-distracter] 
One Sunday afternoon, Susie was about to cook dinner for her husband Mark and herself. She 
hadn’t decided what to cook. Looking inside the fridge, she asked Mark, “What do you fancy 
for dinner?”   Mark said, 
“Anything will do for me, Susie.”  
- Test Question for (h) 
Does Mark have any preference for dinner?  
YES / NO / I DON’T KNOW 
[(j)-distracter] 
Alice was in her room with her friend, Peter. She was picking a dress she would wear for a 
business meeting the next day. She showed him a blue dress and a brown suit and asked, 
“Which one do you think I should wear tomorrow?” Peter looked at her in the mirror and said, 
“I think the blue outfit looks better on you.” 
-Test Question for (j) 
Does Peter believe that the blue outfit looks better on Alice?  
YES / NO / I DON’T KNOW 
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[(k)-distracter] 
Susie and Peter were in a pub having a drink. When Peter realised that Susie’s glass was empty, 
he asked, “Do you want the same again?”  Susie shook her head and said, 
“No, thanks. I’ve got to go soon.” 
-Test Question for (k) 
Does Susie want another drink?  
YES / NO / I DON’T KNOW 
[(l)-distracter] 
Kate and Mark had just started to learn Russian together. Neither of them had ever learned it 
before. After the first class, they stopped for a coffee. Kate said to Mark, “It was tough, wasn’t 
it?”  Mark nodded and said, 
“It was really tough.” 
-Test Question for (l) 
Does Mark believe that the first class was tough?  
YES / NO / I DON’T KNOW 
[(m)-distracter] 
Mary was running a bath, when her husband Peter came back from work. He saw her and asked, 
“Are you having a bath now?” Mary said, “Yeah, can you wait for dinner until I’ve finished?”   
Peter said, 
“No, problem.” 
- Test Question for (m) 
Can Peter wait for dinner until Mary’s finished a bath?  
YES / NO / I DON’T KNOW 
[(n)-distracter] 
John and Susie were taking down Christmas decorations in the living room. John took the tree 
outside and Susie was putting the lights and ornaments into a box. When he came back inside, 
she asked, “Where should I put these boxes, John? All the cupboards are nearly full.” He said, 
“How about the attic? I’m sure there is some space in there.” Susie said, 
“OK, I’ll put these boxes in there.” 
-Test Question for (n) 
Does Susie mean that she will put the boxes in the attic later?  
YES / NO / I DON’T KNOW 
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Sample of answer sheet used in Pilot study 
	
264		
Appendix D 
Sample of informed consent sheet in pilot study 
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Appendix E 
Listening Comprehension Test (LCT) 
Trial 1 [party invitation] 
Story: 
Alice and Tom were planning a dinner party at the weekend. Tom said to Alice that it’d be 
nice to invite Susie to the party. 
Neutral context: 
Susie was working with Tom so he knew she’d be free at the weekend.  
Consistent context: 
Susie was their friend who always looked after their daughter at weekends.  
Inconsistent context: 
Susie was a difficult neighbour who often got drunk and picked fights at parties.  
Filler: 
Tom started checking on the Internet for recipes of tiramisu which he planned to make for the 
party. 
Target utterance: 
Alice said to Tom, 
“It’s a great idea to invite Susie.” 
Question 1 
Was Alice happy to invite Susie to their party?  
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Alice meant by the final utterance? 
Alice meant that    
(1) Tom was stupid to think Susie would be delighted to come to the party. 
(2) Tom was crazy to think it would be a nice idea to invite Susie to the party. 
(3) Susie will be annoyed. 
(4) it would be lovely if Susie could come to the party. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Tom and Alice were planning a dinner party. 
(2) Tom was planning not to invite Susie. 
(3) Tom and Alice were planning to go out for dinner. 
(4) Tom was planning to make roast chicken for the party 
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Trial 2 [promise] 
Story: 
Samantha was worried that Jack would be late as usual for the meeting that she was 
organising. Jack told Samantha that he would not be late this time.  
Neutral context: 
Jack brought his new iPad to the meeting.  
Consistent context: 
Jack arrived just before the meeting started.  
Inconsistent context: 
Jack was 30 minutes late for the meeting. 
Filler: 
When Jack came into the room, Samantha was sitting in the front row with her friends. 
Target utterance: Samantha said, 
"He is right on time." 
Question 1 
Was Samantha pleased with Jack when he arrived? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Samantha meant by the final utterance? 
Samantha meant that    
(1) she was pleased that Jack wasn't late for the meeting. 
(2) it was about time that Jack had attended the meeting. 
(3) she was pleased that Jack knew exactly what the meeting was about. 
(4) it was silly of her to believe that Jack would come on time. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Samantha promised Jack that she wouldn’t be late for the meeting. 
(2) Jack promised Samantha that he would present his work at the meeting. 
(3) Jack promised Samantha that she would have time for presentation at the meeting. 
(4) Jack promised Samantha that he wouldn’t be late for the meeting. 
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Trial 3 [party preparation] 
Story: 
Cathy had to prepare for a dinner party all by herself because her husband David had gone 
golfing. All his guests enjoyed the dinner and they thanked David for his hospitality when they 
left. 
Neutral context: 
David said to them, "Thanks for coming. Have a safe trip home.”  
Consistent context: 
David said to them,” In fact, it’s my wife we have to thank."  
Inconsistent context: 
David said to them, "My pleasure. It was no big deal." 
Filler: 
David came back to the kitchen and asked Cathy for a bottle of water. 
Target utterance: 
Cathy, giving him the water, said, 
"All right, it was no big deal." 
Question 1 
Was Cathy content with what David said to the guests at the end of the party? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Cathy meant by the final utterance? 
Cathy meant that    
(1) Cathy was pleased that David appreciated her effort for preparing the dinner party. 
(2) it was not a big deal for the guests to have a safe trip home. 
(3) it was a big deal for her to give him water. 
(4) David should have thanked her for all the trouble she went to for the dinner party. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) David left Cathy alone to prepare for the dinner party. 
(2) David went to the cinema. 
(3) David helped Cathy to prepare for the dinner party. 
(4) David did shopping for the dinner party. 
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Trial 4 [broken leg] 
Story: 
Mike had broken his leg and came back home in pain. When his flat mate Emma came back, 
he lay down on a sofa in the living room.  
Neutral context: 
Emma asked Mike if he wanted to eat some Chinese food with her.  
Consistent context: 
Emma asked Mike what had happened to his leg and how he was feeling.  
Inconsistent context: 
Emma started telling Mike how stressful her day was and went back to her room. 
Filler: 
Mike sat down on the sofa and took out a bottle of water to take with his painkiller. 
Target utterance:  
Mike said, 
"My leg is really hurting. Thanks for asking." 
Question 1 
Was Mike grateful for Emma's attitude to his broken leg? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Mike meant by the final utterance? 
Mike meant that    
(1) it was nice of Emma to notice his injury and ask him how he was. 
(2) it was nice of Emma to offer him Chinese food. 
(3) Emma was inconsiderate not to care what had happened to him. 
(4) he was feeling better after lying down on a sofa. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Mike asked Emma how her day had been. 
(2) When Emma saw Mike in the living room, he was in pain because of the injury to 
his leg. 
(3) Emma had injured her leg and she was eating Chinese food in the living room. 
(4) Mike bought Chinese food and asked Emma if she wanted some. 
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Trial 5 [country of gentlemen] 
Story: 
Peter had always told Mana that England was a country of gentlemen and he was very proud 
of being English. One day, Mana was taking her heavy suitcase up the crowded stairs at a tube 
station in London. 
Neutral context: 
A young man came down the stairs and stopped a member of staff.  
Consistent context: 
A young man offered to bring her suitcase up the stairs for her.  
Inconsistent context: 
A young man pushed her aside angrily and carried on without saying anything. 
Filler: 
Mana got to the top of the stairs and looked for the main exit to the high street. 
Target utterance:  
Mana said, 
"England is the country of true gentlemen." 
Question 1 
Was Mana impressed by the young man on the stairs? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Mana meant by the final utterance? 
Mana meant that    
(1) it was true that English men were very tall. 
(2) it was absurd of Peter to believe that England was a country of gentlemen. 
(3) it was true that London tube stations were crowded. 
(4) Peter was right about English men. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Peter told Mana that England is a multicultural country. 
(2) Peter told Mana that England was a country of gentlemen. 
(3) Peter told Mana that tube stations in London were very crowded. 
(4) Mana found a tube station crowded and saw many men in hurry. 
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Trial 6 [union meeting] 
Story: 
Ben was a union representative at work. Before a union meeting with his employers, other 
members of the union told Ben that the meeting would go well. 
Neutral context: 
The meeting was about a pay rise.  
Consistent context: 
The employers agreed the pay rise.  
Inconsistent context: 
The employers refused the pay rise. 
Filler: 
Ben went back to his desk and started to write a report of the meeting. 
Target utterance: 
Ben said, 
"That went well." 
Question 1 
Did Ben feel satisfied with the outcome of the meeting? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Ben meant by the final utterance? 
Ben meant that    
(1) the meeting was attended by 15 union members and 3 employers. 
(2) the meeting was successful. 
(3) it was stupid of him to expect that the meeting would go well as the other members had 
said. 
(4) his report would be good. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Before the meeting, the other members of the union said that it would not go well. 
(2) Before the meeting, Ben said that it would go well. 
(3) Before the meeting, the employers of the company assured Ben that it would go well. 
(4) Before the meeting, the other members of the union said that it would go well. 
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Trial 7 [pizza delivery] 
Story: 
Nick was on the phone when his pizza was delivered. His flat mate Simon answered the door 
and brought it into the kitchen.  
Neutral context: 
When Nick went into the kitchen, he saw Simon talking with another flat mate Johnny. 
Consistent context: 
When Nick went into the kitchen, he saw Simon setting a table for him.  
Inconsistent context: 
When Nick went into the kitchen, he saw that Simon had finished all the pizza. 
Filler: 
Nick looked at his watch and saw how long he had been talking on the phone. 
Target utterance:  
Nick said, 
"That's very kind of you, Simon." 
Question 1 
Was Nick pleased with Simon? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Nick meant by the final utterance? 
Nick meant that    
(1) it was unbelievable that Simon had eaten the pizza without asking him. 
(2) it was rude of Simon not to finish the pizza. 
(3) it was nice of Simon to take care of the pizza for him. 
(4) it was nice of Simon not to ask him who he was talking to on the phone. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Simon answered the door and brought Nick’s pizza into the kitchen. 
(2) Simon took the pizza into his bedroom. 
(3) Nick brought his pizza into the living room. 
(4) Simon ignored the pizza delivery. 
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Trial 8 [tell-the-truth] 
Story: 
Tracey really liked Daniel but she didn’t know that her best friend Anna was dating him. 
When Daniel and Anna decided to tell Tracey the truth, Daniel told Anna that Tracey would 
understand. 
Neutral context: 
Anna broke the news that she and Daniel were in love when she saw Tracey at the university. 
Consistent context: 
Tracey was calm and wished her luck when Anna broke the news that she and Daniel were in 
love. 
Inconsistent context: 
Tracey became really angry and shouted at Anna when Anna broke the news that she and 
Daniel were in love. 
Filler: 
Anna left Tracey alone and called Daniel to tell him how Tracey had taken the news. 
Target utterance:  
Anna said, 
"I'm really pleased she took it so well." 
Question 1 
Was Anna relieved to see how Tracey reacted to the news? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Anna meant by the final utterance? 
Anna meant that    
(1) she was pleased that Tracey was not upset about the news. 
(2) she was relieved to know that Tracey was not interested in Daniel. 
(3) it was stupid of her to believe what Daniel had said. 
(4) it was good that Tracey was very well. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Anna thought that Daniel should tell Tracey that he did not like her. 
(2) Daniel thought that Tracey would be very upset if she knew he and Anna were in love. 
(3) Tracey knew that Anna and Daniel were in love. 
(4) Anna and Daniel decided to tell Tracey that they were in love. 
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Trial 9 [clean-up] 
Story: 
Mary asked her flat mate William to clean up his room before their landlord’s visit the next 
day. William said that he would clean up before he went to work.  
Neutral context: 
When Mary came back home, with her coat still on she went straight into William’s room to 
check whether he had cleaned up as he promised. 
Consistent context: 
When Mary came back home, she found that William had not only cleaned up his room but 
had also left some fresh flowers on the living room table. 
Inconsistent context: 
When Mary came back home, she found that William hadn’t cleaned up his room and that he 
had even made more of a mess in the living room. 
Filler: 
Mary went into the kitchen to clean up and then made a cup of tea. 
Target utterance:  
Mary said, 
"He’s done a great job." 
Question 1 
Was Mary grateful to William for what he did?  
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Mary meant by the final utterance? 
Mary meant that    
(1) it was unbelievable that William didn't keep his promise to clean up his room. 
(2) it was great that William made their house look better for the landlord's visit. 
(3) it was great that William had a broken chair repaired. 
(4) it was great that William was not home yet. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) William promised Mary that he wouldn't be at home while their landlord was visiting. 
(2) William promised Mary that he would clean up the bathroom. 
(3) William promised Mary that he would clean up his room. 
(4) William promised Mary that he would put some flowers in the living room. 
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Trial 10 [new girlfriend] 
Story: 
Jack really wanted to impress his new girlfriend Penny and asked his best friends Marcus and 
Thomas to tell her how great he was. Marcus said that Jack could trust him as his best friend.  
Neutral context: 
When Jack introduced Penny to them, Marcus told her about the economy.  
Consistent context: 
When Jack introduced Penny to them, Marcus told her how nice Jack was.  
Inconsistent context: 
When Jack introduced Penny to them, Marcus told her embarrassing stories about Jack. 
Filler: 
After Penny left, Marcus started watching TV in the living room and Jack went upstairs with 
Thomas. 
Target utterance: 
Jack said to Thomas, 
“Super! That's what friends are for." 
Question 1 
Was Jack thankful for what Marcus told to Penny? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Jack meant by the final utterance? 
Jack meant that    
(1) friends should always tell the truth in order to help each other. 
(2) it was nice of Marcus to lie to Penny. 
(3) it was very helpful of Marcus to behave like his best friend in front of Penny. 
(4) it was silly of him to believe that Marcus would behave like his best friend. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Jack asked his friends Marcus and Thomas to tell his new girlfriend about their jobs. 
(2) Jack asked his friends Marcus and Thomas not to talk to his new girlfriend. 
(3) Jack asked his friends Marcus and Thomas to tell his new girlfriend good things about 
himself. 
(4) Jack asked his friends Marcus and Thomas to tell his new girlfriend about the economy. 
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Trial 11 [ballet competition] 
Story: 
When Jenny was nervously waiting for her turn at the international ballet competition, her 
friend Hugo told her that Jenny’s competitor Kate was a very good dancer. 
Neutral context: 
Kate danced first and began with a solo.  
Consistent context: 
Kate danced first and was very graceful.  
Inconsistent context: 
Kate danced first and fell down several times. 
Filler: 
After her performance, Jenny saw Kate’s coach came to talk to her and they spoke for a while. 
Target utterance:  
Jenny said, 
"She is pretty good." 
Question 1 
Did Jenny think that her competitor is a good dancer? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Jenny meant by the final utterance? 
Jenny meant that    
(1) it was silly of Hugo to suggest that her competitor was a good dancer. 
(2) it made her more nervous to see how good her competitor was. 
(3) her competitor was a good person. 
(4) she was disappointed to see her competitor dance badly. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Hugo told Jenny how long her competitor had practiced ballet for. 
(2) Hugo told Jenny that there was no need to worry about her competitor. 
(3) Hugo told Jenny that her competitor was a good dancer. 
(4) Hugo told Jenny that her competitor wouldn’t be able to dance because of her injury. 
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Trial 12 [cold weather] 
Story: 
Harry showed up to go hiking with big thick clothes including a woolly hat and gloves. He 
told Nancy that the weather would be getting colder in the afternoon.  
Neutral context: 
After lunch, they packed up and carried on hiking.  
Consistent context: 
After lunch, the temperature suddenly dropped and it started snowing.  
Inconsistent context: 
After lunch, it stayed really warm and it felt like spring. 
Filler: 
They decided to take a short break and sat down on the bench near a lake. 
Target utterance:  
Nancy said, 
"It did turn out so cold." 
Question 1 
Did the weather in the afternoon surprise Nancy?  
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Nancy meant by the final utterance? 
Nancy meant that    
(1) it was silly of her not to put on thick clothes. 
(2) it was surprising that the weather had changed so quickly. 
(3) it was surprising that the weather stayed good in the afternoon. 
(4) it was silly of Harry to believe the weather forecast and put on too much clothes. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Harry put on warm clothes believing that the weather would get colder. 
(2) Harry put on light clothes even though the weather forecast had predicted cold weather. 
(3) Nancy put on warm clothes believing that the weather would get colder. 
(4) Harry believed that the weather would get warmer. 
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Trial 13 [British Airways] 
Story: 
Steven told his wife Rachel that he had booked a flight with British Airways for their summer 
holiday. Rachel became upset and told him that she always had problems with British 
Airways. 
Neutral context: 
At the airport they noticed that they were in good time and checked in their luggage at the 
counter straight away. 
Consistent context: 
At the check-in counter they were told that their flight was cancelled and there were no more 
flights on that day. 
Inconsistent context: 
At the check-in counter they were told that their seats had been selected for a free upgrade to 
the First Class service. 
Filler: 
They went to one of the cafes in the airport and had a cup of coffee. 
Target utterance:  
Steven said, 
"British Airways always gives you a problem." 
Question 1 
Did Steven agree with Rachel that the service of British Airways was not good? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Steven meant by the final utterance? 
Steven meant that    
(1) Steven felt threatened by British Airways. 
(2) it was silly that Rachel had overreacted to travelling with British Airways. 
(3) it was very difficult to book the flight with British Airways. 
(4) travelling with British Airways was a mistake as Rachel had said. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Steven did not book a flight with British Airways. 
(2) Steven did not want to travel with British Airways. 
(3) Rachel had always travelled with British Airways. 
(4) Rachel had had bad experiences with British Airways before. 
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Trial 14 [tennis match prediction] 
Story: 
Ted and Dean were watching the men’s singles final at Wimbledon. Dean said to Ted that the 
match would be difficult for Federer because Federer had twisted his wrist. 
Neutral context: 
During the match the score remained even and it wasn't clear who was going to win until the 
final set. 
Consistent context: 
During the match it was clear to everyone that Federer was struggling and he lost in straight 
sets. 
Inconsistent context: 
During the match there was no sign that Federer had a problem and he won in straight sets. 
Filler: 
People became very excited and gave the winner lots of applause at the end of the match. 
Target utterance:  
Ted said, 
"It was really hard for Federer to win." 
Question 1 
Did Ted think that it was amazing that Dean had predicted the outcome of the match 
correctly? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Ted meant by the final utterance? 
Ted meant that    
(1) it was not fair that Federer had to play with his injury. 
(2) it was silly of Dean to predict that it would be hard for Federer to win. 
(3) it was surprising that Federer lost the match as Dean had predicted. 
(4) Federer should not have given up the match.	
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Dean told Ted that Federer would win the match in spite of his injury. 
(2) Dean told Ted that Federer would win the match in straight sets. 
(3) Dean told Ted that Federer would not win the match easily because of his injured wrist. 
(4) Dean told Ted that he doubted Federer would lose the match. 
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Trial 15 [conference presentation] 
Story: 
Todd was nervous just before his first presentation at an international conference. While he 
was waiting outside the room, the woman who organised the conference came up to him. 
Neutral context: 
She said that Todd would have 20 minutes for his talk and 10 minutes for questions. 
Consistent context: 
She said that Todd shouldn’t worry about anything because people were very friendly and 
supportive. 
Inconsistent context: 
She said that there were about three hundred people waiting inside for his talk.  
Filler: 
Todd looked at a clock on the wall and opened his notebook one more time. 
Target utterance:  
Todd said, 
"That's good to know." 
Question 1 
Did Todd think that the organizer helped him to relax? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Todd meant by the final utterance? 
Todd meant that    
(1) the organizer had helped to make him feel better. 
(2) it was a relief that his friends were inside. 
(3) the organizer had not helped to make him feel better. 
(4) it was a relief to know exactly how much longer he would have to wait. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Todd became bored while waiting to present his work at the conference. 
(2) Todd was waiting nervously to present his work at the conference. 
(3) Todd asked the organizer of the conference when he could go inside. 
(4) Todd was practicing his presentation while he was waiting. 
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Trial 16 [Justin Bieber concert] 
Story: 
Jennifer and Lilly invited Fiona to go to Justin Bieber’s concert with them. Fiona told them 
that she really loved Justin Bieber. 
Neutral context: 
As soon as they saw Justin Bieber on the stage, all the girls started screaming out loud and 
tried to reach him. 
Consistent context: 
As soon as they saw Justin Bieber on the stage, Fiona pushed over Jennifer and moved 
forward to reach the front row. 
Inconsistent context: 
As soon as they saw Justin Bieber on the stage, Fiona said she was tired and went home for an 
early bed. 
Filler: 
A girl next to them became over-excited and fell down on the floor. 
Target utterance:  
Jennifer said to Lilly, 
"Fiona really loves Justin Bieber." 
Question 1 
Did Jennifer think Fiona was a big fan of Justin Bieber? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Jenifer meant by the final utterance? 
Jennifer meant that    
(1) it was not surprising that Fiona went home early. 
(2) she did not believe that Fiona really loved Justin Bieber. 
(3) it was nice of Fiona to come to the concert with them. 
(4) she understood very well how much Fiona loved Justin Bieber. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) When she was invited to go to a Justin Bieber concert Fiona said that it would be a waste 
of time. 
(2) When she was invited to go to a Justin Bieber concert Fiona said that she was not 
interested. 
(3) When she was invited to go to a Justin Bieber concert Fiona said that she really loved 
him. 
(4) When she was invited to go to a Justin Bieber concert Fiona said that she had already 
bought a ticket for herself. 
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Trial 17 [hard life in London] 
Story: 
Helen always complained that her life in London was really hard. Her father Philip became 
worried about his daughter and decided to visit her.  
Neutral context: 
Philip learned that Helen lived in North London and travelled to her office in Central London. 
Consistent context: 
Philip learned that Helen worked until late every night and worked at some weekends too. 
Inconsistent context: 
Philip learned that Helen always ate out at expensive restaurants and went to theatres every 
weekend. 
Filler: 
Philip went to Helen's office and they went out for dinner after Helen finished her work. 
Target utterance:  
Philip said, 
"I see how hard your London life is." 
Question 1 
Was Philip showing his sympathy towards Helen? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Philip meant by the final utterance? 
Philip meant that    
(1) it was true that Helen’s life in London was really hard and it was worrying. 
(2) it seemed that London was a nice place for tourists to visit. 
(3) Helen's life in London did not seem as hard as she said. 
(4) it seemed that London was a boring place to live. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Helen told her father Philip that her job was not well paid. 
(2) Helen told her father Philip that her boss was not nice to her. 
(3) Helen told her father Philip that her flat was too small. 
(4) Helen told her father Philip that her life in London was hard. 
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Trial 18 [Nobel Prize] 
Story: 
Bob was confident that he was an excellent scientist who deserved a Nobel Prize. 
Neutral context: 
One evening Bob’s friend Jim saw Bob still working hard in his laboratory trying to prove that 
his theory was right. 
Consistent context: 
One evening Bob’s friend Jim saw Bob hearing the exciting news from university that he had 
been nominated for a Nobel Prize. 
Inconsistent context: 
One evening Bob’s friend Jim heard the news that Bob got an electric shock from using a hair 
dryer in the bathroom. 
Filler: 
Jim went to the pub in a hurry and told the news to his friends. 
Target utterance:  
Jim said, 
"Bob is being nominated for a Nobel Prize." 
Question 1 
Did Jim believe that Bob deserved a Nobel Prize? 
YES/NO 
Question 2 
Which one of the following best describes what Jim meant by the final utterance? 
Jim meant that    
(1) it may be possible that Bob would won a Nobel Prize one day. 
(2) it was great that Bob was nominated for a Nobel Prize. 
(3) it was likely that Bob would be on TV soon. 
(4) it was silly of Bob to believe that he was intelligent enough to deserve a Nobel Prize. 
Question 3 
What happened in this story? 
(1) Bob was a very confident scientist and he believed that he would be awarded a Nobel 
Prize one day. 
(2) Bob’s scientific work was not great and he would never receive a Nobel Prize. 
(3) Bob was a very confident scientist and he looked down on his colleagues. 
(4) Bob was not confident in his scientific work and his colleagues always helped his work. 
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Appendix F 
	
Sample of Information sheet 
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Sample of Consent form	
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Sample of Debriefing sheet	
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Appendix G 
 
Processing speed 
	
Data analysis: Response trend in processing speed was examined by measuring reaction 
times (RTs) to the ‘attitude’ question. Reaction time was measured in milliseconds from 
the onset of each stimulus (the target utterance) to the instant when the response button 
was pressed. The data were screened for outliners before statistical analysis. Outliners 
were defined as being (a) a score less than 2000 milliseconds cut-off point (a miss) 
or/and (b) a score exceeding two standard deviations above the mean score of each 
participant under a given condition. These outliners were replaced with the participant’s 
mean score. Given that this experiment did not investigate response accuracy but 
response trend, a speed-accuracy trade-off analysis was not performed. 
Distributions of response time were found not to meet underlying assumptions (i.e., 
normality, homogeneity of variance) according to the Mauchly’s tests of sphericity. 
Several attempts (trimming outliners, using robust method, i.e., bootstrapping) were 
made in order to reduce the biases, but reaction times scores remained abnormal. This 
raises the possibility that these statistical analyses may be prone to Type I error. Hence, 
lower-bound estimates correcting the df were used in all analyses. Non-parametric tests 
were used along with parametric tests for analyses of the data. 
Results: Figure App.G.1 below illustrates mean reaction time to the ‘attitude’ question 
under each of the nine conditions comparing mean scores of immediate echoing 
variables with those of distant echoing variables. The top plot displays mean RTs of JP- 
participants and the bottom plot displays those of BNS-participants. 
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Figure App. G.1: Mean of reaction times in comparison between immediate echoing and distant 
echoing 
Descriptive analysis showed that in most cases, it took not only JP-participants but also 
BNS-participants longer to respond when the source of echo was distant from a target 
utterance than it had appeared just before a target utterance. The effect of the location of 
the source of echo on reaction time was analysed using Wilcoxon tests. The results 
revealed that a difference in reaction time between immediate echoing and distant 
echoing in reaction time was not statistically significant under each condition for both 
JP-participant group and BNS-participant group (the details are shown in Table App.G. 
1 below). 
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Table App.G.1: Results of the Wilcoxon tests 
 
This suggests that processing speed of both JP-participants and BNS-participants were 
not significantly affected by the location of the source of echo. Although a difference 
between two locations was not statistically significant, small-medium sized effect (1% – 
9% of variance) was found in some comparisons. This trend was more evident in the 
reaction time of BNS-participants. 
Next, the effects of the tone variable and the context variable on processing speed 
were analysed as within-group variables. A factorial repeated-measures ANOVA was 
performed. The data for immediate echoing and those for distant echoing were analysed 
separately. First, the results of conditions with the immediate echoing variable. Figure 
App.G.2 illustrates each participant-group’s mean reaction time of each interaction with 
immediate echoing variable: the top plot displays the mean reaction time of JP- 
participants and the bottom plot displays that of BNS-participants. 
The results showed no significant main effects of either types of context relation F 
(2, 60) = 1.30, n.s., or tone F (2, 60) = .288, n.s., on JP-participants’ reaction times. 
Contrasts revealed that, while a difference across the types of context was not 
statistically significant, reaction time under inconsistent context was shorter than 
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consistent context, F (1, 30) = 2.25, n.s., r = .26, and neutral context, F (1, 30) = .47, 
n.s., r = .12. Reaction time under neutral context was shorter than consistent context, F 
(1, 30) = 1.02, n.s., r = .18. Contrasts across the types of tone revealed that reaction time 
under basic tone was longer than deadpan tone, F (1, 30) = .07, n.s., r = .05, and 
exaggerated tone, F (1, 30) = .63, n.s., r = .14. They also revealed that reaction time 
under deadpan tone was longer than exaggerated tone, F (1, 30) = .23, n.s., r = .09. 
None of these differences was significant. 
With regards to BNS-participants’ reaction times, there was no significant main 
effect of either the types of context relation, F (2, 46) = .63, n.s., or the types of tone 
either F (2, 46) = 2.47, n.s. Contrasts revealed that reaction time under consistent 
context was shorter than inconsistent context, F (1, 23) = .48, n.s., r = .14, and neutral 
context, F (1, 23) = 1.83, n.s., r = .27. Reaction time under inconsistent context was 
shorter than neutral context, F (1, 23) = .13, n.s., r = .08. A difference across the types 
of context was not statistically significant. On the other hand, reaction time under 
exaggerated tone was significantly longer than deadpan tone, F (1, 23) = 4.68, p = .041, 
r = .41. It was also longer than basic tone, F (1, 23) = .69, n.s., r = .17, but the 
difference was not significant. Contrasts also revealed that reaction time under basic 
tone was longer than deadpan tone, F (1, 23) = 2.26, n.s., r = .30. 
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Figure App.G.2: Mean reaction time of interaction between tone, context relation and participant 
group (immediate echoing) 
There was no significant interaction effect between the types of context relation and 
the types of tone either on JP-participants’ reaction time, F (4.120) = .58, n.s., or on 
those of BNS-participants, F (4, 92) = 1.01, n.s. Contrasts were performed comparing 
all context relation types with each other and all tone types with each other. No 
statistically significant interaction effect was found (the detailed results of each contrast 
are shown in Table App.G.2). 
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Table App.G.2: Contrasts of context by tone interaction (immediate echoing) 
 
Next, the results of conditions with distant echoing variable. The top plot of Figure 
App.G.3 displays means RTs of JP-participants and the bottom plot displays those of 
BNS- participants. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been 
violated for the interaction effect of context by tone on reaction time of JP-participants, 𝑥2 (9) = 17.08, p = .048. Therefore, following suggestions of Barcikowski and Robey 
(1984), Girden (1992), and Huynh and Feldt (1976) (cited in Field 2013:548), degrees 
of freedom were corrected by using Huynh-Feld estimates of sphericity (𝜀 = .78 for the 
interaction effect of context by tone). The results showed that there was a significant 
main effect of the types of context relation F (2, 60) = 4.28, p = .018 on JP-participants’ 
reaction times. Contrasts revealed that reaction time under inconsistent context was 
significantly shorter than consistent context, F (1, 30) = 6.76, p = .014, r = .43, and 
neutral context, F (1, 30) = 7.81, p = .009, r = .45. Reaction time under neutral context 
was shorter than consistent context, F (1, 30) = .01, n.s., r = .02. A difference in 
reaction time between neutral context and consistent context was not statistically 
significant. In addition, there was no significant main effect of the types of tone on JP- 
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participants’ reaction times, F (2, 60) = .26, n.s. Contrasts revealed that a difference 
across the types of tone was not statistically significant: reaction time under deadpan 
tone was shorter than basic tone, F (1, 30) = .002, n.s., r = .01 and exaggerated tone, F 
(1, 30) = .39, n.s., r = .11, and reaction time under basic tone was shorter longer than 
exaggerated tone, F (1, 30) = .49, n.s., r = .13. 
With regard to reaction times of BNS-participants, Mauchly’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effect of tone on reaction time 
of BNS-participants, 𝑥2 (2) = 13.19, p = .001, and the interaction effect of context by 
tone, 𝑥2 (9) = 17.44, p = .043. Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected by using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (𝜀 = .69 for the main effect of tone and 𝜀 
= .75 for the interaction effect of context by tone). 
There was no significant main effect of either the types of context relation, F (2, 
46) = .56, n.s., or the types of tone either F (1.38, 31.71) = .11, n.s. Contrasts revealed 
that reaction time under consistent context was shorter than inconsistent context, F (1, 
23) = 1.31, n.s., r = .23, and neutral context, F (1, 23) = .08, n.s., r = .06. Reaction time 
under neutral context was shorter than inconsistent context, F (1, 23) = .45, n.s., r = .27. 
A difference across the types of tone was not statistically significant. Contrasts across 
the types of tone revealed that reaction time under deadpan tone was shorter than basic 
tone, F (1, 23) = .15, n.s., r = .08, and exaggerated tone, F (1, 23) = .13, n.s., r = .07. 
They also revealed that reaction time under basic tone was shorter than exaggerated 
tone, F (1, 23) = .25, n.s., r = .10. These differences were not statistically significant. 
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Figure App.G.3: Mean reaction time of interaction between tone, context relation and participant 
group (distant echoing) 
In terms of the effects of context by tone interaction, there was no significant 
interaction effect either on JP-participants’ reaction time, F (3.53, 105.97) = .38, n.s., or 
on those of BNS-participants, F (3.02.69.45) = 1.03, n.s. Contrasts were performed 
comparing all context relation types with each other and all tone types with each other. 
Like the results of conditions with the immediate echoing variable, these contrasts 
revealed no significant interaction (the detailed results of each contrast are shown in 
Table App.G.3). 
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Table App.G.3: Contrasts of context by tone interaction (distant echoing) 
 
These results indicate that processing speed of both participant groups was not 
affected by interaction of tone with context. However, as shown in Table App.G.2 and 
Table App.G.3, some contrasts yielded small to medium effect sizes. Despite the results 
showing no statistical significance in any comparisons of condition between two 
locations for both participant-groups, effect size that each comparison yielded cannot be 
ignored. It is possible, however, that significant interaction effects may be found if the 
sample size were increased. 
Considering that the underlying assumptions of ANOVA were violated, non- 
parametric tests were also performed in order to back up these findings. Friedman’s 
ANOVA and Wilcoxon tests as a follow-up were used. The results of these tests 
confirmed the observations from parametric test (factorial repeated-measures ANOVA): 
JP-participants’ reaction time was not significantly different depending on the 
interaction of context by tone, 𝑥2 (8) = 14.03, p = .85 under conditions with immediate 
echoing variable, and 𝑥2 (8) = 9,61, p = .29 under conditions with distant echoing 
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variable. BNS-participants’ reaction time was not significantly different either 
depending on the interaction of context by tone, 𝑥2 (8) = 13.33, p = .10 under conditions 
with immediate echoing variable, and 𝑥2 (8) =5.13, p = .74 under conditions with distant 
echoing variable. 
Discussion: It was hypothesised that reaction time of JP-participants under conditions 
with immediate echoing would be faster than distant echoing, and that processing speed 
of JP-participants would be affected by the location of the source of echo more strongly 
than BNS-participants. The results partially confirmed this hypothesis. Although a 
difference in reaction time between conditions with immediate echoing and those with 
distant echoing was not statistically significant, the location of the source of echo 
affected not only JP-participants’ processing speed but also BNS-participants’ 
processing speed under most of the conditions. It was also hypothesised that both 
participant groups would respond faster under the influence of deadpan tone with 
inconsistent context relation whereas it would take longer for them to respond under the 
influence of deadpan tone with consistent context relation and the influence of basic 
tone with inconsistent context relation. Only the reaction times (of both participant 
groups) under conditions with distant echoing confirmed this hypothesis. Reaction time 
of BNS-participants under conditions with immediate echoing showed the opposite 
trend: reaction time was longer when inconsistent context relation interacts with 
deadpan tone than when it interacts with basic tone. Reaction time of BNS-participants 
was faster when consistent context relation interacts with deadpan tone than when it 
interacts with basic tone. 
It was hypothesised that the types of tone would affect JP-participants’ 
interpretation processes more strongly than the types of context. The results appeared to 
be the opposite: trends of processing speed of JP-participants indicated that JP- 
participants seemed to be affected by the types of context relation more strongly than 
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the types of tone. This was more evident when the source of echo was distant from the 
target utterance. 
One of the limitations of the analyses of processing speed is that comparisons 
between different conditions in the same example could not be performed due to the 
small number of participants; hence increasing the sample size might provide more 
convincing results. This hindered the present study from finding systematic patterns 
depending on participant-group, the types of tone, the types of context relation, or the 
interaction of tone with context relation. Considering the complexities of the 
experimental design and the different degree of complexities across 18 examples, this 
experiment cannot completely exclude the possibility that these findings occurred by 
chance. However, the trend indicates that Japanese speakers might be able to integrate 
information from different sources (i.e., integrating the information from the speaker’s 
tone with explicatures) and that they might also be capable to do so even when 
additional processing load (by a filler sentence) is imposed. 
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